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Abstract
The thesis seeks to understand why in the post-Cold War era regionalism in Southeastern 
Europe has been largely ineffective. First, it examines the theoretical preconditions for the 
emergence of the phenomenon. It finds that two separate levels of analysis exist for 
explaining its sources, namely the international - divided between rationalist and reflectivist 
schools - and the domestic. Rationalist schools of thought are arranged along a continuum 
between those focusing on sources of regionalism external (systemic) and internal to 
regions. Subsequently, the research project provides a historical perspective of cooperation 
in Southeastern Europe. It finds that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, regional 
schemes did not succeed because of the fragmentory role of external factors - namely the 
intervention in descending order of the Great Powers, Germany and the Superpowers - as 
well as Balkan nationalisms.
The thesis argues that in the post-Cold War era regional cooperation initiatives, such as the 
SEECP, the Royaumont Procès, SECI and the SPSEE, have also been ineffective due to 
external and domestic reasons. On the one hand, while promoting regional cooperation 
initiatives in Southeastern Europe, the EU has at the same time pursued differentiated 
integration and bilateral policies with Balkan states which further contribute to the region's 
heterogeneity and generate centrifugal dynamics. On the other hand, intra-national 
prerequisites for the emergence of regionalism are absent. These include the retarded state 
and nation-building process of Yugoslav successor states and entities as well as domestic 
economic conditions related to the delayed transition in the 1990s.
The methodology of the study places the thesis within the literature of International 
Relations. Systemic theories and domestic political and economic reasons are used to 
explain the failure of regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe. The research project 
introduces the concept of 'stateness' - generally referred to in the démocratisation 
literature as state and nation-building or 'third transition'- to the domestic explanations for 
the lack of regionalism as well as a neo-liberal aspect to the traditional state-centric 
external approach to regional cooperation.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Background
The post Cold War period has seen a resurgence of regionalism in international relations 
manifested through increased inter-state agreements at regional levels as well as a 
thickening in transnational flows of interaction in various sectors such as migration. 
Compared to the first wave of regionalism which, prompted by the emergence of the 
European Communities in the 1950s and decolonisation in the 1960s, focused on issues of 
economic integration in the industrialised and non-industrialised world as well as security 
alliances, the contemporary phenomenon labelled "new regionalism" is more diverse and 
multi-dimensional in character emphasising social, political and cultural aspects and 
involving many actors and levels of cooperation in 'high' and 'low’ politics (Hettne and 
Sodenbaum, 1998),  ^ In addition, 'new regionalism' accommodates diverse groups of states 
with different sizes, governmental systems and economies and often bridges the 
North-South divide (Gruegel and Hout, 1999).^
The 'new regionalist' trend has been particularly evident in Europe, previously the main area 
of bipolar competition andhas taken primarily two forms. On the one hand, already 
established regional organisations such as the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe
* According to Hettne and Sodenbaun "New Regionalism is a comprehensive multifaceted and 
multidimensional process, implying the change o f a particular region from relative heterogeneity to 
increased homogeneity with regard to a number o f dimensions, the most important being culture, security, 
economic policies and political regimes" (Hettne and Sodenbaum, 1998: 7).
 ^Regionalism is generally viewed as a phenomenon through which all the parties involved are expected to 
benefit although increased interdependence may eventually lead to a conflict o f interests.
(CoE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are undergoing processes of deepening and widening 
(enlargement). On the other hand, new sub-regional organisations have emerged in various 
geographical parts of Europe stretching from the Baltic to the Black seas, such as the 
Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Central 
European Initiative (CEI) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Their aim is to 
contribute to security and confidence-building among neighbouring countries, foster 
cooperation in various areas, ease post-communist transition as well as prepare countries of 
integration into the European Union (Cottey, 1999).
As a conflict-prone zone. Southeastern Europe is a test case for "new regionalism'.^ In the 
post-Cold War era, the Balkans have witnessed the emergence of a series of regional 
initiatives. These include the Royaumont Process for Good Neighbourly Relations which 
accompanied the signing the of Dayton Accords in 1995, the Conference on Stability, 
Security and Cooperation of Southeastern Europe (CSSC) and the Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI) established 1996, the Multinational Peace Force for 
South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) created in 1998 as well as the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe (SPSEE) and the South East European Initiative (SEEI) founded in the 
aftermath of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999."^  Overlapping the region 
but not exclusive to it are also the CEI and the BSEC, both established in 1992 (Kearns and 
Hook, 1999).
Regional schemes have been promoted in the Balkans as a means of achieving stability and
 ^The term Southeastern - or South East - Europe will be used interchangeably with the term Balkans to 
imply the wider geographical region comprising of contemporary Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and Turkey.
 ^ The Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation (CSSC) was renamed Southeast European 
Cooperation Process (SEECP) in 1999.
10
security through the strengthening of good-neighbourly relations and the resolution of 
bilateral disputes, the introduction of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), 
military cooperation and the harmonisation of defense and crisis-management related 
issues. They have been viewed as a way of addressing common problems, such as transport 
and energy infrastructure, the environment, post-war reconstruction, cross-border 
cooperation and organised crime. They have also been considered as a means for promoting 
the creation of vibrant market economies, regional economic cooperation, democratic 
political processes, unimpeded contact among citizens as well as the protection of minorities 
(SECI, 1996, EU, 1998; SPSEE, 1999; SEEI, 1999; SEECP, 2000)/
Despite some significant achievements such as increasing levels of societal interaction in 
the region by bringing together state and non-state actors and putting in place various 
infrastructure projects and a series of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), the 
effectiveness of regionalism, however, has been questioned as stability and security was 
not achieved in the region in the post-1995 era. To illustrate, violence broke out in Kosovo 
in June 1999 and March 2004 and FYR Macedonia in March 2001.^ In addition, the further 
fragmentation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was only prevented by outside 
mediation which promoted the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 
March 2003. Finally, regional schemes have not addressed Southeastern Europe’s 
developmental problems as indicated by the continued macro and micro-economic
 ^ To illustrate, according to the Charter o f Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and 
Cooperation in Southeastern Europe, the primary objective o f SEECP is ‘Vo strengthen good-neighbourly 
relations among all states in the region so as to transform it into an area o f  peace, security, stability and 
cooperation'' (SEECP, 2000: Article I). Similarly, the Stability Pact stressed the aim o f “strengthening 
countries in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect fo r  human rights and economic prosperity in 
order to achieve stability in the whole region." (SPSEE, 1999: 2).
 ^Although the constitutional name o f the country is ‘Republic o f Macedonia’, it was the term Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that was officially used as a basis for its entry into the UN in 
1993 subsequent to Greece’s objections to its use. This thesis will use the term FYR Macedonia to refer to 
the country in question.
11
instability and lack of sustainable growth of many countries undergoing transition to market 
economies, especially in the Western Balkans. ^
1.2 Research Question and Structure of the Thesis
In light of the faith attributed to regionalism in the Balkans as a solution to instability and 
conflict, the purpose of the research project is to examine why in the post-Cold War era 
the promotion of regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe has been largely 
ineffective. It is an important project for PhD research given that subregional cooperation 
has been identified by the international community as one of its main policies towards the 
region and significant funds have been allocated to its implementation. To illustrate, at the 
regional conferences of March 2000 and October 2001 donors pledged Euros 2,4 and 3 
billion respectively for the Stability Pact’s projects in the region (Anastasakis and Bojicic, 
2002: 24). Moreover, the question merits doctoral attention as regionalism is considered to 
be a major facilitator for Southeastern Europe's European and Euro-Atlantic integration 
(SECI, 1996 1; SPSEE, 1999: Objectives; SEECP, 2001: Article 1).*
In order to understand why regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe has been largely 
ineffective since 1995, it is first essential to examine the theoretical preconditions for the 
emergence of regionalism. The study of regionalism has a rich theoretical tradition behind it 
and a significant emergent debate as a dominant topic in the literature of International 
Relations and International Political Economy. Chapter 2, therefore, will be devoted to
 ^Western Balkans is an appellation given by the EU to the region comprising Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro.
* To illustrate, in the Charter o f Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation signed in 
Bucharest in February 2000 it is stated that " We aim to create a Southeastern Europe whose future lies in 
peace, democracy, economic prosperity and full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures" 
(SEECP, Article 1).
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surveying the literature on international regions and regionalism in order to define key 
concepts and approaches to be employed in the study/
It will find that two separate levels of analysis exist for explaining the sources of 
contemporary regionalism, namely the international, which is divided between rationalist 
and reflectivist theories, and the domestic (Hurrell, 1995). Rationalist theories are divided 
between those focusing on sources internal or external to the region. The internal dynamics 
approach, which is dominated by integration theories, regards bureaucracies, political 
parties or trade unions as principal regional actors and links them to regional institutions 
(Mitrany, 1975; Haas, 1964; Deutsch, 1957; Keohane, 1989). The external approach 
concentrates on the role of states and firms in influencing regionalism (Waltz, 1979; Ohmae, 
1995). Reflectivist theories are characterised by emphasising the interpretation of actors as 
central to the process of cooperation (Wendt, 1994; Adler, 1997). Finally, domestic 
explanations of regionalism include intra-national structural factors such as types of regimes 
(‘democratic peace’ thesis), state coherence, sustained economic dynamics as well as 
state-society relations related to policy preferences (Doyle, 1997; Milward, 1992; Hettne, 
2001; Busch and Milner, 1994).
 ^The only previous attempt to evaluate Balkan cooperation attempts in a theoretically informed manner was 
made in Small States and Security in the Balkans (Braun, 1983). Braun found that during the Cold War 
'concordisation', a concept that he identified with a pre-pluralistic security community, was 'perceptible but 
barely so' among Balkan states (Braun, 1983: 273). All other literature on the subject has been limited to 
historical accounts o f specific schemes, both prior and subsequent to the emergence o f regional theory. 
These include The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente (Kemer and Howard, 1936), Balkan Union: 
A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe (Geshkoff, 1940), Balkan Federation (Stavrianos, 1964), The 
Balkan Triangle: Birth and Decline o f an Alliance across Ideological Boundaries (latrides, 1968), Balkan 
Cooperation and European Integration (Wallden, 1994) and, more recently. Regional Initiatives in 
Southeastern Europe (Lopandic, 2001).
An important body o f literature regarding international factors that generate regionalism operates between 
the internal and external schools of thought. For the ‘security complex’ theory regional developments are 
determined by the internal dynamics o f the subsystem in conjunction with external influence (Buzan, 1983).
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Subsequently, the thesis will provide a historical perspective of regionalism in the Balkans. 
Chapter 3 will examine the regional projects that were undertaken in the region in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and analyse the reasons for their failure. The analysis will 
provide a picture of the region prior to the initiation of the post-Cold War region-building 
process and consider the legacy of cooperation attempts and lessons from the past. It will be 
argued that all efforts towards regional cooperation, such as the Balkan Leagues in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Balkan Conferences of the 1930s, the Balkan 
Federation, the Balkan Pact, Balkan Arms Limitation Talks (BALTs) and the second series 
of Balkan Conferences during the Cold War, failed to produce concrete results because of 
the fragmentary role of Balkan nationalisms as well as the external factor, namely the Great 
Powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Germany in the interwar period 
and the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In Chapter 4 the thesis will consider how regionalism has been promoted in Southeastern 
Europe in the post-Cold War era. It will assess regional cooperation initiatives in which 
Balkan states have been included, such as the Royaumont Process, SECI, SEECP, the 
SPSEE, the MPFSEE and the SEEI, in order to evaluate what modalities of regionalism they 
have introduced and what has been their impact. It will find that most initiatives promoted 
a combination of activities on a high political level (inter-state) and concrete measures that 
are of programmatic use for the economies and societies of member-states. They have 
significant organisational flexibility and accommodate countries at different levels of 
development.
In addition, they have created special legal instruments, the Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoUs), which provide 'soft law' cooperation in the region. Finally, regional schemes 
encourage cooperation among business and other professional circles, facilitate
14
communication and create networks of contacts and institutions. As such, they are 
contributing to the emergence of a regional identity and creating a sense of a Southeastern 
European community through increased societal interaction. In addition, the use of the term 
Southeastern Europe denotes a political project aimed at overcoming the pejorative legacy 
of the term Balkans (Bechev, 2001: 1).^ *
Most initiatives, however, have not had significant visible results. To illustrate, despite 
putting in place a series of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and certain 
infrastructure schemes as well as promoting a Regional Electricity Market in the Balkans, 
the Stability Pact has not addressed the region’s developmental problems and has acted 
merely as a forum for the registration of projects (Gligorov, 2002). Similarly, although it 
saw the signing of a Charter on Good-Neighbourly Relations and an Action Plan for 
Regional Economic Cooperation, the SEECP has not yet gone beyond the declaratory stage 
of its development (Tsardanides, 2001).
The absence of practical results of regional initiatives has been attributed to the lack of 
institutionalisation that would provide enforcement mechanisms. In addition, most schemes 
do not have independent budgets and depend primarily on loans from International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs). Moreover, their activities are often duplicated as they have 
lacked coordination and competition has often emerged, such as between the SECI and the 
Stability Pact. Finally, some Southeastern European countries such as Croatia showed 
scepticism towards joining regional schemes for fear that they would endanger their 
prospects for European integration.
" The word Balkan derives from the Turkish word for 'wooded mountain'. It is also the common Turkish 
name for the largest mountain range in the peninsula traversing Bulgaria (Stara Planina in Bulgarian or 
Aimos in Greek). The use o f the term to imply the Balkan peninsula was introduced in 1808 by the German 
geographer Johann August Zeune and arose from the misconception that this mountain range stretched from 
the Black Sea to the Adriatic coast. In the twentieth century, the word acquired a pejorative connotation and 
‘balkanisation’ came to imply fragmentation and war (Glenny, 1999: xxxii).
15
Chapter 5 will turn to an examination of EU bilateral policies in Southeastern Europe in 
order to assess other external/systemic pressures on the region. It will find that while 
promoting subregional cooperation in the Balkans, the European Union has at the same time 
been pursuing differentiated integration with Southeastern European countries, thus 
exacerbating dividing lines in the region and promoting centrifugal dynamics. To 
illustrate, Bulgaria and Romania have been involved in the enlargement process since the 
mid-1990s through Europe Agreements (EAs) and their participation in the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) which granted them gradual liberalisation of 
trade and a means through which to adopt the rules and regulations of the Internal Market 
They have also been included in the Pan-European Free Trade Area since 2001. Having 
signed Accession Treaties with Brussels in 2003, Bulgaria and Romania are expected to 
join the Union in 2007.
The Western Balkan countries, however, were not granted EAs but have since 1999 been 
included in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) which includes asymmetrical 
trade liberalisation, financial assistance and support for démocratisation as well as 
cooperation in fields such as justice and home affairs. Within the Western Balkans, 
differentiation is even greater with countries such as Croatia and FYR Macedonia having 
applied for membership and signed Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with 
the EU in 2001, Albania negotiating one and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro 
not yet been deemed capable to do so.'^
In addition, as envisaged by the 1964 Association Agreement (AA), Turkey established a
Similarly, although NATO promoted regional cooperation through the SEEI and the MPFSEE, its 
contractual relations with Balkan countries were based on the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Agreements. In 
addition, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro have not yet signed the PfP Framework Document 
with the Alliance, thus further contributing to heterogeneity in the security sector.
In addition, Croatia was granted candidacy by the EU during the Brussels European Council o f June 2004.
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Customs Union with the EU in 1996 which embodies elements of both deep and shallow 
integration and is introducing the country to Single Market legislation/"^ After the 1999 
Helsinki European Council, Ankara was also granted candidate status by the European 
Union. Until 2003, however, the country had not been deemed capable to initiate 
negotiations for membership given its lack of progress in satisfying the political criteria set 
out at the European Council of Copenhagen in 1993.
Chapters 6 of the thesis will consider the domestic political obstacles that obstruct the 
emergence of regionalism in Southeastern Europe. It will be argued that the problem of 
'stateness' in the former Yugoslav space has been a key obstacle to regional cooperation 
given that in the theoretical chapter it will be shown that the viability of states is a key 
prerequisite for successful regionalism (Linz and Stepan, 1996).^  ^The process of state and 
nation-building in the Yugoslav success states and entities in the post-Cold War era, namely 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the FRY -  succeeded by Serbia and Montenegro - Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia, will therefore be examined.
Created by the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, in the post-Cold War era 
Bosnia-Herzegovina faced the greatest difficulties of all Yugoslav successor states in state 
and nation-building. Set up as an 'asymmetric confederation ' between two entities - the 
Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Serb Republic (RS) - and three nations 
(Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks), the central state lacked effective sovereignty and common
Turkey has abolished its tariff protection against the EU for all industrial and processed agricultural goods 
(shallow integration) and is also addressing new regulatory areas such as competition policy, technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs) and other administrative procedures (deep integration) (EU, 1996). Agriculture and 
the free movement o f labour and capital, however, are not yet covered by the agreements that guide 
EU-Turkish relations.
In the words o f Linz and Stepan, "when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries 
o f a political community's state or about who has the right o f citizenship in that state, there is what we call 
a 'stateness'problem" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 16).
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decisions were difficult to implement. In addition, although internationally recognised, de 
facto the country has not been sovereign as it does not have the monopoly of legitimate 
coercion such as a Bosnian army. The structure of the state is constitutionally guaranteed by 
the presence of an international army - the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) - and at the few joint 
institutions foreign nationals are appointed. The expansion of the role of the international 
community after 1997 disempowered Bosnian institutions, weakening state and entity 
bodies central to unifying society and reinforcing ethnic identification (Chandler, 2001).
In the post-Cold War era, Croatia’s 'stateness' problem was primarily related to the status 
of the Serbian minority which constituted 12% of the country's population before the war 
but was expelled from Krajina during the final stages of the campaign against Belgrade in 
the summer of 1995. Although since the death of Franjo Tudjman in 1999 Croatia has 
undertaken a transition towards liberal democracy and was even granted candidate status 
by the European Commission in June 2004, the country still needs to resolve border issues 
with neighbouring countries and accelerate efforts to facilitate the return of refugees from 
Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as recognised by the Commission’s Opinion 
of April 2004 (COM, 2004: 257).
Comprising of Serbia and Montenegro, in the post-Cold War era uncertainty also 
characterised the FRY the constitutional structure of which was challenged by Montenegrin 
separatism. Under international pressure, Belgrade and Podgorica formed the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro in March 2003. It is a loose federal structure in which the 
common state has limited competences such as foreign affairs. The implementation of the 
Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, however, has been 
problematic and many delays have become apparent in important reforms such as the Law 
on Minorities. In addition, the Constitutional Charter has not clarified Kosovo's unresolved
18
status problem or the relationship between the federal and republican levels within Serbia.
Kosovo's ‘stateness’ problem is related to irréconciliable differences over its territorial 
boundaries and status. A full protectorate of the international community since the end of 
the bombing campaign against FRY in June 1999, Kosovo's unresolved status problem 
derives from the fact that UN Resolution 1299, upon which the United Nations Interim 
Administration’s mandate is based, introduced an intentional ambiguity supporting both 
"substantial self-government for Kosovo and the territorial integrity o f the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia" (UN Resolution 1299: Annex 1).^ ® In addition, although the 
Constitutional Framework for Self-Government in Kosovo signed in May 2001 granted 
many competences to local institutions in an attempt to create a self-administered political 
unit, it has failed to make power-sharing a reality or provide for a revision of the status 
problem. Meanwhile, incidents against minorities continue to take place culminating in the 
renewed outbreak of violence in March 2004.
Finally, in the post Cold War era, FYR Macedonia's 'stateness' problem has been related to 
the strained inter-ethnic relations between the Slav Macedonian majority and the ethnic 
Albanian minority as a result of the exclusionary citizenship and language policies of the 
Macedonian state. Although subsequent to the outbreak of violence in the country in 2001 
a Framework Agreement was signed promoting collective and individual rights for the 
Albanian minority, many of the components of the accord have not been applied and the 
institutions of state have been granted strong ethnic qualifiers. Extremists, therefore, 
continue to pose a security threat and an ongoing partition between the two communities is 
also taking place despite the fact that the country applied for EU membership in March 
2004.
Resolution 1244 has subsequently applied fully to Serbia-Montenegro as the successor state o f the FRY.
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Chapter 7 will analyse the domestic economic obstacles to regionalism in Southeastern 
Europe in the post-Cold War era in light of the fact that sustained economic dynamics will 
be argued in Chapter 2 to be a precondition for successful regionalism. It will find that in the 
post-Cold War era, Southeastern European countries were laggards in transition to market 
economies and confronted serious developmental problems that sapped growth. At the heart 
of the most significant economic problems were a number of internal constraints and 
inappropriate international assistance policies. Internal constraints included large trade, 
current account and fiscal deficits, high unemployment, deindustrialisation, incomplete 
privatisation and inadequate restructuring (Gligorov et al, 1999). In addition, international 
assistance policies often worsened external indebtedness by covering imbalances through 
capital inflows, such as foreign aid, granted on commercial terms (Kekic, 2001).^^
Since the late 1990s, however, many countries in the region experienced a ‘second 
transition’ after pursuing structural change with more vigour. Whereas Bulgaria and 
Romania accelerated their economic reforms subsequent to being invited to initiate 
negotiations for EU membership at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, 
Croatia also saw improved growth rates and micro-economic stability after the change of 
regime in 2000 and the signing of an SAA with the EU in March 2001. Other Balkan 
countries, however, still face significant macro-economic imbalances in their budgets, 
balance of payments and labour markets as well as a protracted process of 
deindustrialisation (BeCel: 2003: 5). To illustrate, in 2003 Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia-Montenegro were still at slightly above half their 1989 GDP levels (EBRD, 2004: 
16).
Finally, Chapter 8 will briefly recapitulate issues raised in the analysis and explore its policy
The problem o f dependency has been most acute in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kekic, 2001).
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implications at greater length. It will question the available instruments for regional 
cooperation in the direction of strengthening the European perspective of the Western 
Balkan countries. It will argue that regional cooperation in the Balkans has no chance of 
being effective unless the problems of delayed nation-building and economic 
underdevelopment are addressed and the relationship between regionalism and integration 
is clarified. Involving the EU in the state and nation-building processes and economic 
transition of the Western Balkans as well as making regionalism endogenous to integration 
are, therefore, the best ways to enhance the effects of cooperation initiatives in the region.
1.3 Methodology
The thesis uses a single 'case study' approach with an emphasis on historical detail. Research 
is hypothesis-generating (Yin 1984). The hypothesis put forward is that in the post-Cold 
W ar era the lack of effective regionalism in Southeastern Europe can be attributed to 
the insufficient mechanisms of implementation of primarily externally-driven 
regional schemes and the systemic pressures on the region by the EU's bilateral 
policies with Balkan countries as well as the delayed state-making of most Yugoslav 
successor states and the economic vulnerability of the region. External (systemic) and 
domestic theories will be used to explain the failure of regionalism in Southeastern Europe 
in the post-Cold War era.^ *
Apart from the insufficient mechanisms of implementation of regional schemes, the 
external obstacles to regional cooperation refer primarily to the impact of the differentiated 
European integration process which created distortions and divisions and generated
The external/domestic hypothesis is confirmed by the historical analysis in Chapter 3 which demonstrates 
that regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe was constrained by the interplay between Great and 
Super-Power policies towards the region as well as Balkan nationalisms throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries,
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centrifugal dynamics in the region. Given that in the period under consideration the 
European (EU) system has been essentially inter-govemmental with respect to its external 
relations, a liberal institutionalist approach is more appropriate for explaining the external 
constraints on regionalism in Southeastern Europe. Systemic explanations for the lack of 
regionalism will therefore introduce the region (EU) as an actor that can influence the 
emergence of the phenomenon thus contributing a neo-liberal aspect to the more traditional 
state-centric (neo-realist) outside-in approach to regional cooperation.
Domestic obstacles to Balkan regional cooperation are primarily related to the retarded state 
and nation-building of former Yugoslav countries and the delayed transition to market 
economies. The thesis will contribute to the theory of regionalism the concept of'stateness' 
which subsequent to the collapse of communism has been added to the literature on 
démocratisation with respect to developments in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states 
(Kopecky and Mudde, 2000).^° Tools from the inter-disciplinary study of nationalism will 
thus be introduced into the theory of contemporary regionalism and link state coherence and 
the 'democratic peace' thesis as prerequisites for its emergence (Hurrell, 1995). In addition, 
the economic analysis will highlight the importance of a stable macro-economic and 
institutional environment for the success of regionalism. Finally, the interaction between 
political and economic factors specific to the Balkan region will contribute to bridging the 
gap between the disciplines of International Relations and International Political Economy.
For the empirical base, the thesis depends upon the extensive examination of primary
Similarly, the Euro-Atlantic system (NATO) has obstructed the emergence of effective regional 
cooperation in the security sector in the Balkans.
State coherence has been identified as a precondition for successful regionalism by Andrew Hurrell who 
defines it in terms o f effective state apparatuses and mutually accepted boundaries (Hurrell, 1995: 67). 
Mohammed Ayoob referred to the problem of the simultaneity o f state-making and démocratisation which 
he saw as a major source of insecurity in the developing world. He did not, however, go as far as to name the 
phenomenon (Ayoob, 1995: 57).
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sources, such as official documents of regional initiatives (Royaumont Process, SECI, 
SEECP, SPSEE, MPFSEE, SEEI), the European Union (Commission and Council of the 
European Communities) and other organisations (NATO). Southeast European 
constitutions, such as The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(GFAP), the Constitution of Croatia, The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro, Resolution 1244 (1999), the Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-Government of Kosovo and the Framework Agreement will also be examined. For the 
economic analysis, data will primarily be drawn from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
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Chapter 2
The Concept of Regionalism
2.1 Introduction
In order to understand why subregional cooperation has been largely ineffective in 
Southeastern Europe in the post-Gold War era, it is necessary to examine what are the 
preconditions for its emergence. Chapter 2 will therefore survey the variety of theoretical 
approaches for the study of regional systems. It will present the two separate levels of 
analysis that exist for explaining the emergence of regionalism within the disciplines of 
International Relations and International Political Economy, namely the international and 
the domestic. Within the international level of analysis, both rationalist and reflectivist 
schools of thought will be considered.^' In addition, a concise historical overview of the 
study and praxis of regionalism as well as some definitions of the terminology used in the 
thesis will also be provided.
2.2 Historical Overview of the Study and Praxis of Regionalism
Regionalism as a basis of world order emerged in the aftermath of World War The rise
of the Cold War and the loss of confidence in the United Nations (UN) as a collective
Rationalist schools o f thought are arranged along a continuum between those focusing on sources of  
regionalism internal or external to the region. The inside-out/outside-in continuum was first introduced by 
Iver Neuman in 1994 and subsequently taken up by Andrew Hurrell and Stephen Calleya (Neuman, 1994; 
Hurrell, 1995; Calleya, 1997).
Some authors view the protectionist policies of the 1930s as the first wave of regionalism (Hettne and 
Soddenbaum, 1998: 20).
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security system initially led to the formation of regional defence systems such as the NATO 
in 1948 and increased interest in security regionalism. Prompted by the emergence of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the first wave of regionalism was confined 
predominantly to the highly institutionalised forms of international cooperation among 
countries in the industrialised world. Decolonisation, however, paved the way for regional 
economic integration and regional security agreements in the developing world. Here 
regional integration was a response to the economic predominance by industrial powers 
whereas security groupings tried to cope with the emergence of newly independent states.^^
Security regionalism became a major topic of academic discussion immediately after the 
war but was quickly replaced by research on regional integration which flourished in the 
1950s and 1960s. It concentrated on different versions of integration theory and was 
advanced by such scholars as Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas (Deutsch, 1957, Haas, 1964). 
The study of regionalism, nevertheless, declined in the 1970s as the pace of European 
integration slowed down and expectations of economic development through regional 
economic integration were not realised in the developing world. To the waning of 
integration theory also contributed the influence of the realist and later neo-realist 
approaches to international relations which emphasised the interaction between the state and 
the international system disregarding the region as a level of analysis (Morgenthau, 1948; 
Waltz, 1979). This trend was reinforced by Cold War considerations which divided the 
world in two blocs, thus undermining regional dynamics. In the 1970s interest in the field 
declined mainly because difficulties arose in locating empirical proof of regionalism 
(Puchala, 1971).
To illustrate, the 1960s saw the emergence o f economic groups such as the Association for South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central American Common 
Market (CACM), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Andean Pact. Security initiatives include 
schemes such as the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact established in 1954 
and 1955 respectively.
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The revival of the integrationist momentum started in the mid-1980s in response to 
increased social and economic interdependence in Europe manifested by the signing of the 
Single European Act in 1986 and to the emergence of a regionalist projects in North 
America - such as the 1988 US-Canada free trade agreement - which was interpreted as a 
shift away from US support of multilateralism. Economic regionalism once again spread to 
the developing world with the reinvigoration of long-stagnant regional schemes in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia-Pacific. '^^ Post-Cold War international relations consist of 
different patterns of regionalism simultaneously taking place and carried forward by the 
most powerful states (Calleya, 2000). It is seen by many analysts as a response to 
globalisation often emerging at the North-South interface (Wyatt-Walter, 1995).
The 'new regionalist' trend has been particularly evident in Europe, previously the main area 
of bipolar competition and has taken primarily two forms. On the one hand, already 
established regional organisations such as the EU, the CoE, NATO and the OSCE are 
undergoing processes of deepening and widening (enlargement).^^ On the other hand, new 
sub-regional organisations have emerged in various geographical parts of Europe stretching 
from the Baltic to the Black seas, such as the CBSS, the BEAC, the CEI and the BSEC. 
Their aim is to contribute to security and confidence-building among neighbouring 
countries, foster cooperation in various areas, ease post-communist transition as well as 
prepare countries for integration into the European Union (Cottey, 1999).
To illustrate, the post-Cold War era has seen the revival o f ASEAN, CARICOM, CACM and the Andean 
Group as well as the emergence of formal economic regionalism such as the Mercado Comun del Sur 
(MERCOSUR) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and transnational models of economic 
integration such as the Economic Community for West Afiican States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) (Page, 2000).
^ The EU enlargement process is one of the most significant regional economic integration efforts as it implies 
the removal of legal, regulatory or tax obstacles to the movement of goods and services, finance and 
entreprises.
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Regionalism has therefore re-emerged as an important theme in international relations 
literature and is viewed as a solution to major security and economic problems. It is often 
argued that 'new regionalism' is an advance over different versions of integration theory 
because it emphasises the social, political and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon, apart 
from the economic which traditionally has been the focus of analysis (Hettne, 1994; Page, 
2000). The nature of regionalism has also become more linked to questions of 
development and often bridges the North-South divide (Gruegel and Hout, 1999).^  ^In 
contrast to the 'old regionalism' which was inward oriented and exclusive, the recent 
manifestation of the phenomenon is open and often emerges from below (Hettne and 
Soddenbaum, 1998: 7-8). The political understanding of the new wave of the phenomenon 
has been labeled New Regionalism Approach (NRA) and is different to the dominant 
discourse among economists who conceive it as merely a trade promotion policy (Hettne 
and Soddenbaum, 1998: 16-17). The theory and praxis of the 'new regionalism', however, 
are in a state of flux and thus difficult to conceptualise.^*
2.3 Definitions of a Region and Regionalism
Given that regionalism implies the region as a level of analysis, it is first essential to define
^  According to Hettne and Sodenbaum, 'Wew Regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and 
multidimensional process, implying the change ofa particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased 
homogeneity with regard to a number o f dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic 
policies and political regimes" (Hettne and Sodenbaum, 1998:7).
Signed in 1992 by the US, Canada and Mexico, the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is an example 
of North-.South regionalism.
Nevertheless, for those who see globalisation as a direct consequence of intra-systemic integration within the 
Western camp and as such one o f the causes of the end o f the Cold War, 'new regionalism' is not all that 'new* 
(Clark, 1997).
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the latter and provide a terminology for the thesis/^ Defining regions attracted significant 
academic attention in the 1960s and 1970s as well as the 1990s with the second wave of 
regionalism. The first criterion used by most scholars in defining a region is geography 
(Russett, 1967; Nye, 1968; Cantori and Spiegal, 1970; Hettne, 1994; Hurrell, 1995; Buzan, 
1999). The geographical concept of a region is usually based on its physical characteristics 
delimited by natural barriers. Although it is a widely held view that physical proximity is a 
defining criterion of regionalism, there are no 'natural' regions and boundaries such as the 
sea can be seen to both unite and divide. Moreover, proximity nowadays is not only related 
to contiguity but to technology as well.
Other criteria are also used in defining a region.^® These may include political criteria such 
as membership of certain organisations denoting common political interests and similar 
attitudes (Russett, 1970; Hettne, 1994). They may also include cultural or social 
cohesiveness (Russett, 1970; Hettne 1994). The cultural definition may emphasise the 
similarity of historical development in such factors as ethnicity, religion, lifestyle, language 
and other characteristics of societies. Another important criterion is economic 
cohesiveness such as intra-regional trade and complementarity (Russett, 1968; Hettne,
1994). According to Page, the most important criterion is an extensive economic 
relationship with a legal fi’amework (Page, 2000).
An international region can therefore be defined in many ways, depending on the criteria
The term region will be used here to imply a subunit o f the international system, even though it can also be 
part of a state or a single territory covering parts of several states, such as Euro-regions (Keating and Loughlin, 
1997).
In International Regions and the International System, Bruce Russett identified five types of regional 
classification groupings: a) of social and cultural homogeneity; b) which share political attitudes; c) o f  
institutional interdependence; d) o f economic interdependence and e) o f geographical proximity (Russet, 1967: 
11).
Though often interrelated, these aspects of culture may also differ significantly.
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used to measure regionness}^ In ideal types of regions, several criteria might be applied at 
the same time forming a complex interaction between political, socio-economic and 
geographic factors. According to Hettne, the most comprehensive way to see an ideal region 
is as a historical formation, a political subject with its own identity (Hettne, 1994: 2).^  ^For 
others, however, it is how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and 
notions of regionness that is critical (Nye, 1968). For Neuman, for example, all regions are 
constructed and hence politically contested. They are made and remade, 'imagined 
communities' brought into existence (Neuman, 1994: 59).^ "^
Finally, for some analysts regions become united by more than one ad hoc problems. For 
Barry Buzan, for example, regions are identified through ‘regional security complexes’ 
united by common security problems (Buzan 1983). They are international subsystems that 
can be distinguished from the whole by the particular nature and intensity of their 
interactions with each other. According to Sophia Clement "a region shall be loosely 
defined as a pattern o f relations among basic units in world politics which exhibits a 
particular degree o f regularity and intensity o f relations as well as an awareness o f 
interdependence among its particular units" (Clement, 2000: 92). A degree of mutual 
interdependence is therefore a key to defining international regions (Nye, 1968).
According to Hettne, regionness is the degree to which a particular area constitutes a coherent unit. Different 
degrees of regionness are distinguished by five levels o f interaction which encompass a geographical unit, a 
social system, organised cooperation, regional civil society and a region-state (Hettne, 1994: 7-8).
Hettne identified three types of structurally different regions: a) regions in the core zone, namely North 
America, Europe and East Asia which are economically advanced and politically stable; b) regions in the 
intermediate zone, such as South America, Central Europe and South-East Asia which are strongly linked to 
one or more of the core regions and c) regions in the peripheral zone which are politically turbulent and 
economically stagnant (Hettne, 2001: 5-7).
According to Neuman ""regions are defined in terms of speech acts, they are talked and written into 
existence"(fiievmdn, 1994: 59).
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Defining international regionalism has attracted less academic effort than regions/^ Often 
its meaning is assumed, with discussion focusing on its manifestations or utility. By 
regionalism one can imply both the general phenomenon as well as the ideology of 
regionalism, that is the urge for a regionalist order aimed at creating wealth and providing 
security within a region. However, concrete causal links between regionalism as a body of 
ideas, values and goals and manifestations of intra-regional interaction have not yet been 
established (Hveem, 1995). Prescriptive regionalism should, therefore, be analytically 
distinguished from its descriptive counterpart (Hurrell, 1995: 39).
Regionalism as a descriptive attribute has been used as a label to discuss many 
manifestations of the phenomenon such as economic cooperation, ft-ee trade areas, 
régionalisation of world politics, regional organisations, interest and policies of regional 
states. Conceptualising descriptive regionalism depends on identifying patterns of 
interaction within an area. When doing so, it is important to distinguish between undirected 
processes of social and economic integration, namely régionalisation, and regionalism as a 
state project.^^ The former includes transnational flows and links in various sectors. The 
latter is manifested through inter-govemmental agreements, regional schemes or regional 
economic integration.^^ Economic regionalism can take several forms including a Free
Inter-state (macro) regionalism should be distinguished from the intra-state (micro) phenomenon. For some 
scholars, however, they are interlinked processes so that regionalism has both integrative and disintegrative 
implications (Hettne, 1994; Mittelman, 1999).
According to Hurrell, there are five different categories of regionalism These are a) régionalisation, or else 
migration, markets and social networks; b) regional identity, namely the discourse o f regionalism or regional 
awareness; c) construction of inter-state agreements or regimes (statist); d) state promoted regional economic 
integration and; e) regional cohesion, a combination o f the above. Hurrell considers these categories to be 
analytically distinct "although the ways in which they can be related to each other lie at the heart o f both the 
theory and practice of regionalism" (Hurrell, 1995: 39).
Regional economic integration involves "specific policy decisions by governments designed to reduce 
barriers to mutual exchange o f goods, services, capital and people. Early stages o f integration tend to 
concentrate on the elimination o f trade barriers and the formation o f a Customs Union for goods. As 
integration proceeds, the agenda expands to cover Non-Trade Barriers (  NTBs), the regulation o f markets and 
the development o f policies at the micro and macro levels" (Hurrell, 1995: 43).
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Trade Area (FTA), a Customs Union (CU), a Common Market, an Economic Union or 
complete integration (Balassa, 1961: 2).
In the developing world, economic integration has been treated as an approach to 
development, not just a tariff issue. It was labeled developmental regionalism because it was 
designed not only to encourage new industries but also to help diversify national economies 
and increase bargaining power with developed nations (Sloan, 1971). More recently, by 
developmental regionalism we refer to "concerted efforts from actors (state, market and 
civil society) within a geographical area to increase the economic development o f a region 
as a whole and to improve its position in the world economy' (Hettne and Soderbaum, 1998: 
19)/'
Despite the flexible use of the term regionalism to cover multiple activities, it is possible to 
discern a core meaning which implies cooperation among regional states and non-state 
actors to enhance well-being. The phenomenon is generally considered to benefit all parties 
although increased interdependence may eventually lead to a conflict of interests. 
Regionalism can thus be defined as "cooperation among governments or non-government 
organisations in three or more geographically proximate and inter-dependent countries for 
the pursuit o f mutual gain in one or more issue areas" (Alagappa 1997: 362)
Finally, equally ambiguous to the definitions of a region and regionalism are those of a 
subregion and subregionalism. A subregion can be seen as part of a region or parts of states 
intersecting at border areas (Weaver and De Wilde, 1998; Mittelman, 1999). Like a region.
Security regionalism, on the other hand, "is an attempt by the states and other actors in a particular 
geographical area - a region in the making - to tranform a security complex with conflict-generating 
intra-state relations towards a security-community with cooperative external relations and domestic peace" 
(Hettne, 2001: 13).
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its definition depends on one's own delimitation. Subregionalism, which exists in the 
shadow of regionalism, refers to “projects promoted by the weaker states in the global 
economy which are seeking to strengthen cooperation in a more circumscribed space than 
at the regional level In this sense, subregionalist projects take on their significance within 
the context o f more embracing regionalist projects and identities promoted by the more 
powerful states” (Hook and Kerns, 1999: 5). Such a definition raises the question of the 
complementarity between subregionalism and wider integration, namely its linkage to the 
broader regional context.
2.4 International Theories of Regionalism
2.4.1 Rationalist Continuum
(i) Internal/Inside-out Factors
Regionalism is often equated with the study of regional integration. Integration theory 
operates squarely at the inside-out end of the continuum. The study of regional integration 
is concerned with tasks, transactions, perceptions and learning. Scholars have argued at 
length whether regional integration is a process or a terminal condition. With hindsight, 
integration can be said to be a process, not an end state, but many of its aspects can become 
consolidated in structures, rules and practices that are enduring (Caporaso, 1998). There is 
no simple definition or path of integration so that groups move in different ways towards its 
various forms. Theories that explain its emergence include economic integration, 
functionalism and neo-functionalism, transactionalism as well as neo-liberal
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institutionalism.^^
The functionalist strand of integration theory refers to its role in promoting peace. David 
Mitrany was the first to state its principles in the classic essayé Working Peace System: An 
Argument for the Functional Development o f International Organisation (Mitrany, 1943). 
The basic premise of functionalism is that divisions between states can be overcome by the 
spread of cooperation in various social and economic areas. Mitrany was concerned 
primarily with the practical problem-solving of concrete tasks mostly of a technical nature, 
namely how to replace territorially defined structures of decision-making with international 
functional agencies leading towards a working international system. As such, his tradition is 
above all a theory of international society based on the principle of ‘technical 
self-determination ’ (Mitrany, 1943: 35; Chrysochoou, 2003: 10).
The importance of functionalism lies in discovering the types of forces responsible for 
bringing countries closer together politically, although 'technical self-determination' should 
be separate from power-political issues. This potentially positive influence of integration is 
relevant to regional conflict issues and has a strong prescriptive element. Functionalist 
analysis, however, which is characterised a by society-centric bias, regards the state as 
suspect and neglects it as an actor (separability thesis). In The Funtional Theory o f Politics, 
for example, Mitrany argued that the functional structure could be made by a union of 
peoples directly concerned by giving them ‘functional representation’ (Mitrany, 1975).
The theory of economic integration is concerned with the effects that arise from divergences in national 
monetary, fiscal and other policies (Balassa, 1961). To illustrate, at one time it was believed that the 
establishment o f a Customs Union would be beneficial to its members by leading to the optimal allocation of 
world resources. Jacob Viner, however, pointed out that the creation o f a Customs Union could have either a 
trade-creating or a trade-diverting effect (Viner, 1950). Although in recent years the theory o f economic 
integration has opened up to other disciplines such as political science and international relations, it will be 
considered as part of economics and trade theory and will not be analysed here.
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Functionalist theory helped understand change, namely how political actors reassess and 
redefine their interests. The technocratic nature of politics and the spillover dynamic may 
be a successful way of trying to reduce friction likely to be encountered in the process of 
integration. But it does not however account for what happens when the process of 
technocratic change fails to secure the necessary political support. Moreover, the 
assumptions of this school of thought failed to allow for the influence of extra-regional 
dynamics and 'high' politics.
Neo-functionalism has been the most influential branch of regional integration theory The 
first generation of neo-functionalist scholars tried to explain the broad transition from 
societal movement and political plan forged by European heads of state to a concrete project 
embodied first in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and later in the 
EEC in 1957 (Linberg 1963, Etzioni 1965; Haas, 1964). They argued that high levels of 
interdependence create an ongoing process of cooperation that will lead eventually to 
political integration. Neo-functionalism shares with functionalism the centrality of 
transnational interaction and stresses the role of the elites in promoting integration.
Ernst Haas's research programme came to dominate the field of integration studies. 
According to Haas, integration is a process leading to the creation of political communities 
defined in attitudinal and institutional terms. By participating in the policy-making process, 
for example, interest groups are likely to develop a stake in promoting further integration 
and can bridge the elite-mass gap (Haas, 1968). The successful experience of integration in 
one area of society or the economy therefore might lead to fiirther integrative ventures as a 
result of the spillover effect. Apart from the impact society has on political cooperation, the 
role of supranational organisations and transnational society are also stressed (Haas, 1964).
Monnet's gradualist approach to integration was a synthesis o f both functionalism and neo-functionalism, 
without however being in complete agreement with either (Chrysochoou et al, 2003:21).
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The major dependent variable in Haas' work was the hypothesised evolution of 
supranational institutions thus linking domestic to regional dynamics.
Neo-functionalism played a central, but criticised, role in the study of European integration. 
The major factor that gave rise to the shortcomings of this school is its reliance on a 
technocratic understanding of the post-1945 politics of Western Europe. It has also been 
criticised for projecting a supranationally biased image of Community arrangements, 
overstressing the role of organised interests and underestimating the viability of national 
polities (Chrysochoou, 2003: 24). Finally, similar to functionalism, it did not account for 
external pressures on the region.
Another strand of integration theory is transactionalism, named after its stress upon the 
quantitative analysis of the wide range of transactions between and within states. In his 
1957 study Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, its main proponent Karl 
Deutsch advanced powerful insights about integration and disintegration processes based on 
detailed historical evidence (Deutsch, 1957)."*^  Deutsch hypothesised that many of the same 
processes which led to national integration and nationalism in domestic politics might be 
equally relevant for international politics and community development."^  ^At the heart of his 
approach is the assumption that communication is the cement of social groups in general and 
political communities in particular.
Disintegration is the antithesis o f integration. According to Groom and Heraclides, approaches to 
disintegration can be divided into a) negative theories of integration such as explanations of nation-building; b) 
negative theories o f cohesion such as consociationalism and c) indirect theories of disintegration and 
separatism such as revolution and inter-group conflict. Direct theories of integration have as their intellectual 
forebear the theory of nationalism (Groom and Heraclides, 1985: 183-185).
In the 1953 study Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations o f Nationality, 
Deutsch had introduced communication theory to the study o f nationalism arguing that nations acquire 
coherence through communicative processes (Deutsch, 1953).
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Integration, for Deutsch, was the process of creating unified habits and institutions strong 
enough to ensure expectations of peaceful change among populations (Deutsch, 1957: 5). 
He argued that when cultural interaction is intense, a region can become a 'security 
community', a group that has become integrated through the attainment of a sense of a 
'we-feeling' accompanied by formal institutions and where war is no longer possible among 
its members. 'Security communities' for Deutsch could either be 'amalgamated' when 
political units merge or 'pluralistic' when separate states retain their sovereignty (Deutsch, 
1957: 7). His study concluded that the North Atlantic area had in the 1950s moved a long 
way towards becoming integrated.
Transactionalism shares with neo-functionalism the commitment to certain variables such 
as regional transactions, communication between elites and the adequacy of institutions. For 
communication theory, however, all types of transactions are equally salient, whereas for 
neo-functionalists welfare-related issues are more important regional tasks. The Haasian 
approach was therefore more durable a research programme. Both branches of integration 
theory, however, exaggerated the role of European states in the integrative process and 
simplified their historical development. In the 1970s it became apparent that many of the 
predictions of neo-functionalism and transactionalism were insufficient to explain the ups 
and downs of European integration (Puchala, 1971). Many theorists, therefore, shifted their 
attention to analysing how states succeeded in maintaining their authority and in shaping the 
pace of the integration process by creating the institutional conditions for it (Taylor, 1971).
Moreover, scholars interested in theorising integration increasingly started to use the 
vehicles of international interdependence. In the self-critical monograph The Obsolence o f 
Regional Integration Theory, Haas argued that neo-functional theory became irrelevant in 
circumstances of interdependence among advanced industrial societies (Haas, 1975). He
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claimed that integration and interdependence would cease to co-vary" because of pressing 
problems in the global agenda which led to novel types of scientific and technological 
knowledge (Haas, 1975: 88). Haas had assumed, however, that problems of 
interdependence would lead governments to cooperation. This meant that regional 
integration theory should be supplemented by a general theory on national policy response 
to international interdependence.
A more advanced version of regional integration theory therefore emerged. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism/neoliberalism argues that a successful theory of cooperation must take into 
account the effects of international institutions without denigrating the role of the state 
(Keohane, 1989: 11). This school of thought concentrates on the ways in which strategic 
interaction among actors may manage interdependence in any given area of international 
relations and examines the impact of institutions on state action as well as the nature of 
institutional change. The neoliberal institutionalist perspective has two branches: one which 
views regionalism as the creation of institutions and regimes for policy coordination where 
the state acts as a negotiator at the inter-govememental level and another which explains 
action as a result of policy-making processes and state-society relations (Krasner, 1983; 
Moravcsik, 1993).
The origins of neo-liberal insitutionalism can be found in Keohane and Nye's seminal study 
Power and Interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). In this ambitious but somewhat 
vague attempt to bridge realism and liberalism, Keohane and Nye used tools from both 
approaches in order to explain how states are affected by changes in the global economic 
system. Interdependence - or mutual dependence - is defined by the authors as referring to 
'"'‘situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries'' (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 8). Complex interdependence, an ideal type
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contrasting with realist assumptions about the international system, is "a situation among a 
number o f countries in which multiple channels o f contact connect societies and where 
military force is not used by governments toward one another" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 
249). At the core of liberal theories of economic interdependence is the claim that the 
increasing flows of goods, services, factors or pollutants create international policy 
externalities among nations which in turn trigger the need for policy coordination. Increased 
levels of interdependence, therefore, generate demand for international cooperation 
(Keohane, 1984).
Neo-liberal institutionalists drew from this study a regional interpretation of complex 
interdependence as opposed to a worldwide one nowadays referred to as globalism 
(Keohane and Nye, 2000). In the 1970s, the concept was used primarily to describe 
emerging relationships among democratic industrialised countries. These were principally 
Western, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
offered an integrative perspective of regionalism not necessarily implying geographic 
cohesion. For neo-institutionalists, regionalism emerges when states define common 
interests brought about by interdependence (Axelrod, 1984). Designed to manage the 
complexities that arise with interconnectedness and exerting substantial influence on the 
policies of governments, the institutionalisation of international relations therefore treated 
the politics of interdependence and was concerned with creating the institutional conditions 
for integration.
International regimes were identified as major types of international institutions alongside 
inter-govemmental organisations and conventions and became particularly appealing tools 
to liberal insitutionalists in the late 1970s (Keohane, 1989:3-4). Introduced by John Ruggie, 
the concept of international regimes has been a major focus of theoretical and empirical
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research in international relations (Ruggie, 1975). According to Krasner, regimes are '^sets 
o f principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area o f international relations” (Krasner, 1983: 2).
Although Krasner saw regimes as instruments of state power used primarily by the 
powerful, neoliberal institutionalists emphasised the role of regimes in helping states realise 
their shared interests and are more optimistic about their effects on international relations 
(Keohane, 1984: 131). The basic concern of regime analysis is its normative interest in the 
conditions of international governance without government” (Rittberger, 1995). More 
recently, transnational actors such as corporations have also been identified as possible 
actors in regime formation. Regimes have expanded in all issue areas of contemporary 
world politics and delimit a range of activities from trade and security to human rights and 
the environment (Rittberger, 1995).
Liberal institutionalists increasingly turned their attention to the European project. They 
drew from neo-functionalism the role of domestic and transnational societal influence, but 
undermined its supranational organisational component stressing the role of 
intergovernmental bargains between states. Andrew Moravcsik explained EC institutional 
development through an analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental 
strategic interaction and saw it as an international regime for policy coordination 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 480). This two-stage theory of state-society relations brought together a 
liberal theory of preferences with an intergovernmental focus on power-bargaining among 
states.
Following liberal theories of international relations, Moravscik saw the policy goals of 
governments as responses to pressures from domestic groups determined by
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interdependence. According to Keohane and Hoffman, institutional change such as the 
Single European Act is explained in terms of changes in the international political economy 
and a convergence of interests among states related to changes of national interest around 
neoliberal policy-making (Keohane and Hoffinan, 1991). For Keohane and Hof&nan, 
however, the EC was much more centralised and institutionalised than international regimes 
for it is organised as a network that involves the pooling and sharing of sovereignty 
(Keohane and Hof&nan, 1991).
Liberal institutionalism's major contribution to regionalism studies is that it placed the EC 
case to models of integration potentially applicable to all states, thereby specifying the 
conditions under which a similar process may occur elsewhere. In contrast to 
neo-functionalism, neoliberalism sees regional institutional frameworks emerging in 
response to concrete needs of states to manage regional problems and as a means of 
reducing the costs of strengthening intra-regional linkages such as economic transactions. 
Within the neo-liberal school, however, there have been extensive debates over the exact 
relationship between economic interdependence and cooperation. Moreover, liberal 
institutionalist theory is still struggling to define conditions under which institutions matter 
as in some regions cooperation can proceed in the absence of institutionalisation, whereas 
dense institutionalisation does not guarantee deep levels of cooperation.
(ii) Inside/Out - Outside/In Factors
An important body of literature regarding international factors that generate regionalism 
operates at the centre of the continuum. Among the first proponents of such a synthesis were 
Cantori and Spiegal in their comparative framework of regions or else 'subordinate systems' 
(Cantori and Spiegal. 1970). According to Cantori and Spiegal “ < a r  subordinate system
40
consists o f one state, or o f two or more proximate and interactive states which have some 
common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense o f 
identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes o f states external to the system. ” 
(Cantori and Spiegal, 1970:6). Their hierarchy of'subordinate systems' consists of the core 
and periphery sectors as well as the intrusive system, namely the influence of external 
powers on the international politics of regions. They also identified four pattern variables 
intended to establish elements of intrinsic importance to the understanding of subordinate 
systems: levels of cohesion and power, nature of communications and the structure of 
internal relations.
Although useful in tiying to pool together various approaches to the study of regional 
international politics, Cantori and Spiegal failed to produce a satisfying classification of 
their variables which lack clarity in the empirical analysis. Moreover, that core and 
periphery sectors were viewed as part of the same 'subordinate system' was contrary to the 
conventional understanding of these terms. The attempt to set up a comparative framework 
of five 'subordinate systems' in global perspective, therefore, proved too complex to provide 
a generally accepted understanding of regions.
That regions become the product of dynamics working inside-out and outside-in, however, 
was further elaborated by Barry Buzan in the theory on security complexes first sketched out 
in People, States and Fear (Buzan, 1983). For Buzan a ‘regional security complex’ is a 
specific kind of region united by common security problems, "a set o f states whose major 
security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems 
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another'' (Buzan 1999: 2). The 
essential logic, therefore, of such a subsystem is security interdependence of states 
characterised by their patterns of enmity and amity. But regional developments are
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determined by the internal dynamics of the security complex in conjunction with the 
external dynamics. At the time the theory was first developed, external dynamics were 
associated with the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War and it was suggested that superpower 
overlay suppressed local security dynamics."*^
Finally, the kind of analysis whereby regional transformation is the product of both internal 
and external dynamics is further elaborated by other scholars who see regions in terms of 
security relations. For Vayrynen, for example, ‘regional conflict formations’ are a mixture 
of intranational, intraregional and extraregional contests of violent character. They are 
shaped by the impact of the capitalist world economy and the economic and strategic 
penetration of major powers as well as their own domestic and regional circumstances 
(Vayrynen, 1984). Adjusting the concept of regional security complex to fit contemporary 
international politics, Lake and Morgan defined it as "a set o f states continually affected by 
one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area" (Morgan 
and Lake, 1997: 12)
Although the ‘security complex approach’ avoided many of the problems contained in 
earlier attempts to define regions by focusing on interdependence, the existence of local 
externalities linking states together did not explain how these states manage their relations. 
The concept o f‘regional orders’ was consequently introduced by Morgan and Lake to imply 
a dependent variable, namely "the mode o f conflict management within the regional security 
complex" (Morgan and Lake, 1997: 11). A typology of regional orders therefore includes 
Great Power concert, collective security, pluralistic security communities and integration
It is not possible to identify security complexes, however, when states are too weak to project power beyond 
their boundaries or the presence of outside powers is so strong that it suppresses the operation o f security 
dynamics between local ones (Buzan 1991:197), Although in the 1983 classic People, States and Fear Buzan 
categorised the Balkans as a 'security subcomplex', in the post-Cold War era the theory cannot be applied to 
Southeastern Europe in light of the extensive international military presence in the region as well as the 
proliferation o f collapsed states (Buzan, 1991: 226),
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(Morgan, 1997: 32-33). Overall, however, there is a lack of well developed theories of 
regional security systems.
(ii:) External/Outside-in Factors
Whereas advocates of the internal dynamic approach regard bureaucracies, political parties, 
trade unions and commercial enterprises as principal regional actors, the external dynamics 
school of thought tends to emphasize systemic factors (states and firms) and geography. On 
the one hand, systemic/structural schools of thought, which constitute the most important 
body of rationalist 'outside-in' theories, concentrate on the level of the system in which 
regionalist schemes are embedded and the impact of outside powers working on the region. 
Two sets of systems theories have emerged, namely structural realism, which stresses the 
importance of broader political structures within which regionalist schemes emerge and the 
impact of states, and globalism which focuses on the role of economic structures holding 
firms responsible for outside pressures (Waltz, 1979; Ohmae, 1995). Geography, on the 
other hand, stresses the importance of natural geopolitical or strategic landmarks such as 
mountain ranges and bodies of water in delineating a region's borders (Cloke et al, 1991). It 
stands in opposition to the internal theories that attribute regionalism to common culture or 
civilisation (Huntington, 1996).
Structural realism or neorealism has characterised Anglo-American thinking of 
international relations since the beginning of the Cold War. Political realism, which inspired 
the writings of such classical authors as Thucydides, Macchiaveli and Hobbes, became 
conventional wisdom in Europe with the rise of nation-states and the Westphalian system. 
Modem realism sees the international system as essentially anarchic since there is no central 
government capable of making and enforcing international rules of conduct. Nation-states
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are the dominant unitary actors of such a system. According to the father of this school of 
thought Hans Morgenthau, states promote their own interests in a constant struggle for 
power according to the principle of rationality (Morgenthau, 1948). Political competition 
for power among states, therefore, is at the centre of realist thinking. Although he tried to 
create a 'science' of international politics, however, Morgenthau failed to offer coherent 
definitions of power and balance of power or to explain alterations of war and peace.
Keneth Waltz tried to remedy the defects of Morgenthau's theory by developing a systemic 
explanation of world politics, that is to say he tried to delineate more clearly the effects of 
the international system on the behaviour of states. His structuralist view locates sources of 
explanation at the system level and its main outcomes at the unit level (states) (Waltz, 1979: 
99). According to the Theory o f International Politics, international relations is an anarchic 
realm composed of units (states) performing similar functions but differing in their 
distribution o f power. Whereas for Morgenthau power had predominantly a military 
dimension, for Waltz capabilities were ranked according to how states score on such issues 
as “i'/ze o f population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence ” (Waltz, 1979:131). States were therefore seen 
to be constrained in their relations with other units by their relative capabilities vis-a-vis 
these others. Their fundamental goal became to prevent other states from achieving 
advances/gains in these capabilities (Waltz, 1979: 105). By focusing primarily on 
conflictual relations among states, neorealism has thus been criticised for presenting a 
pessimistic analysis of prospects for international cooperation.
Neorealism stresses the role that the international political system has on its units. 
Consequently, it understands regionalism by looking at the region from outside-in and 
analysing its position in the broader international picture. Its proponets introduced the
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bipolarity of the Cold War system as a variable that explained the change of international 
politics after 1945 and saw the creation of the EU as a response to superpower confi-ontation 
(Wallace, 1995). For power theorists, therefore, regional groupings form in response to 
external challenges in the same way that states form alliances in order to balance against 
threats (Walt, 1987). They believe regional economic integration, for example, to be 
ultimately determined by the structures of the international political system and policies of 
major states. For neorealists, political actions by state institutions are therefore at the core of 
regionalism.
The neorealist logic has been elaborated in the ‘hegemonic stability theory’ which argues 
that order in world politics is created by a single dominant power and that its maintenance 
requires continued hegemony (Keohane, 1984). According to Robert Gilpin, the Pax 
Brittanica and Pax Americana were created by Great Britain and the United States 
respectively in order to ensure their own interests in the world and the their decline brought 
about change in the international system (Gilpin, 1981). For the ‘hegemonic stability theory’ 
the existence of a predominant state is also a prerequisite for cooperation among states. 
When applied to regionalist arrangements, the hegemonic leadership thesis expects that the 
existence of a hegemon will enhance the success of regionalist projects. In regions without 
a clear hegemon, neorealists would argue that regionalist arrangements will be evaluated on 
the basis of the relative gains accruing to the different partners in the arrangement (Grieco, 
1993). From this perspective, regionalism can be understood as a means for states to 
enhance their bargaining power, balance a bigger power or as a means to contain a more 
powerful state in a given framework.
As has been mentioned in the discussion on regional integration theories, the critique of 
neorealism came mostly from neo-liberalism and crystalised in the 1970s with
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interdependence and regime theory. By focusing almost exclusively on power structure at 
the system level, neorealism is useful in explaining external pressures on states and regions 
but weak in accounting for change, especially in international political economy, the 
domestic structure of states or the concept of sovereignty. Neo-liberal criticisms, however, 
triggered a debate between the two approaches that is ongoing and fruitful especially as 
regards understanding the conditions that promote or inhibit international cooperation 
(Keohane, 1986; Baldwin 1993). The main areas of contention between the two approaches 
include the relative importance of non-state actors, priority of state goals as well as relative 
and absolute gains.
Globalism is the second systemic theory that emphasises the changing character of the 
international system and criticises neorealism for not accounting for changes in the global 
economy and how it affects states. It has triggered a significant debate as regards its impact 
on regionalism. Globalism has been defined as a "state o f the world involving networks o f 
interdependence at multicontinental distances. The linkages occur through flows and 
influences o f capital and goods, information and ideas, people and forces as well as 
environmentally and biologically relevant substances" (Kehoane and Nye, 2000: 105) To 
distinguish it from interdependence, Keohane and Nye explain that globalism refers to 
networks of connections and includes multicontinental distances, not just regional networks. 
This implies that twenty years after it was first conceptualised, complex interdependence 
can be seen to correspond to reality in many parts of the world, not Just the West.
Contemporary debates on globalism originated in the works of the 1970s regarding 
transnationalism. In 1971 Keohane and Nye had argued that the state-centric paradigm was 
an inadequate basis for the study of changing world politics and defined transnational 
interactions as "the movement o f tangible and intangible items across state boundaries
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when at least one actor is not an agent o f a government or intergovernmental organisation " 
(Keohane and Nye, 1971: xii) Similarly, Rosenau focused his attention on the effects that 
international transactions, flows of money, goods, people have on the transnationalisation 
of world affairs (Rosenau, 1980). Today, one of the strongest proponents of globalism is 
Kenichi Ohmae who argues that economic ties across the world have become so strong that 
political boundaries have lost much of their meaning. He views globalisation, triggered by 
modem information technology and business practices, to be the dominant force in the 
contemporary era bringing about a "borderless" economy (Ohmae, 1995).'^ '^
The relationship between globalism and regionalism has come into particularly sharp focus 
with the end of the Cold War and is related to questions of world order (Payne, 1996). The 
debate focuses mainly on whether regionalism is a "building" or a "stumbling" bloc in the 
process of globalisation. The answer depends on how processes are defined. Some scholars 
who reserve regionalism for the arena of trade policy see it as a stumbling bloc towards 
globalisation and a threat to multilateralism (Baghwati, 1992). Regionalism as a political 
response to economic internationalisation divides the world economy into three blocs that 
might lead to conflict in the form of trade wars and contribute to world disorder. The 
neoliberal school of thought, however, holds that by helping national economies become 
competitive in the world market, regional integration encourages multilateral cooperation. 
Ohmae, for example, argues that by stimulating global regional trade, regionalism is a 
building bloc towards globalisation (Ohmae, 1995). For these scholars, however, 
regionalism is driven by transnational forces and micro-regions and the role of states is 
diminished.
^  According to Keohane and Nye globalisation is the increase of globalism, the process by which the latter 
becomes increasingly thick' (Keohane and Nye, 2000). The terms globalisation and globalism will be used 
interchangeably in the thesis,
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In fact, the conflict between regionalism and globalisation is more theoretical than real. 
Regionalism is not in dialectical opposition to globalism but rather they are complementary 
processes. Regionalism sustains regions as it does globalism. According to Wyatt-Walter, 
the processes are symbiotic and both the régionalisation and globalisation metaphors are 
misleading: ’’Régionalisation literature focuses on international trade patterns overlooking 
the ways in which capital movements have reinforced economic interdependence between 
regions. Globalisation literature focuses on firms underplaying the way in which the 
existence o f political boundaries influences flows o f economic activity” (Wyatt-Walter,
1995). Above all, it is important to examine the ways in which regional policies and 
business processes interact to produce both régionalisation and globalisation in the patterns 
of world trade and investment.
2.4.2 Reflectivism
The above rationalist literature seeks to explore the conditions under which cooperation 
takes place. The politics of defining and redefining regionalism are marginalised while 
scholars are concerned with weighing the importance of 'inside-ouf and 'outside-in' 
pressures against each other or combining them. The reflectivist approach, however, is 
characterised by emphasising the interpretation of actors as central to the process of 
cooperation. This perspective presents actors as reflective, capable of adapting to challenges 
imposed by changes in their physical and social environment as well as the behaviour of 
other actors. The world-making approach of reflectivism stands in opposition to the 
world-description approach of rationalist theories (Keohane, 1989:158-76). The reflectivist 
approach is manifested in constructivism and cognitivism, a symbolic turn in social 
sciences.
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Deutsch's preoccupation with communication, language and meaning is at the origins of 
constructivism. For Deutsch, socially influenced patterns of learning were crucial for 
community and identity-building and political integration was a process of social learning 
implying that human identities alter (Deutsch, 1957). Constructivists are interested in the 
construction of identities and interests and as such take a more sociological than economic 
approach to systemic theory. For constructivism, regionalism is explained not as a result of 
structural or institutional factors but as an instrument for changing existing structures and 
institutions to create new identities through intersubjective dynamics.
Constructivists seek to understand how shared ideas, knowledge and norms, namely 
collective identity, can contribute to the emergence of regional cooperation. Drawing on 
integration theory which focuses on the formation of community at the international level, 
Alex Wendt reframed the collective action issue in terms that make interests endogenous to 
interaction or the process of cooperation. He argued that interaction at the systemic level 
shapes and reshapes state identities and interests (Wendt, 1994). This means that regional 
entities can be constructed through building new loyalties and identities above the 
nation-state and promoting a collective definition of interest.
Cognitivism, an overlapping representation of the constructivist perspective, emphasises 
that actors are capable of restructuring international society and reshaping interest 
formations. Cognitivism holds that actors attempt to pursue their own strategies based on 
their own ideas and goals. For Emanuel Adler, for example, security communities are 
'cognitive regions', regional subsystems of meaning not limited to a specific geographic 
space that help constitute the interests of their members. Adler saw the OSCE as a 'cognitive 
region' because of its community-building functions as well as its aim to promote security 
by means of inclusion (Adler, 1997). These region-building processes, nevertheless, often
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compete with conflicting visions of regions. To illustrate, that there are different national 
conceptions of Europe among the French, German and Russians explains why the attempt to 
create a new order on the continent became problematic in the immediate post-Cold War 
days (Waever, 1990).
Changes in international relations theory in recent years, however, have contributed to 
renewed interest in exploring the role of identity, norms, ideas and the social basis of global 
politics. A transnational community of policy-makers has emerged who have departed from 
realist-based security debates by attributing the existence of common values primarily at the 
origin of security cooperation and 'new' security issues. The concept of security community, 
for example, is being revisited and scholars have started examining its empirical application 
in various historical and regional contexts beyond the original North Atlantic area 
considered by Deutsch and his associates (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The community 
concept, however, is a direct challenge to models of security politics that dominated the 
Cold War. Constructivist scholarship is therefore suited to consider how social processes 
and an international community might transform security studies.
2.5 Domestic Theories of Regionalism
Neither of the above approaches, both rationalist and reflectivist, pay sufficient attention to 
the domestic sources of regionalism, that is to say economic and political factors internal to 
states. Integration theories emphasize the role played by the domestic dynamics such as 
interest groups or elites but link them to regional ones such as institutions (Haas, 1964, 
Linberg, 1963). With the advent of interdependence theories and transnationalism, the role 
of domestic factors slipped more out of focus, particularly as the concept of regimes came to 
dominate the field (Krasner, 1983). In the post-Cold War era, however, it is hard to ignore
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the domestic prism as regional relations are no longer linked to the logic of superpower 
competition. The politicisation of regional policy offers a better opportunity to study the 
domestic conditions that shape regionalism. These include structural factors such as types 
of regimes, state coherence, sustained economic dynamics and state-society relations related 
to domestic interests and policy-preferences.
A large body of literature on domestic explanations of regionalism is concerned with the 
relationship between democracy and peace. The 'democratic peace' hypothesis postulates 
that democracies do not wage wars against each other, thus extending into the debate of 
cooperation and conflict. This thesis originates in the Kantian idea that the spread of 
liberalism is likely to draw a pacific union in its wake. In the twentieth century, the theory 
acquired a status of conventional wisdom (Doyle, 1997). The conceptual links between 
democracy and peace/cooperation have a structural and normative base. The structural 
model is related to the institutional checks and balances of democratic regimes on their 
leaders that make conflict difficult to pursue, especially in light of public opinion's 
sensitivities to the human and material costs of war. The normative model is related to the 
tradition of compromise between democracies which prevents conflicts of interest from 
escalating to violent clashes (Maoz and Russett, 1993). Owen, for example, defends the 
'democratic peace' proposition by arguing that liberal ideas cause democracies to avoid war 
with one another (Owen, 1994)."^ ^
An overview of regional schemes in the world, however, demonstrates that cooperation has 
not always been the result of democratic minds. Many regional schemes such as ASEAN 
include non-democratic states such as Myanmar whereas in Latin America the Andean
Using justification fi’om both normative and structural restraints on conflict between democracies, Russett 
even found evidence for the 'democratic peace' thesis among ancient Greek cities and non-industrialised 
societies (Russett, 1993).
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Group or LAFTA were first established in the 1960s under authoritarian regimes. According 
to Cohen, the 'democratic peace' phenomenon is restricted in time, place and civilisation.^^ 
Moreover, the causal mechanism behind the concept is not proven, thus lacking a serious 
theoretical foundation (Cohen, 1994). Nor does most of the literature answer why 
democracies wage wars against non-democracies. It is also essential to determine at which 
stage of the démocratisation process a country is. During transition, for example, various 
pressures might affect a country's disposition towards conflict or cooperation (Mansfield 
and Snyder, 1995). In fact, the existence of democracy in itself is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for cooperation to emerge. Given the centrality of economic reforms to the pace 
and stability of democratic institutions, a review of the interaction between political and 
economic liberalisation is therefore essential (Solingen, 1998).
Domestic explanations of regionalism also concentrate on state coherence. While 
regionalism may over time lead to new forms of political organisation, state strength is a 
prerequisite for regional development and states are often building blocs within which 
regionalist arrangements are constructed. Alan Milward has argued that even in the case of 
Europe there is no antithesis between integration and the nation-state, the former being part 
of the reassertion of the latter as an organisational concept (Milward, 1992). Milward goes 
as far as to argue that European states have never had more effective power and extensive 
control over their citizens than since World War II (Milward, 1992). The most successfiil 
regional schemes such as the EU exist, therefore, where strong states have been built in 
terms of effective apparatuses and mutually accepted territorial boundaries.
As Haas wrote in the 1960s, regionalism is a phenomenon that emerges beyond the
^  Like Karl Deutsch, Cohen only found evidence for 'democratic peace' in North Atlantic/Western European 
countries during the Cold War, He attributed this to powerful interests such as a common external threat, the 
experience o f the World War II and economic interdependence (Cohen, 1994).
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nation-state (Haas, 1964). In Europe, the challenge of competing nationalisms within 
territorial states was not really a salient issue after World War U. In fact, the territorial and 
economic basis for national states had been prepared as far back as the late fifteenth century 
(Hutchinson and Smith, 1994). A state that enjoys legitimacy is more at ease with devolving 
some aspects of its sovereignty to supranational institutions than one that is trying to attain 
domestic cohesion and autonomy. The EU has made significant steps towards political and 
economic union precisely because most of its members enjoy an intact sense of national 
identity and undisputed borders, features that enable them to participate safely into 
arrangements that impinge on the traditional realm of sovereignty (Kupchan, 1995).
In the developing world, however, Mohammed Ayoob has argued that the vulnerability 
and permeability of states is the major source of insecurity. Including the Balkans in this 
category, Ayoob points out that the infancy of developing world states, the simultaneity 
of their state-making and démocratisation processes and their colonially imposed 
boundaries - and consequent overlap in the affinities of significant segments of their 
populations across borders - contribute to the emergence of regional subsystems based 
more on conflict than cooperation (Ayoob, 1995: 57)."^ ^
Although the relationship between economic development and regionalism has to date 
been underdeveloped and as was shown in section 2.4.1 academic analysis has mostly 
focused on the impact of economic integration on welfare, sustained economic dynamics 
can be argued to be a precondition for successful regionalism. Post-war European 
integration, for example, was based on the growth experienced in the continent after
The complex relationship between state, nation and démocratisation has been called ‘stateness’ problem 
by political scientists (Linz and Stepan, 1996).
As was shown in footnote 39, economists ra 
losses in any one instance of economic union.
rely agree in their projections of the balance of gains and
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World War II. Although the mainstream view is that growth in Europe was the result of 
US aid through the Marshall Plan, historical controversy surrounds the extent to which the 
latter assisted the continent economically or even the degree to which European countries 
needed the help in the first place."^  ^Whereas Alan Milward, for example, has argued that 
when the Marshall Plan was authorised in 1948 no symptoms of an economic crisis were 
observed in European countries, Michael Hogan has claimed that a serious crisis of 
production had hit Europe in 1947 and that the ERP helped recovery by ^"facilitating 
imports, easing production bottlenecks and encouraging high levels o f capitalformation'' 
(Milward, 1984: 365; Hogan, 1987: 432).^° The establishment of the ECSC in 1951, 
however, came in the aftermath of the economic reconstruction period. Output and 
external trade continued to grow fast and the creation of the EEC in 1957 merely catered 
to trade in existing products (Tsoukalis, 1997: 12).
In Latin America, however, early regionalist efforts ended in failure because economic 
events in the 1970s and 1980s reduced the desire for integration and even contributed to 
actual regression in certain cases. Whereas, for example, in the 1960s the need to enlarge 
the markets for import substitution led to the creation of LAFTA and CACM, after 1973 
the substantial increase in the price of oil weakened industrialisation efforts and export 
expansion in countries like Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela and the abundance of foreign
The Marshall Plan, otherwise known as European Recovery Programme (ERP), provided the finance for 
the large payments deficits o f Western European economies and was conditional on effective cooperation 
among governments and the progressive liberalisation o f intra-european trade, creating the foundations for 
economic cooperation at the regional level. It led to the creation o f the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (GEEC) (later OECD) and the European Payments Union (EPU) and contributed significantly 
towards the rapid expansion of intra-european trade (Tsoukalis, 1997: 10).
Alan Milward, for example, has argued that the economic crisis o f 1947 amounted to a shortage o f dollars 
for the purchase of US capital goods urgently required to maintain an already impressive economic recovery 
of Europe (Milward, 1984: 365). Similarly, John Harper has argued that the Marshall Plan’s contribution to 
European reconstruction was more political and psychological than economic given that industrial 
production was on the upswing already by mid-1947 (Harper, 1998: 151).
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exchange made it difficult for these countries to export non-oil products. In addition, in 
the second half of the 1970s, easy access to bank loans weakened efforts to earn foreign 
currency through exports to regional partners. And in the 1980s, the debt crisis, a 
recessionary framework and the proliferation of import restrictions and retaliatory 
practices within Latin America adversely affected intra-regional trade which never 
reached much more than one fifth of total external trade (Sunkel, 2000: 61).^ *
According to the early theoreticians of integration, national economic performance was 
argued to be a precondition for regionalism in so far as it is spread homogeneously among 
the units. Schmitter and Haas, for example, considered economic size and power, which 
they defined as '^‘the relative weight o f industrial capacity in the specific functional 
context o f the union'\ to be one of nine conditions for integration (Schmitter and Haas, 
1964: 711). Barrera and Haas expanded on the argument by stating that the more 
homogeneous the countries are in per capita GNP, the greater the chance of a successful 
union (Barrera and Haas, 1969: 155). Similarly, Joseph Nye argued that the more equal 
the level of development measured by per capita GNP, the higher the regional trade 
integration (Nye, 1971: 79).
More recently, Bjom Hettne defined sustained economic dynamics together with political 
stability as the two basic criteria of core regions, a category in which he included Europe, 
North America and East Asia (Hettne, 2001: 3).^  ^ Similarly, Sheila Page has found that
Neo-liberal macroeconomic adjustment and restructuring in the 1990s initially had a stimulating effect on 
trade, investment and cooperation in Latin America through the new regionalism. But the fragility of 
economic development in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina, places a question mark on the 
prospects for regional integration in the region.
According to Hettne, "'‘regions in the core are accordingly coherent, politically strong, well organised at 
the supra-state level and, furthermore, not only economically growing in a sustained manner, but also 
leading in technological innovation. They organise for the sake o f being better able to control the rest o f the 
world, the world outside their own region, and compete among themselves in exercising this influence'' 
(Hettne, 2001: 4).
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these regions, which have institutionalised their activities through the EU, NAFTA and 
APEC, have the highest average income per capita rates in the world at Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) (Page, 2000: 67). Page also suggested that more developed regions are more 
likely to maintain the same interests and survive longer (Page, 2000: 71).
Finally, there exists an emerging literature on the political economy of regionalism which 
highlights interest-group politics and societal pressures as well as the influence of structural 
factors such as domestic political institutions. Putnam, for example, offered a two-level 
game theory of integrating domestic and international spheres, addressing the role of 
domestic preferences, negotiating strategies and political practices (Putnam, 1988). 
Although this literature produced few attempts to explain patterns of regionalism, recent 
years have seen authors point to the importance of factors internal to states, such as 
pressures by firms, domestic economic conditions and distributional issues in shaping 
regional economic groupings (Milner and Manfield, 1997). Busch and Milner argue that 
sources of regionalism are to be found in the interaction of domestic politics and the 
changing international economy. In this approach, regionalism is perceived as the result of 
the 'demand' of domestic firms that are export dependent to the 'supply' by states of regional 
arrangements (Busch and Milner, 1994).
A major recent work that pays significant attention to the domestic field is Regional Order's 
at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Solingen, 1998). 
Etel Solingen explains how coalitions that evolve within states affect countries' overall 
behaviour internationally and regionally. She argues that the coalitions’ agendas - grand 
strategies - have lead to more regional orders. Internationalist orders favour economic 
liberalisation thus promoting cooperation whereas statist-nationalist and confessional ones 
oppose it thus reproducing zones of war. According to Solingen ^^coalitions provide a
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means for coming to terms with the otherwise elusive concept o f regions, by subsuming a 
region's boundaries to the coalitions'respective grand strategies” (Solingen, 1998: 4).
In fact, coalitions are policy-networks spanning state and private political actors and 
assuming that state agencies and societal actors can undertake joint projects, thus avoiding 
sterile debates between purely statist and purely societal reductionist conceptions. While 
helping define sources of change, another important contribution of this approach is that it 
requires a conceptual blending between the more extensive literature on the impact of 
economic liberalisation and the less so on domestic, regional and global dimensions of 
security. By relying on a coalitional perspective as the essential building bloc of emerging 
regional orders, therefore, it is possible to integrate some of the most important concerns and 
premises of different approaches to international politics.
2.6 Conclusions
The study or regionalism has a rich theoretical tradition behind it and constitutes an 
emergent topic in the literature of International Relations and International Political 
Economy. Rational/world description international explanations of regionalism are 
concerned with weighing the importance of'inside-ouf and 'outside-in' pressures on a region 
or combining them. Dominated by integration theories, for example, the internal dynamics 
approach regards bureaucracies, political parties or trade unions as principal integrative 
actors and links them to regional ones such as institutions (Mitrany, 1975, Haas, 1964, 
Deutsch, 1957, Keohane, 1989; Moravscik, 1993).
The external dynamics school emphasises the role of outside powers working on the region, 
such as the broader political structures within which regionalist schemes are embedded or
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the role of economic factors such as transnational companies (Waltz, 1979; Ohmae, 1995). 
An important body of literature regarding international factors that generate regionalism 
also operates at the centre of the continuum. It includes the theory on security complexes 
which are viewed as determined by the internal dynamics of a region united by common 
problems in conjunction with external dynamics (Buzan, 1983).
The reflectivist/world-making approach, on the other hand, is characterised by emphasising 
the interpretation of actors as central to the process of cooperation. Constructivists, for 
example, believe that regional entities can be created through building new loyalties and 
identities above the nation-state and promoting a collective definition of interest (Wendt, 
1994). Similarly, cognitivists view 'security communities' as regional subsystems of 
meaning - cognitive regions - that help constitute the interest of their member states (Adler, 
1997).
Finally, domestic explanations of regionalism concentrate on intra-national structural 
factors that shape regionalism. To illustrate, the 'democratic peace' thesis postulates that 
democracies do not wage war against each other, thus extending into the debate of regional 
cooperation (Doyle, 1997). State coherence is another prerequisite for regionalism to 
emerge (Milward, 1992; Haas, 1964). In addition, sustained economic dynamics have been 
identified as an important contributor to a successfiil union (Nye, 1971; Hettne, 2001). 
Finally, an emerging literature on the political economy of regionalism argues that the 
sources of the phenomenon are to be found in the interaction of domestic politics and the 
changing international economy (Busch and Milner, 1994).
As can been demonstrated primarily through the development of the European project, one 
cannot locate the sources of regionalism by focusing on one level of analysis. The European
58
Communities, for example, can best be understood through a staged approach, as the result 
of particular historical circumstances, external pressures and a response by states to 
regulating the consequences of interdependence. A major conclusion, therefore, is that 
regionalism can be more accurately explained by integrating the various theories developed 
in the last half century (Hurrell, 1995).
In this thesis, the lack of effective regionalism in Southeastern Europe in the post-Cold War 
era will also be explained by focusing on various levels of analysis. In particular, the modest 
achievements of regional cooperation in the Balkans will be attributed to the absence of 
clear mechanisms of implementation and coordination of regional initiatives and the 
systemic pressures on the region primarily by the EU as well as the lack of domestic 
preconditions for the emergence of successful regionalism.^^ The thesis will, therefore, 
demonstrate that theories of regional systems that have been worked out on the basis of the 
experience primarily among Western countries can apply to areas where the phenomenon 
has been under-developed as well as to subregional cooperation processes which are to date 
undertheorised.
Apart from the lack of institutionalisation, self-financing and coordinated activities of 
regional initiatives, external obstacles to regionalism refer primarily to the impact of the 
differentiated European integration process that has also been taking place in the Balkans in 
the post-Cold War period, exacerbating the region's heterogeneity and inducing centrifugal 
tendencies by regional countries. Given that in the period under consideration the European 
(EU) system was essentially inter-govemmental with respect to its external relations, a 
liberal institutionalist approach is more appropriate for explaining the external constraints 
on regionalism in Southeastern Europe. Systemic preconditions for the lack of regionalism
Similarly, the Euro-Atlantic (NATO) system has obstructed the emergence o f effective regionalism in the 
security sector.
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will, therefore, introduce the region (EU) as an actor that can influence the emergence of the 
phenomenon thus contributing a neo-liberal aspect to the more traditional state-centric 
outside-in approach to regional cooperation.
In addition, the major domestic barriers to the emergence of regionalism in the Balkan are 
the ongoing state-building process of the Yugoslav successor states as well as the delayed 
transition to market economies which perpetuate insecurity in the peninsula. An 
examination of the intra-national preconditions for regional cooperation will introduce to 
the domestic sources of regionalism the concept of 'stateness' which subsequent to the 
collapse of communism has been added to the literature on démocratisation with respect to 
developments in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states (Kopecky and Mudde, 2000).^^ 
Finally, the interaction between political and economic factors that inhibit the emergence of 
successful regionalism will contribute to bridging the gap between International Relations 
and International Political Economy.
In the words o f Linz and Stepan **when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries 
o f the political community's state or about who has the right ofcitizenship in that state, there is what we call 
a ‘stateness’problem'' 1996: 16).
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Chapter 3
Historical Overview of Balkan Regional Cooperation
3.1 Introduction
Before turning to contemporary patterns of interaction in Southeastern Europe, it is 
necessary to examine earlier attempts at regionalism in the Balkans in order to put the 
contemporary experience in perspective and draw lessons from the past. Chapter 3 will 
examine attempts at Balkan cooperation by states and non-state actors in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and will elaborate on why they failed to produce concrete results. It will 
consider such schemes as the Balkan Alliances of 1868 and 1912, the Balkan Conferences 
and Balkan Entente of the 1930s, the Balkan Federation, the Balkan Triangle of 1953-55, 
Balkan Arms Limitation Talks (BALTs) and the second wave of Balkan Conferences in the 
1970s and 1980s and will argue that they were largely ineffective because of external and 
domestic reasons. External constraints on regional cooperation, on the one hand, refer to the 
interest in descending order of the Great Powers, Germany and the Superpowers in keeping 
the region divided. Domestic constraints, on the other hand, are related to the fragmentory 
role of Balkan nationalisms.
3.2 Balkan Leagues and Confederal Plans
Even before the formation of nation-states in the Balkans, a number of plans for regional 
cooperation were put forward in Southeastern Europe. The origins of the idea can be sought
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in the works and activities of Rhigas Pheraios/^ Inspired by the French Revolution, in 1797 
Rhigas anonymously published the New Political Constitution for the Inhabitants o f 
Rumelia, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean Islands and Moldavia-Wallachia (Geshkoff, 
1940: 19)/^ In this revolutionary manifesto of Pan-Balkan political cooperation, Rhigas 
called on all Southeast European peoples to take up arms in a common struggle against the 
Ottomans. His goal was the establishment of a confederation comprising of the Balkans and 
Anatolia in which Greek would be the language of administration and the Church as it had 
been during the Byzantine Empire (Woodhouse, 1984: 130). The spirit of combined 
struggle moved certain individuals and small groups, such as the planners of the 1821 
revolution, but it did not however have wide popular support as the universalistic tendencies 
of the Enlightenment were not capable of countering the rise of nationalism (Lopez Villalba, 
2003: 146).”
Other proponents of regional cooperation in this period included the Hungarian 
revolutionary Lajos Kossuth who in the 1850s and 1860s envisaged the creation of a 
Danubian Confederation comprising of Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Transylvania to be 
joined at a later stage by Croatia, Bosnia and Bulgaria (Braun, 1989; Stavrianos, 1964:66).^* 
Kossuth’s anti-Habsburg initiative was meant to operate via a federative parliament and 
council with powers to collectively manage trade, customs, foreign affairs and defence 
(Kearns, 1999: 29). The fundamental cause of its failure, however, was that none of the
Rhigas Pheraios, or else Constantine Velestinlis, was a Secretary o f Phanariot and boier magnates in 
Constantinople and Bucharest who settled in Vienna in the late eighteenth century stirring through his 
revolutionary poems a Balkan uprising against the Ottoman Empire (Pavlowitch, 1999: 25).
The statute for the ‘Greek Republic’ contained a sut generis translation of the 1793 French Constitution as 
well as the famous revolutionary poem Thourios (Lopez Villalba, 2003: 144).
Rhigas was eventually captured and killed by the Ottomans in 1798 (Svolopoulos, 1999).
In 1848, Kossuth formed an anti-Habsburg liberal government in Hungary which was eventually defeated 
by Franz-Joseph with the aid of Russia (Jelavich, 1983: 310).
62
national groups involved was seriously interested in a confederation for its own sake, but 
only insofar as it might satisfy their national aspirations for autonomy and independence 
(Stavrianos, 1964: 83).
With the emergence of states in the region, the responsibility for setting up mechanisms of 
regional cooperation became an affair of national governments. Such cooperation, however, 
was never achieved on a multilateral basis. Rather it involved two sets of alliance systems 
against the Ottomans based on a network of bilateral agreements. The first Balkan League 
was set up between 1866 and 1868 by Michael HI of Serbia and consisted of a series of 
treaties that Serbia concluded with Romania, Montenegro, a Bulgarian revolutionary society 
and Greece (Stavrianos, 1958; Svolopoulos. 1999).^  ^The coordinated Balkan revolt against 
the Turks planned for 1868, however, disintegrated very fast after the assassination of 
Michael HI and the withdrawal of Russian support (Jackson, 1996).
A second Balkan League consisting again of a series of separate treaties between Greece, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro was formed in 1912 .The Treaties of Alliance between 
Bulgaria and Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were largely the product of Russian diplomacy 
and were signed as a result of the opposition of Balkan states to the Turkification policies of 
the Young Turks (Geshkoff, 1940: 41). Although the Second Balkan League gained a 
measure of success against Ottoman Turkey in 1912, when it came to "minting common 
victory into political coin" and dividing the spoils, however, the antagonisms between the 
partners became apparent (Mitrany, 1927:166). The Second Balkan War broke out in 1913 
with Greece, Serbia and Montenegro -  and subsequently Romania - on the one side and 
Bulgaria on the other (Geshkoff, 1940:43).
The Greek-Serbian alliance was expressed through the 1867 Treaty of Voeslau.
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That Balkan cooperation never succeeded in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can 
be attributed to internal and external factors. Within the region, the awakening of 
nationalism and the creation of autonomous and independent states with overlapping claims 
on Balkan territories was not compatible with creating the necessary climate for 
cooperation. The period 1878-1914 in particular was one of crises and wars in the 
peninsula because of the grievances created by the Congress of Berlin. Although the 1878 
Berlin settlement involved major changes in frontiers and political status, all Balkan states 
were left dissatisfied. To illustrate, Bulgaria gained autonomy from the Ottoman Empire but 
embitterment followed the loss of territories that were granted to Sofia earlier that year by 
the Treaty of San Stefano, namely all of present day FYR Macedonia and large parts of 
northern Greece (Stavrianos, 1958).^ * In addition, although Serbia and Romania gained full 
independence and additional territory, Serbs were unhappy about the advance of 
Austria-Hungaiy into Bosnia and Romanians about the loss of Bessarabia to Russia 
(Stavrianos, 1958).
The consequences of the Treaty of Berlin, therefore, were the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, 
the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. That Macedonia remained 
under Turkish administration also brought about the suicidal Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian 
struggle over its territories which eventually overcame even their common opposition to the 
Porte (Stavrianos: 1958: 412). In the nineteenth century, therefore, Balkan statesmen 
occasionally showed some interest in cooperating with their neighbours and even talked of 
forming federations, but only so long as it suited the interests of their particular country
^  The Balkan national revolutions of the nineteenth century were carried out individually with little 
cooperation among nationalities. But they all, however, shared common characteristics such as a cultural 
revival, armed insurrections and similar political and economic goals for the future (Sfikas, 1999).
The Treaty of San Stefano was dictated to the Ottomans by Russia at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877-78 (Stavrianos, 1958).
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(Stavrianos, 1964). Finally, the creation of nation-states further fragmented the region 
economically since production was nationalised and linked to dominant centres in Europe.^^
External factors were also unfavourable to Balkan cooperation. In the nineteenth century. 
Great Power diplomacy concentrated in keeping Southeast European states divided. 
BalkanO divisions were initially supported by the Concert of Europe due to a fear that a 
major rearrangement derived from the decline of the Ottoman Empire would favour Russia 
because of its influence on Balkan Slavs (Stavrianos, 1958)^  ^Arranged by Bismarck with 
the participation of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Britain and Germany who had been the 
representatives of the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty, therefore, the 1878 Congress of Berlin 
checked Russia's ambitions in the region and led to the diplomatic carve-up of the Balkans 
that ruled out the creation of viable states (Gallagher, 2001). Thereafter, the European 
powers were interested in preserving the status quo, opposing territorial revisions in the 
region, collecting interest on state loans and keeping each other in check (Lampe, 1990: 
15).^
Finally, economic interests of the Great Powers also stood in the way of Balkan cooperation. 
To illustrate, when as early as 1880 the governments of Bulgaria and Serbia entered into
The failure of the Ottoman command economy in the eighteenth century to establish a mercantilistic 
institutional framework to replace a military and feudal state structure, allowed Balkan traders to provide the 
commercial nexus around which modem nation-states would emerge in Southeastern Europe (Lampe, 1982: 
16).
Asa result o f their competition with Britain over influence in the Near East, Persia and India and given their 
historical interest in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, Russians played the card o f the natural protectors of 
the Orthodox Christians under Ottoman domination. In the 1860s and 1870s, Russian Panslavists had 
proclaimed their own plans for a federal union of Balkan people with Russia as the guiding power 
(Rosenberger, 1969:16; Jelavich, 1983: 353).
^  Even Russia, which had sponsored the Balkan Alliance systems o f 1866-68 and 1912, was not keen to see 
the Ottomans collapse and on both occasions eventually restrained its policies so as to preserve the crumbling 
Ottoman Empire (Stavrianos, 1958: 228),
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negotiations for the establishment of a Customs Union, Austria-Hungaiy posed significant 
objections and Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations fell through. When a treaty was signed 
between Sofia and Belgrade in 1905, Austria closed her border to Serbian cattle imposing 
an economic war between 1906-1911 (Geshkoff, 1940:32). A Habsburg tariff war had also 
been imposed on Romania between 1886-91 (Lampe, 1990: 13).^ ^
3.3 Balkan Conferences and Balkan Entente
With the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires which had been 
significantly involved in Southeastern Europe until 1914, Balkan governments had the 
opportunity to form a front to protect their interests and fill the political vacuum in the 
region.^  ^In the 1920s, international impetus for cooperation was provided by the spirit of 
liberalism that followed the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and the signing 
of treaties like Locarno in 1925 which guaranteed the borders between France and Germany 
embodying the principle of non-aggression and arbitration (Economides, 1992: 121). The 
conclusion of a series of bilateral agreements between Balkan countries was an important 
factor in promoting stability in the region and removing sources of discord.^^
In 1911, the Romanian economist Xenopol re-examined prospects for the creation o f a Balkan Federation 
He concluded against it arguing that the industrial countries dominating the Bulgarian and Serbian markets 
would not allow it (Mitrany, 1927:166). Serbian trade with Vojvodina and Romanian trade with Transylvania, 
however, already provided a degree o f economic cooperation for the enlarged states o f Yugoslavia and 
Romania that would be created after the Great War (Lampe, 1990:13).
^  Apart fi’om their diplomatic role in the region, until the Great War the three Empires also dominated large 
parts of the peninsula. Austria-Hungaiy owned Dalmatia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Transylvania, Russia Bukovina and Bessarabia and Ottoman Turkey Albania, Macedonia and Thrace. The 
annexation o f Bosnia by Austria-Hungary in 1908 intensified Great-Power rivalries culminating in June 1914 
in the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Habsburg heir to the throne, an event Wiich 
sparked World War I (Cviic, 1995).
Romania, for example, signed an agreement with Greece in 1928, Yugoslavia in 1929 and Bulgaria in 1930. 
Turkey signed treaties of fiiendship with Yugoslavia in 1925, Bulgaria in 1929, Greece in 1930 and Romania 
in 1933 (Kemer and Howard, 1936; Lopandic, 2001: 45).
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In such a climate of reconciliation, David Mitrany presented his liberal ideas for promoting 
cooperation in the Balkans. In The Possibility o f a Balkan Locamo, Mitrany argued that an 
all inclusive arrangement should be set up in Southeastern Europe in order to guarantee 
borders and provide a mechanism for arbitration (Mitrany, 1927). According to the father of 
functionalism, conditions for the success of such a project were finding a commonality of 
interest among Balkan countries as well as containing outside interference. Even Mitrany's 
idealism, however, found these conditions to be lacking in Southeastern Europe in the 
interwar period (Mitrany, 1927: 30).
The most significant attempt at regional cooperation in the interwar period was promoted 
multilaterally through a series of Balkan Conferences between 1930-33. Organised as 
meetings of unofficial representatives of all states in the region, the Balkan Conferences 
aimed to create a Union of Balkan States.^* The idea was initiated by Greek representatives 
at the Twenty-Seventh World Peace Congress held in Athens in 1929 and headed by former 
Premier Alexander Papanastassiou. Although delegations to the Conferences included 
politicians, intellectuals, chamber representatives and journalists, the positions of national 
groups were in line with their governments and observer status was granted to diplomatic 
representatives (Lopandic, 2001: 38)
It has been argued that the Balkan Conferences were an attempt by countries in Southeastern 
Europe to adjust their mutual interests and organise a bloc strong enough to resist pressures 
from the Great Powers (Geshkoff, 1940: 147). An implicit reason for these plans was that 
the Great Depression of 1929 had hit Balkan countries hard through a significant drop in
"The aim of the Balkan Conference is to contribute to a rapprochement and collaboration of the Balkan 
peoples in their economic, social, cultural and political relations, so as to direct this collaboration toward the 
ultimate establishment o f the Union o f Balkan States (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia)" (Statutes o f the Balkan Conference: Article 1).
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agricultural prices and a decline in their exports (Lampe, 1982). A Customs Union was 
consequently also promoted with view to allowing Balkan states to bargain on equal terms 
with those countries which had formed protectionist blocs in Western and Central Europe 
(Stavrianos, 1964).
The First Balkan Conference held in Athens in October 1930 adopted various ambitious 
declarations and resolutions as a basis for future work as well as The Statutes of the Balkan 
Conference whereby it was established as a permanent organisation. It was also agreed that 
the directing bodies would be a General Assembly, a Council, a Bureau and a Secretariat 
(The Statutes of the Balkan Conference: Article 2). Finally, symbols of an incipient union 
were introduced such as a flag and a hymn composed for the first Balkan games (Braun, 
1983:41). The Second Balkan Conference held in Istanbul in October 1931 saw the creation 
of six commissions for the establishment of a political, social and economic rapprochement. 
An Inter-Balkan Trade and Industrial Chamber, Postal Union and Tourist Federation were 
also formed and the abolition of visas among Balkan citizens was advocated (Lopandic, 
2001:39).®’
The Third Balkan Conference held in Bucharest in October 1932 saw the adoption of a draft 
for the creation of a Balkan Pact and a Convention on the State of Citizens as well as various 
proposals for the elaboration of a common textbook on the region's history or the foundation 
of a Physicians’ Union.^° Finally, the Fourth Balkan Conference held in Thessaloniki in 
November 1933 examined proposals for the development of a network of regional transport
Various other technical cooperation bodies were promoted such as a Balkan Press Association, a Medical 
Union as well as Tobacco and Labour Offices (Geshkoff, 1940).
The draft o f the Balkan Pact comprised of 39 articles which were divided into five chapters. These included 
a) non-aggression and fiiendship; b) pacific settlement o f disputes; c) mutual assistance; d) the protection of 
minorities and d) general provisions (The Bucharest Draft Balkan Pact).
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infrastructure and saw the adoption of a Draft Convention on Regional Economic Entente/*
The process, however, gradually broke down as Bulgaria and Albania raised objections 
during the Third and Fourth Conferences with respect to the Draft Balkan Pact. Refusing to 
further participate until their grievances were satisfied with respect to unresolved territorial 
disputes and minority questions, Tirana and Sofia continued to pursue their own claims on 
neighbouring states (Economides, 1992: ; Lopandic, 2001: 40).^  ^In practice, therefore, the 
Balkan Conferences failed to resolve political problems that derived primarily from 
Bulgarian revisionism of the Treaties of Berlin (1878), Bucharest (1913) and Neuilly (1919) 
(Geshkoff, 1940: 199).
In addition, the establishment of a Customs Union was doomed to fail because of the 
unwillingness on the part of Balkan countries to relinquish trade barriers (Lampe, 1982: 
457). Bilateral economic agreements with Germany gradually created competition between 
Balkan countries and the lack of significant levels of intra-regional trade - which at the time 
was estimated at 9% - hampered prospects for the establishment of economic integration in 
the region (Karafotakis, 1999:24). The signing of a Yugoslav Free Zone in Thessaloniki in 
1914 eventually proved to be the only concrete step towards economic integration in the 
Balkans in the interwar period (Karafotakis, 1999: 2)?^
"The Governments o f the Balkan States animated by the desire 1) to develop the exchange o f goods and 
services among the national markets o f the Balkan countries to the largest possible extent and 2) to cooperate 
fo r the most effective protection of their staple products in the extra-Balkan markets, bind themselves to 
establish, within the period o f one year, the Regional Economic Entente as a first step toward the Balkan 
Customs Union" {The Draft Convention on Regional Economic Entente: Preamble).
Bulgaria had never accepted the loss of Dobrudja to Romania and believed Macedonians to be ethnic 
Bulgarians. Albania claimed Greek Epirus and Yugoslav Kosovo.
The Yugoslav Free Zone, however, was not consolidated until 1929 when Greece and Yugoslavia disposed 
o f a controversy over its functioning (Karafotakis, 1999:28),
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The consequence of the rift among participants of the Balkan Conferences was the signing 
in February 1934 of an Entente between Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. It was 
intended as a regional compact against all forms of territorial revision and provided for a 
permanent Economic Council and legislative coordination.^"  ^In practice, however, the 
Balkan Entente was an alliance aiming to uphold the territorial status quo against Bulgarian 
revisionism and was not directed against any states outside the region.^  ^In addition, that 
Yugoslavia and Romania had already been signatories to the 1921 Little Entente, which in 
1933 reorganised under the Pact of Organisation directed against the Axis Powers, 
destroyed any notion of a Balkan regional identity by removing two major countries fi*om 
the equation (Economides, 1992).^^
Furthermore, since they did not possess a protective mechanism against external threats, the 
members of the Balkan Entente eventually sought security through bilateral treaties with 
Germany and Italy, such as the Italo-Yugoslav agreement of 1937 (Veremis, 1994: 34). In 
addition, although in 1938 the Balkan Pact was even briefly enlarged to include Bulgaria in 
return for a promise that Sofia would not seek frontier revisions by force, the agreement 
formally functioned until September 1940 when Romania officially withdrew its 
participation (Campus, 1978: 150-3). The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940, 
therefore, provoked no reaction among members of the Balkan Entente.
The Balkan Entente comprised of three articles whereby the signatories a) mutually guaranteed security of  
borders; b) undertook to consult one another and act in a mutually adjusted manner with respect to other 
regional countries and c) guaranteed that the agreement was open to all Balkan countries (The Pact o f Balkan 
Entente, 1934).
It is noteworthy that the word "Balkan' first gained international recognition through its use in this pact 
(Geshkoff, 1940),
The Little Entente was signed in 1920-21 between Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia in order to 
guarantee the territorial integrity of the successor states o f the Austro-Hungarian Empire and prevent Hungary 
from restoring the Habsburg Dynasty. In 1933, the Little Entente reorganised under the Pact of Organisation 
out of fear that Great Britain and France would appease the Axis Powers at the expense of small states, turning 
it into a defensive alliance against Germany (Campus, 1978).
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Apart from domestic controversies, therefore, external factors undermined the foundations 
of Balkan cooperation in the interwar period. Germany's revival in the 1930s gradually filled 
the power vacuum in Southeastern Europe and the centrifugal pull of its expansionism was 
too strong for Balkan countries to resist.^  ^Italy, which also sought to expand eastwards, 
backed revisionist powers Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria and subsidised terrorist groups in 
other countries contributing to turbulence in Balkan politics. In addition, France, which in 
the 1920s had promoted Balkan and Central European cooperation in order to preserve a 
favourable continental status quo, was unable to maintain a balance between revisionist and 
anti-revisionist powers in the 1930s.^* Finally, the 1930s saw the discrediting of the League 
of Nations’ principle of collective security in favour of bilateral pacts of non-aggression.^^
3.4 Balkan Federation
In the interwar period, a federation movement with considerable mass following first 
developed under the leadership of the radical agrarian as well as socialist and communist 
parties (Stavrianos, 1964: 260). Espousing its ideas in 1922, the Premier of Bulgaria 
Alexander Stambolinski put forward a plan for the creation of a Customs Union between 
Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes along agrarian lines (Braun, 1989).
As they formed a political alliance to oppose revisionism which the Reich supported, the Balkan Entente 
associates were on the way to becoming economically dependent on Germany (Pavlowitch, 1999: 273).
The rise o f the Axis powers made France reconsider Hungarian containment and even support plans for a 
Danubian Federation between 1930-35 to end the latter's isolation (Rosenberger, 1969). In 1932, French 
Foreign Minister Tardieu advocated the creation o f a Customs Union between Austria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Romania in order to prevent German expansionism. But Austria and Hungary blocked the 
idea of creating an economic entity between the states that emerged from the Habsburg lands (Gallagher, 2001 : 
106).
In the Balkans, these included the Pact on a Cordial Alliance between Greece and Turkey o f 14/9/1933; the 
Agreement on Friendship, Non-Aggression, Arbitration and Reconciliation between Romania and Turkey of 
17/10/33 and the Agreement on Friendship, Non-Aggression, Judicial Negotiations, Arbitration and 
Reconciliation between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Turkey o f27/11/33 (Lopandic, 2001:45).
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Fearing that a cooperation scheme between Croats, Slovenes and Bulgarians might deprive 
them of supremacy in an integral Yugoslav Federation, however, the Serbs rejected the 
Stambolinski proposal (Geshkoff, 1940: 61)T Although Stambolinski was assassinated in 
1923, ideas of a unification of the Balkans along an agrarian union were alive in the region 
until the late 1930s (Braun, 1983:48)/^
Socialist parties had also been suggesting federal solutions for Southeastern Europe as early 
as 1870 (King, 1973: 57). At the first Balkan Conference of Social Democrats in 1910 the 
idea of a federation was put forward as a way to solve the national, social and class problems 
of the region (Lopandic, 2001: 36). In addition, in the 1920s and 1930s, the communist 
Comintern advocated the creation of a Balkan Federation with the aim of replacing the 
French-backed Kingdom of Yugoslavia and other surrounding national states. The 
ideological basis behind the Marxist advocacy for a Balkan Federation was that it would be 
a step on the road to an eventual world-wide revolution. A Secretariat and other organs were 
organised to include Balkan communist parties (King, 1973: 58).
Advocating the creation of an autonomous Macedonian state within the federation, the idea 
was popular in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia - which in this period was called 
Southern Serbia - but not among Croats, Serbs and Slovenes (Cviic, 1995: 13).*  ^ In 
addition, up to World War U, the communist parties and Marxist intellectuals in Balkan
Despite the network of treaties that emerged in the 1920s, no cooperation agreement was signed between 
Bulgaria and the newly-founded Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Kemer and Howard, 1936:22).
Contrary to the ideas of the agrarian movement, in 1943 Rosenstein-Rodan advocated that Southeastern 
Europe should develop strategic complementarity and light labour-intensive industries. His classic study on 
industrialisation problems in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is considered to have founded development 
economics (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).
Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists each felt they could benefit from the unification of Macedonia with a 
Balkan Federation as a means of consolidating or reestablishing their control on its territories (King, 1973: 
59-61).
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States did not have more than a limited impact on the foreign policies of their countries. 
Finally, in the mid-1930s, the Comintern was obliged to change its line of supporting an 
anti-fascist coalition of states and temporarily stopped advocating the break-up of 
Yugoslavia until the two-year rapprochement with Nazi Germany instigated by the 1939 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of Non-Aggression between Berlin and Moscow was over 
(Braun, 1989).
After its break with the Axis Powers in 1941, however, Moscow encouraged plans for a 
federation in the Balkans to occur in steps, first among the Southern Slavs to be followed by 
the inclusion of Albania, Greece and Romania. This policy was in line with Stalin's flirtation 
with the idea of creating a number of federations in Eastern Europe that would look towards 
the Soviet Union (Vucadinovic, 1994). The universalistic interpretation of Marxism and 
subservience to Soviet interests influenced the more concrete proposals toward federation 
that were made in the latter part of the Second World War.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) initially promoted plans for a Balkan 
Federation because Tito thought he could benefit fi’om it, especially by consolidating 
Yugoslav control over Macedonia (King, 1973). Under the so-called Tito-Dimitrov 
Proposals of 1944-45, Yugoslav-Bulgarian unification plans were put forward (Braun, 
1989: 33). In 1946, steps were taken for an economic union with Albania through the 
signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which envisaged the coordination of 
economic plans between the Belgrade and Tirana, standardisation of monetary systems, the 
creation of a Customs Union and unification of prices (Cviic, 1995: 28). In 1947, the Bled 
Accords were signed with the prospect of creating a similar union between Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria (Wallden, 1994: 89).
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Socialist Yugoslavia, however, favoured proposals for regional cooperation so long as it felt 
that it was leading ideological developments and that its national aspirations were fulfilled. 
When Tito realised that these plans were to be no more than an appendage to the Soviet 
system, he began to interpret socialism as a world process that developed at different speeds 
and introduced the concept of decentralisation (Braun, 1989: 36). Subsequently, Yugoslav 
plans were condemned by Moscow and the diverging aspirations contributed to the 
Yugoslav-Soviet break in 1948 (Wallden, 1994).*^ Marxism, therefore, failed as an 
integrative force in the Balkans because when national economic and security interests were 
threatened, as in the case of Yugoslavia, its ideology was reinterpreted to fit the interest of 
these states (Braun, 1989).
The idea of a Balkan Federation was also controversial among many Greek, Bulgarian and 
Albanian communists who saw it as Tito's aspiration to hegemony in Southeastern Europe 
(Braun, 1989; Wallden, 1994).^^ Internal Balkan antagonisms such as the perennial 
Macedonian question, for example, plagued the Yugoslav-Bulgarian unification proposals 
which were viewed as counter to Bulgarian national aspirations. The West was also opposed 
to the proposed union for it was seen as an attempt by Bulgaria to evade punishment for its 
role in supporting the Axis powers (Braun, 1989: 35). Eventually, Stalin lost interest in a 
Balkan Federation that Moscow would not control and after 1948 found other ways to push 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the Soviet orbit through the creation of COMECON and
To the Yugoslav-Soviet break also contributed quarrels over Soviet intelligence activities in Yugoslavia, 
Tito's impression o f economic exploitation through plans for the creation o f mixed Soviet-Yugoslav 
corporations and Moscow's half-hearted support to Belgrade over its claims on Trieste and Austrian lands 
(Kulski, 1964: 168).
^  Tirana in particular resented Tito's attempt to turn Albania into a Yugoslav satellite through setting up joint 
stock companies to exploit the country's oil and mineral reserves in which it had the status o f a junior partner. 
After the Yugoslav-Soviet break in 1948, Albania expelled Yugoslavs fi’om its territory on grounds o f national 
sovereignty and turned towards Moscow for economic and technical aid (Cviic, 1995: 28).
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the Warsaw Pact. 85
3.5 Balkan Triangle*^
During the Cold War, the Balkan peninsula was divided into two blocs of competing 
socio-economic and political systems. On the one hand, Greece and Turkey became 
attached to Western European institutions set up to counter the Soviet threat. Subsequent to 
being offered economic and military assistance through the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and 
the Marshall Plan in 1948, Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. In addition, both 
countries signed Association Agreements (AAs) with the EEC in 1961 and 1963 
respectively.*^ On the other hand, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania became part
of the communist bloc as Moscow saught tightly knit economic relations in Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans through the establishment of Comecon in 1949.** In addition, the Soviet 
Union based its pursuit for security in its Eastern and Southeastern neighbourhood through
Braun has even argued that after Stalin turned against the idea o f a federation in Southeastern Europe in 
1948, "Moscow looked askance at Balkan cooperation and both the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were 
important tools that could be used in trying to prevent the growth o f regionalism in the peninsula" (Braun, 
1983: 116).
The term Balkan Triangle is taken fi-om the literature (latrides, 1968).
Greece's agreement with the EEC provided for a Customs Union to be established between the two within 
22 years and covered agricultural harmonisation, technical and financial assistance and issues considered 
necessary for the gradual integration o f the country into the EC such as competition, fi’ee movement o f labour 
and services and the coordination of economic policies. It was the first and most comprehensive AA ever to 
have been signed by the EC. It covered more ground than the Ankara Accord which envisaged a long transition 
period before the harmonisation of important policy areas, set up fewer institutions and gave a less positive 
commitment to Turkey's EC membership (Kazakos, 1994:1).
** The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) - or else COMECON - was promoted by the Soviets 
as an attempt at regional economic integration in the communist world. Introduced in the aftermath of the 
launching of the Marshall Plan, CMEA attempted to establish an alternative economic complex in the Peoples 
Democracies o f Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Comecon's founding members in 1949 were the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, GDR and soon after Albania. Mongolia joined in 1962, 
Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in 1978 (Brine, 1992).
75
the creation of the Warsaw Pact/^
Even within the same blocs, however, conflicts arose. The Greek-Turkish disputes that 
evolved into serious crises over the status of Cyprus during 1955-58,1963, 1967 and 1974, 
constantly brought the two countries to the brink of war and plagued NATO's cohesion. To 
illustrate, Athens' estrangement from the Alliance subsequent to the Turkish occupation of 
the northern part of the island in 1974 led to its withdrawal from NATO's military wing 
between 1974 and 1980 (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 7). Following the American weapons 
embargo against Turkey in 1975 and still resenting Lyndon Johnson's letter of June 1964 to 
Ismet Inonu urging him not to intervene in Cyprus, Ankara closed down twenty-six US 
military installations on its territory (Branch, 1983: 86).^°
The communist bloc was also seriously fragmented and lacked ideological uniformity. 
Belgrade, Tirana and Bucharest frequently challenged Soviet domination and flirted with 
outside powers. To illustrate, although the Yugoslav-Soviet break was mended after 1958, 
Belgrade never joined the Warsaw Pact and despite eventually joining COMECON as an 
associate member in 1965, it was the first Balkan country to sign Trade and Cooperation 
Agreements (TCAs) with the EEC in 1970 and 1980 respectively (Wallden, 1994: 60). 
Albania stopped participating in COMECON meetings after its break with Moscow in 1961 
and its alignment to Beijing in 1962 and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968.^^
The Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) was founded in 1955 as a reaction to West German rearmament 
and integration into NATO and was used as an excuse to station Soviet troops in Romania and Hungary after 
the signing of the Austria State Treaty. WTO signatories were the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania (Braun, 1983: 86).
^  Only four US military installations were allowed to resume their activities in Turkey in 1978 (Braun, 1983: 
86).
The Soviet-Albanian rift took place because of Hoxha's dislike o f Khrushchev's revisionism and the new 
theory of'peaceful coexistence' with the West and his opening towards China. In 1961, the USSR suspended 
economic aid to Albania asking for the removal of the Albanian leadership. Tirana responded by extraditing
7 6
Subsequent to breaking with China in 1978, Tirana turned to autarchy and isolation and an 
independent foreign policy as a means of achieving security (Nelson, 1990: 139).^^
Furthermore, in the 1960s Romania affirmed its desire for autonomy from the USSR by 
refusing to participate in WTO joint operations and withdrew from many joint COMECON 
projects after realising that increased specialisation was at the advantage of the more 
industrially developed Eastern European countries (Linden, 1990). In addition, in 1980 
Bucharest signed an industrial Cooperation Agreement with the EEC (Wallden, 1994). 
Finally, even Bulgaria, the only loyal Soviet ally in the Balkans, was traditionally the least 
active member of the Warsaw Pact as WTO troops were not stationed on its territory (Braun, 
1983: 90). During the Cold War, therefore, "the Balkans were not separated by the iron 
curtain only, but by a number o f regional curtains o f differing thickness" (Gligorov, 1999: 
2).
In the early 1950s, regional cooperation breaking traditional Cold War lines was first 
promoted through the so-called Balkan Triangle. Intended to counteract Moscow's 
expansionism in the area at a time when Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey felt exposed to a 
perceived Soviet threat, the Balkan Triangle can be seen as the outcome of western support 
for Belgrade against the Soviet Union after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. In 1953, a 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Ankara between Turkey, Greece and 
Yugoslavia. It provided for the parties to consult on a regular basis on issues of common 
interest. It was envisaged that foreign ministers would hold regular meetings and that the 
parties would exert efforts to preserve peace and security including common defense
Soviet advisers and closing down Moscow's submarine base on the Adriatic port of Vlore (Lange, 1989; 
Nelson, 1990).
^  The Sino-Albanian relationship deteriorated after Mao's death in 1976. In 1978, Beij ing cut off aid to Tirana 
due to disagreements over revolutionary principles and foreign policy (Nelson, 1990:139).
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measures (Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: Articles 1 and 2)P
The Treaty also provided for cooperation in the spheres of the economy, technology and 
culture upon which separate agreements could be concluded (Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation: Article 4). Finally, a supplementary agreement concluded in November 1953 
provided for the creation of a Permanent Secretariat which had the status of an international 
organisation (Règlement Intérieur du Secretariat Permanent: Article 1). The tasks of the 
Permanent Secretariat were to prepare foreign ministers meetings, examine questions of 
political and military cooperation and propose the convening of conferences. It consisted of 
a Committee and Permanent Bureau and had sections for political, military, economic and 
cultural issues (Règlement Intérieur du Secretariat Permanent; Article 3).
The Ankara Treaty was followed by the Treaty on Alliance, Political Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance signed in Bled in August 1954. The so-called Bled Pact committed 
military aid among the signatories in case of an attack raising relations to the level of an 
alliance (Treaty on Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance: Article 2)?^ A 
Permanent Council was also created consisting of foreign ministers and other government 
members. Finally, in March 1955 an Agreement on the Establishment of a Balkan 
Consultative Assembly was signed in Ankara. The Assembly was intended to examine 
issues concerning the consolidation of cooperation in many areas (Agreement on the
"Les parties contractantes entendent continuer leurs efforts communs pour la sauvegarde de la paix et de la 
sécurité dans leur region et poursuivre, en commun, l'examen des problèmes de leur sécurité y  compris les 
mesures communes de defense dont la nécessite pourrait se produire au cas d'une agression non provoquée 
contre elles" (Traite d'Amitié et de Collaboration entre le Royaume de Grece, la Republique Turque et la 
Republique Federative Populaire Yougoslave: Article II).
^  "Les parties contractantes conviennent que toute aggression armee contre Tune ou plusieurs d'entre Elles 
sur n'importe quelle partie de leur territoire sera considérée comme une aggression contre toutes les parties 
contractantes" (Traite d'Alliance, de Cooperation Politique et d'Assistance Mutuelle: Article H).
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Establishment of the Balkan Consultative Assembly: Article 2; Lopandic, 2001: 53) 95
Like the 1934 Balkan Entente, however, the 1954 Bled Pact in practice created a defensive 
alliance that set one group of countries against another depicting more division than unity in 
the peninsula. In addition, in practice both the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the 
Treaty on Alliance, Political and Mutual Assistance failed to establish an efficient 
bureaucracy. The instruments of tripartite cooperation were small in size and not endowed 
with any significant authority or the ability to evolve. Finally, both military and political 
matters essentially remained outside the competence of the Secretariat which as a result was 
prevented from enhancing the credibility of the Balkan Triangle (latrides, 1968:183).
Based on the signatories' temporary interests, the Balkan Pact in particular ceased to have 
any significant role after a complete break down in Greek-Turkish relations caused by a 
standstill in discussions over the fiiture status of Cyprus in September 1955 and the 
subsequent violent anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir (latrides, 1968: 167).^  ^To its 
demise also contributed the first signs of a Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement subsequent to 
Stalin's death in 1953 and Tito's shift towards non-alignment. The last Council of Foreign 
Ministers, therefore, took place in 1955 (latrides, 1968: 178). The abandonment of the 
Balkan Pact may serve to illustrate the case that alliances which form in times of tension 
tend to succumb to regional differences which reappear as soon as external threats have
''The Assembly has as its task to study all the means which might benefit the development of cooperation 
between the Signatory Countries with the aim o f security peace, protection o f common interests and 
achievement o f welfare of the peoples of the signatory powers in all fields o f their mutual relations" 
{Agreement on the Establishment of the Balkan Consultative Assembly: Article 2).
At the London Conference of September 1955, Greece requested that Cyprus be granted independence from 
the British. Turkey, however, was concerned with minority rights and its own security in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The British eventually offered a new constitution granting the island enhanced self-rule and a 
vague prospect of independence (latrides, 1968: 167).
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receded (latrides, 1968)/^
3.6 Balkan Arms Limitation Talks (BALTs)
During the Cold War, regionalism bridging the bipolar divide in the Balkans was also 
pursued through arms limitation talks. A variety of proposals for reducing arms and 
denuclearisation were promoted in the region primarily by communist countries (Platias and 
Rydell, 1983: 120). In 1957, for example, Romania put forward the Stoica Plan for a 
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Balkans. It was supported by the Soviet Union 
in its attempt to eliminate US nuclear weapons and came shortly after Greece and Turkey 
decided to install American missile bases on their territory (Braun, 1989). Although the 
Stoica Plan appeared in line with Khrushev's desire to restore an atmosphere of 'peaceful 
coexistence' in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, Gheorghiu Dej's 
primary goal was securing the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces fi*om Romania (Branch, 
1983: 83). The proposal, however, was rejected by NATO allies which stressed the 
necessity for a nuclear means of counterveilling Soviet conventional forces and long-range 
nuclear weapons (Platias and Rydel, 1983:121).
Interest in Balkan disarmament continued throughout the Cold War. Supported by Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union reiterated calls for a NWFZ in 
Southeastern Europe on several occasions between 1959-1963 (Platias and Rydel, 1983: 
120). In the context of preparations for the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, Romania pursued a 
strategy of Confidence and Security-Building Measures similar to the neutral and
^  This interpretation is in line with realist theory which argues that alliances form in response to external 
challenges (Walt, 1979).
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non-aligned European countries.^* In 1972, for example, Romania tabled a proposal for 
denuclearisation of Southeastern Europe at the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva (Branch, 1983: 83). In the 1980s, Romania joined 
Yugoslavia in promoting BALTs as a subregional forum of European arms-control and 
disarmament negotiations (Branch, 1983: 92). Finally, Greece took up the cause of Balkan 
denuclearisation between 1982 and 1984 under the newly elected Socialist government 
(Veremis, 1995: 39).
Platias and Rydell have argued that these initiatives constituted an attempt to promote an 
international 'security regime' in the Balkans and illustrate local concerns for stability and an 
alternative defense arrangement in Southeastern Europe (Platias and Rydell, 1983). 
Gradually, however, the idea of a NWFZ became a means for Balkan countries to further 
their own foreign policy objectives. Whereas the Soviet Union had a security interest in the 
removal of long-range nuclear forces from Greece and Turkey that could reach its territory, 
Romania's initiatives for Balkan disarmament, which proliferated after Bucharest 
announced its autonomy form the USSR in 1964, can be seen to have stemmed from its 
desire to have a foreign policy independent from Moscow.^^ Similarly, that Greece joined 
the campaign against nuclear weapons in the early 1980s can be interpreted as one of 
Papandreou's tactics of pursuing an independent policy from the West in light of Greece's
The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was the culmination o f a three stage process under the aegis of the 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) set up in 1972 in order to promote European 
security,
^  Romanians have traditionally seen themselves as having a moderating role in the Balkans given their 
preeminence as arbitrators at the 1913 Bucharest Peace Conference and their leading position in the Little 
Entente in the interwar period (Rosenberger, 1969: 46-47). Anti-Soviet feeling originated in the immediate 
post-war years as a result o f the heavy reparations that Moscow imposed on the country classifying it as a 
former enemy state and the loss of Bessarabia to the USSR. Romania's drive towards independence from 
Moscow, however, started to be played in 1960-61 given the leverage offered to Bucharest by the Sino-Soviet 
rift and culminated between 1964-1968 due to disputes over the country's role in COMECON. The nationalist 
policy had a strong cultural context as well given Romanians' self-image as a Latin oasis in the middle o f a Slav 
world (Cviic, 1995: 31-33).
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disappointment at NATO's disability to prevent the Turkish military occupation of northern 
Cyprus in July 1974 (Papahadjopoulos, 1998).
Overall, however, one can argue that during the Cold War, denuclearisation and 
disarmament were considered as bases for Balkan cooperation but were never implemented 
given bipolar considerations (Veremis, 1995: 35-39). The Romanian Communist Party, for 
example, would never have gone as far as withdrawing from the communist bloc as its own 
position would have been threatened by such a move and did not name the Soviet Union as 
the enemy of its territorial defense strategy (Eyal, 1989). Paparela has even argued that 
Yugoslavia would have eventually sided with the Soviets in a potential conflict with NATO 
given the internal character of the regime and the lack of international security guarantees in 
the non-aligned movement (Paparela, 1989:208). Finally, despite his anti-Western rhetoric, 
Papandreou maintained Athens' link to NATO and never attempted to launch a non-aligned 
Greece (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 8).
3.7 Balkan Conferences
Until the mid 1970s, few concrete steps were reached in Balkan multilateral cooperation. 
These include an agreement on tourism in 1971 - the first in the post-war period to have been 
signed by all Balkan countries except Albania - and some cooperation in road transport 
under the auspices of the UN Commission for Europe (UNECE) (Wallden, 1994: 488). In 
1975, the latter also set up a committee for the interconnection of electric grids in 
Southeastern Europe. Some fiinctional projects were also undertaken between COMECON 
countries during this period including a pipeline on Romanian territory for the delivery of 
natural gas from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria and the joint Romanian-Yugoslav Iron Gates
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hydroelectric damn on the Danube (Djerdap I and H) (Hoffinan, 1974: 234-35). 100
The detente era after 1975 saw renewed attempts at multilateral cooperation in the region 
through the convening of Balkan Conferences. Introduced by Prime Minister Constantine 
Karamanlis, a Conference on Governmental Experts for Economic and Technical 
Cooperation was held in Athens in 1976 reflecting Greece's multi-dimensional foreign 
policy in the context of the Helsinki spirit. On the basis of consultations fi'om the 
delegations of Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania, a list of proposals for 
multilateral cooperation in various sectors was drawn up. These included agriculture, 
energy, transport, tourism, telecommunications and the environment (Wallden, 1994: 122). 
The initiative, therefore, entailed an incremental approach which assumed that cooperation 
in non-controversial areas would spillover into more difficult political ones in a 
neo-functional way (Braun, 1989: 52).
The 1976 Athens Conference, nevertheless, yielded inconclusive results. Political 
constraints on its success derived from the Greek-Turkish rivalry and Bulgaria's hostility 
towards the process given its role as a Soviet proxy in the region.*®* As was the case in the 
1930s, Albania did not participate either given its alliance with China.*®^  When Bulgaria 
softened its opposition, however, follow-up sectoral meetings were held on 
telecommunications (Ankara 1979), transport (Sofia 1981), energy (Bucharest 1982) and
Other functional cooperation projects were also considered, such as joint projects for utilisation of mineral 
resources and power production between Greece and Bulgaria and joint irrigation projects between Greece and 
Yugoslavia, but never materialised (Hoffinan, 1974:234-236).
Bulgaria was a loyal COMECON member conducting over 80% of its trade with the organisation and 
primarily the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War period (Braun, 1983: 204-5),
After Hoxha's alignment with Beijing in 1962, Albania refused to participate in multilateral cooperation 
efforts in the Balkans and was the only country in Europe not to participate in the CSCE in 1975 (Branch, 1983: 
83).
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industrial cooperation (Belgrade 1984) (Lopandic, 2001: 54). Nevertheless, the political 
importance and practical significance of the follow-up meetings was equally minimal given 
Soviet opposition to Balkan cooperation which Moscow feared would affect the cohesion 
of the Warsaw Pact (Veremis, 1994: 37).
Ideas for more advanced forms of cooperation between the two socio-economic systems, 
including the establishment of a Balkan Common Market, were also strongly voiced in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s along the lines of'development integration' theories popular at 
that time (Poumarakis, 1981). °^  ^An industrial and technological cooperation agreement 
between Romania and Greece in 1976, for example, had set up joint commercial 
corporations for petroleum and other products (Braun, 1989:71). Despite some cooperation 
in various types of specialisation primarily between Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
however, the industrial structures of Balkan countries did not develop in accordance with 
revealed comparative advantages (Braun, 1989: 71). Consequently, parallel activities were 
built causing them to be competitors in foreign trade (Novak, 1999). In addition, ideas for 
'development integration' were never implemented due to systemic obstacles and after 1981 
the constraints put upon Greece by EC membership
In the context of perestroika after 1985 and the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement on nuclear 
arms limitations which improved East-West relations, however, Soviet bloc opposition to 
Balkan cooperation eased. In 1988, the multilateral process was eventually institutionalised 
through the Balkan Conference of Foreign Ministers. Held in Belgrade, the 1988 the First 
Balkan Conference of Foreign Ministers was a milestone in the history of Balkan 
regionalism because it included top level representation from all six Balkan countries.
As has been shown in Chapter 2, in the 1970s ‘development integration’ was designed to encourage new 
industries and diversify national economies (Sloan, 1971).
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including Albania (Wallden, 1994: ). The emphasis of the 1988 meeting was on economic 
cooperation and although political issues such as the nuclear-free zone and minorities were 
also discussed progress was only made on questions of education, communications, the 
environment, commerce and culture (Veremis, 1995:41).
The Second Balkan Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Tirana in 1990. It was 
proposed that Balkan cooperation be established on a more functional basis and that a 
Secretariat be created to act as a referee to ethnic and territorial disputes (Veremis, 1995: 
41). Greece requested that a Research Institute for Balkan Economic Cooperation be set up 
in Athens and called for increased exchange among Balkan parliamentarians. An agreement 
was approved calling for the protection of cultural, linguistic and religious freedom and an 
Albanian proposal to set up guidelines and principles for good-neighbourly relations was 
endorsed (Veremis, 1995:41).
From the 1988 Belgrade Conference to the end of 1989, more than twenty multilateral 
meetings were held on sectoral issues such as transport (Belgrade 1988), trade (Ankara, 
1989), industrial cooperation (Bucharest, 1989) and energy production (Tirana, 1990) 
(Lopandic, 2001: 56). Most sectoral meetings, however, were confined to declarations of 
intent and plans that were never implemented, such as the creation of a Balkan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, which had been briefly established in the 1930s (Wallden, 1994: 
179). As soon as COMECON collapsed in 1990, for example, Balkan countries were more 
concerned with reorienting their trade towards the West as except for economic links within 
Yugoslavia, little trade had existed between Southeastern European countries prior to 1989 
(Uvalic, 2001: 2).*°'^  It was Yugoslavia's disintegration in 1991 and the ensuing wars
According to Penglis and Christodoulakis, prior to 1989 only 6% of total Balkan trade was intra-regional 
and was based on barter (Penglis and Christodoulakis, 1993).
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between 1992-95, however, that eventually halted the progress of multilateral cooperation in 
the Balkans.
3.8 Conclusions
The main argument of this chapter is that during the last two centuries, regional cooperation 
in the Balkans was obstructed by the interplay between internal and external factors, namely 
nationalism and foreign intervention. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
for example, the Balkan Alliances of 1868 and 1912 as well as various federal plans, were 
set up in opposition to Ottoman rule in the region. The creation of nation-states with 
overlapping claims on Balkan territories, however, was not compatible with a climate for 
cooperation and these schemes disintegrated fast. In addition, the Great Powers kept the 
region divided through the 1878 Treaty of Berlin so as to maintain the status quo and prevent 
a Russian advance in light of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
In the interwar period, the climate of the League of Nations allowed for the emergence of 
multilateral plans for regional cooperation primarily through the Balkan Conferences which 
between 1930-1933 envisaged the creation of a Union of Balkan States and the 
establishment of a Customs Union. Objections over unresolved minority and territorial 
questions expressed by Bulgaria and Albania, however, halted their progress and led to the 
signing of the 1934 Balkan Entente which merely exacerbated dividing lines in the region. 
In addition, the rise of the Axis Powers after 1933 saw German and Italian penetration in the 
region which further obstructed cooperative attempts in the Balkans.
During the Cold War, it was primarily the bipolar divide that prevented the success of 
cooperation schemes in the region. Attempts to establish a communist Balkan Federation in
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the early years after the end of World War H, for example, met Western objections which 
viewed it as a method of expanding Soviet influence in the region. Moscow became equally 
disinterested in the scheme when it realised that it would not eventually be able to control 
it, despite the fact that it had been one of its major advocates both before and during the 
Second World War. Similarly, the 1953-54 Balkan Triangle, which was the outcome of 
Western support towards Belgrade at a time when Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey felt 
exposed to a perceived Soviet threat, broke down in light of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
rapprochement which re-established Moscow's influence in the region and the traditional 
Cold War divide.
In addition, disarmament efforts such as the 1957 Stoica Plan or the BALTs of the 1970s and 
1980s expressing local interest in an alternative defense arrangement in the region as well 
as a means to promote Balkan foreign policy objectives, were nevertheless never 
implemented given NATO's interest in maintaining a nuclear means of countervailing 
Soviet conventional forces. Finally, the Balkan Conferences of the 1970s and 1980s 
entailing an incremental approach which assumed that cooperation in non-controversial 
areas such as trade, energy, transport and industrial cooperation would spillover into more 
political issues in a neo-ftmctional way, were, however, of little practical significance given 
Moscow’s opposition to their implementation. As a soviet proxy, Bulgaria obstructed the 
process between 1976-79.
Finally, during the Cold War cooperation schemes were also obstructed by Balkan 
nationalisms. To illustrate, inter-state Balkan antagonisms such as the Macedonian question 
plagued the Bulgarian-Yugoslav unification proposals in the late 1940s. Moreover, 
Yugoslavia was interested in a Balkan Federation only so long as it felt that it was at the 
forefi’ont of ideological developments and that its national aspirations for hegemony in
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Southeastern Europe were fulfilled. In addition, the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations 
after the 1955 crisis over the status of Cyprus brought progress towards the 
institutionalisation of the Balkan Triangle to a halt. Finally, it was the disintegration of 
former Yugoslavia in 1991 that caused the suspension of the Balkan Conference of Foreign 
Ministers initiative in 1991.
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Chapter 4
Regional Initiatives in the Post-Cold War Era
4.1 Introduction
As presented in Chapter 1, in the post-Cold War era Southeastern Europe has witnessed the 
emergence of a series of regional initiatives such as the Royaumont Process for Good 
Neighbourly Relations, the SEECP and the SECI established in the aftermath of the Dayton 
Peace Accords, the MPFSEE established in 1998 as well as the SPSEE and the SEEI 
founded in the aftermath of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. Overlapping 
the region but not exclusive to it are also CEI and the BSEC.^°  ^Chapter 4 will examine the 
initiatives exclusive to Southeastern Europe in order to assess how regionalism is promoted 
in the region and what has been its impact. It will find that despite contributing to 
increased societal interaction in the region and implementing certain cooperative projects, 
most initiatives have had limited practical results failing to meet their original goals, become
Established in 1992, the CEI and the BSEC have included many Balkan countries in their membership 
and have seen the implementation of projects within Southeastern Europe. These include the reconstruction 
o f Sarajevo airport or the telecommunications project KAFOS linking Moldova to Istanbul through Bulgaria 
and Romania undertaken by CEI and BSEC respectively (Cviic, 1999: 122; Aybak, 2001: 42). Both 
initiatives, however, included states from other regions in their membership, namely Central Europe and the 
Caucasus, and consequently will not be examined in Chapter 4.
Alongside regional schemes, a wide range o f cross-border cooperation arrangements have emerged within 
Southeastern Europe, such as the Euro-Region Initiatives established between FRY-Hungary-Romania, 
FRY-Bulgaria-FYROM, Bulgaria-Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia-FRY. They have an important 
role to play in the development of border regions and in fostering good-neighbourly relations and people to 
people contacts, contributing to strengthening peace, stability and growth and promoting the process of 
European integration (SPSEE, 2002g). Regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe is also conducted on 
a trilateral ministerial level between Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia and Albania (corridor N8 project); Bulgaria, 
Romania and Greece (since 1995), Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (since 1998) and Turkey, Greece and 
Bulgaria (since 2000) (Bechev, 2001: 13).
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institutionalised and financially independent or gain the unequivocal support of Southeast 
European countries.
4.2 Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness
The Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness accompanied the signing 
of the Dayton Accords in December 1995 given the need for the peace process to be 
included in a regional forum for strengthening stability in Southeastern Europe. It was 
inspired by the principles outlined in the Pact on Stability that was launched in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic Republics in early 1994 as a first attempt to conduct 
preventive diplomacy within the fi'amework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) (Ehrhart, 1999: 178). The Declaration on a Stability Process and Good 
Neighbourliness was signed by the Dayton signatories and neighbouring and other 
European states, namely Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, 
FRY, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, the EU, US, Russia, the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE."’*
The Declaration on a Stability Process and Good Neighbourliness stressed that the aim of 
the initiative was "the progressive restoration o f dialogue and confidence, the prevention o f 
tension and crises, reconciliation, regional cooperation, economic reconstruction and good 
neighbourliness" (Erhart, 1999: 181). The EU Council of 29 January 1996 accepted a
Launched as a Joint Action in December 1993, the Pact on Stability saw the creation o f two round tables 
for the Baltic states and Central and Eastern Europe. Adopted in 1995, it consisted o f three parts: a) a 
declaration on good-neighbourliness; b) 120 bilateral agreements by participating countries and c) an annex 
containing project suggestions intended to give substance to its objective. The solutions that were found in 
regional tables, such as between Hungary and Romania, were embodied in national legislation or inter-state 
agreements while the OSCE was entrusted with monitoring its implementation (Ehrhart, 1999: 178).
At a time when FRY was exluded from most cooperation schemes, Royaumont was the only initiative that 
included the country in its framework. The 1998 Kosovo crisis, however, froze Belgrade’s participation in 
the process.
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broader platform for the development of Royaumont including activities such as the 
progressive restoration of the movement of people and ideas, the organisation of regional 
meetings among intellectuals, journalists and religious leaders, the banning of propaganda 
promoting aggression, the relaunching of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, the 
identification of cross-border projects as well as assistance in the construction of a civil 
society especially in the fields of justice and administration (EU, 1996).
Although the main institutional framework within which Royaumont was envisaged to 
function was the OSCE which was supposed to act as its Secretariat and monitor, in practice 
the EU took over the coordination of the process primarily because FRY had been 
suspended from the former since 1992 (Ehrhart, 1999: 181). In the early years of its 
implementation, Royaumont activities were coordinated by the General Secretariat of the 
EU Council which after 1997 named a Special Coordinator for the Process. Nevertheless, 
no separate resources from the EU budget were envisaged when the process was launched. 
Support could only draw on PHARE programmes already in place which under EU 
conditionality prevented the participation of Croatia and FRY (Ehrhart, 1999: 183).
In November 1998, the Council eventually adopted a 'Common Position' whereby 
Royaumont obtained a legal basis in European legislature through the CFSP as well as the 
possibility of direct financing from the EU budget (Lopandic, 2001: 120; EU, 1998). The 
Common Position further clarified the main areas of action of the process. These were: a) 
the normalisation o f relations between the countries involved including the possible 
conclusion o f treaties o f good-neighbourliness: b) the restoration o f full freedom o f 
movement and expression and the organisation o f events and projects which encourage it 
and c) the promotion o f regional cooperation in cultural, religious, scientific and technical 
fields, as well as in the re-establishment o f a civil society in the region (EU, 1998: 3).
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As envisaged by its goals, the Royaumont Initiative promoted civil society dialogue among 
neighbouring states by organising meetings between journalists, academics, trade-unionists, 
NGOs and parliamentarians. Until 2000, up to 80 projects had been submitted for financing 
and 18 obtained financial assistance to the total value of Euros 2.1 million (Lopandic, 2001 : 
121).*°  ^These included parliamentary exchanges through meetings of chairmen of foreign 
policy committees and projects on education and training {Graz Process) as well as 
cooperation between Balkan universities. The gathering of media representatives in Athens 
in March 1998 saw the adoption of a Declaration and Action Plan for Peace, Understanding 
and Tolerance in Southeastern Europe. Finally, conferences of non-govemmental 
organisations were held establishing a Non-Govemmental Organisations’ (NGO) network 
in the region (Lopandic, 2001: 122).
Although the Royaumont Initiative increased levels of societal interaction in certain fields in 
Southeastern Europe, its achievements were modest and the Process failed to gain a high 
political profi le. 'The slow implementation of the civilian parts of the Dayton Agreement 
affected its own development which was held up for the first two years. A small number of 
projects were subsequently financed and few resources engaged but no treaties of 
good-neighbourliness were achieved through its framework. According to Ehrhart, "the 
Royaumont Process lacked the diplomatic initiative and political clout necessary to make it 
an influential instrument for regional security-building and conflict prevention" (Ehrhart, 
1999: 192). By the time Royaumont was adopted as a Common Position, the crisis in 
Kosovo had demonstrated the need for a much larger initiative on the part of the
Many of these projects were financed by European member states and organisations on an ad hoc basis 
(ESI, 1999: 5)
In the four years o f implementation, the only meeting held at high political level was that o f labour 
ministers in January 2000 in the scope o f the Conference on Dialogue of Social Partners (Lopandic, 2001 : 
123).
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international community in the Balkans. After the launching of the SPSEE in 1999, the 
Royaumont Process lost its independent purpose and was eventually integrated in Working 
Table I on Democratisaion and Human Rights in 2000.
4.3 Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP)
The SEECP originates in the CSSC held in Sofia in July 1996. The Foreign Ministers of 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, FRY, Greece and Turkey came together 
in Sofia with the aim of relaunching the Balkan Conferences initiative that was halted after 
the Tirana meeting in 1990 due to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Croatia, which 
was not keen to be included in cooperation schemes with other Balkan countries, preferred 
to remain outside the process and only later became an observer.* ^  * FYR Macedonia joined
a year later thus increasing the number of participants to eight (Lopandic, 2001: 110). 112
Subsequent to the holding of the CSSC in Sofia in July 1996, a number of meetings took 
place at ministerial and head of state level. These included Conferences of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in Thessaloniki in 1997, Istanbul in 1998, Bucharest in 1999, Skopje in 
2000, Tirana in 2001, Belgrade in 2002 and Sarajevo in 2003 as well as Summits of Heads 
of State in Crete in 1997, Antalya in 1998, Bucharest in 2000, Skopje in 2001, Tirana in 
2002 and Belgrade in 2003.*^ *^  ^During the 1999 Romanian presidency the CSSC was 
renamed SEECP (Altman, 2003: 135).
’ ' ' Croatia's reluctance to be included in Balkan cooperation schemes is constitutionally entrenched. Article 
141 o f the 1991 Constitution, for example, stated that "/f is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the 
association o f the Republic's alliances with other states if  such association leads to a renewed Slav state 
community or to any other Balkan state o f any kind' (Constitution o f the Republic o f Croatia: Article 141).
*'2 yyas suspended from the process between 1998-2000 because o f the Kosovo crisis.
To illustrate, during the first Summit o f Heads of State held in Crete in 1997, the leaders of Albania and 
Yugoslavia met for the first time in forty nine years (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 61).
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During the 1996 Sofia meeting of Foreign Ministers a Declaration of Good-Neighbourly 
Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans was signed identifying main 
areas of cooperation such as transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure, trade 
and investment promotion as well as the protection of the environment (CSSC, 1996). In 
1997, the Conference of Foreign Ministers that met in Thessaloniki introduced 'high politics' 
to the agenda by including security matters such as cooperation in areas of justice, the fight 
against organised crime, elimination of terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and 
people and reaffirmed all ten principles referred to in the Helsinki Final Act (CSSC, 
1997)."“
The goals of the SEECP, however, were not codified until the Summit Meeting of 
Bucharest in February 2000 during which a Charter of Good-Neighbourly Relations, 
Stability, Security and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe was signed. According to the 
Charter, the primary objective of SEECP is "to strengthen good-neighbourly relations 
among all states in the region so as to transform it into an area o f peace, security, 
stability and cooperation" (SEECP, 2000: Article I). The above objective is to be 
achieved through the enhancement of politico-security and economic cooperation as well 
as cooperation in the field of justice through regular meetings of Heads of State, Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and Political Directors as well as inter-parliamentary dialogue 
(SEECP, 2000). During the Skopje Summit of Heads of State in February 2001, an Action 
Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation was also adopted encompassing areas such as 
trade, foreign direct investment, infrastructure, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
organised crime, the environment and transfrontier cooperation (SEECP, 2001).
These include "sovereign equality, respect for rights inherent in sovereignty, refraining from the threat 
or me o f force, inviolability o f frontiers, territorial integrity o f states, peaceful settlement o f disputes, 
non-intervention in internal affairs, respect fo r human rights andfundamental freedoms, equal rights and 
self-determination ofpeoples, cooperation among states andfulfillment in goodfaith o f obligations under 
international law" (CCSC, 1997. Annex II).
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Although the SEECP has served as an important forum for discussions where common 
positions and declarations among Balkan countries can be taken at the level of political 
elites without external intervention, it has however, remained a declarations-oriented 
initiative (SEECP, 2001-2004; Tsardanides, 2001). Few practical steps have been taken in 
the direction of satisfying the goals identified in the Charter. A Balkan Regional Trade 
Promotion Centre, for example, was created in Istanbul aiming to strengthen commercial 
relations between Balkan countries.*'^ In addition, the telecommunications sector has 
seen high level contacts with the aim of establishing a Balkan pool but the meetings of 
ministers of telecommunications have not gone beyond adopting a declaration for the 
exchange of information and envisaging the cooperation in internet services (Lopandic, 
2001: 112).Sectoral meetings at ministerial level on trade and development, 
telecommunications, energy, justice and defense held between 2001 and 2004, however, 
have been organized in cooperation with the Stability Pact.
In addition, the SEECP has not made progress in terms of institutionalisation. Although 
attempts have been made to turn the high level political forum into a regional organisation 
through the setting up of a troika formed by representatives of the current, past and future 
SEECP at the ministerial, political directors and other high officials levels as well as the 
establishment of a joint Secretariat as envisaged by the Charter Annex, these proposals have 
not found unanimity among members (Lopandic, 2001: 107). For example, the 
parliamentary dimension of SEECP has been limited to meetings at the highest level
’ The Association o f Balkan Chambers o f Commerce (ABC) founded in 1994 and comprising o f Bulgaria, 
Romania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, FYR Macedonia, Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, is also considered 
part o f the SEEPC (Lopandic, 2001: 114).
The only auxiliary working body that has an institutionalised position is the regular meeting of Political 
Directors of Ministries o f Foreign Affairs (Charter Annex; Paragraph 4).
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(Stability Pact, 2002c)/^^ Finally, the initiative does not have a budget or the resources to 
implement concrete decisions. SEECP, therefore, has been seen as 'an ad hoc inter-state 
conference without more specific work rules, a political or technical Secretariat and 
without any kind o f implementing bodies' (Lopandic, 2001: 114-15).
4 .4  Southeast European Cooperative Initiative - (SECI)
The SECI was launched by the United States in December 1996. Based on the Points of 
Common EU-US Understanding adopted under the auspices of the OSCE in the SECI 
Statement o f Purpose, its objectives were "to enhance regional stability through the 
development o f economic and environmental cooperation throughout the region, in 
particular involving the private sector in these activities" (SECI, 1996). Participating 
countries initially included Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, 
Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Turkey whereas FRY was accepted in 
December 2000. Croatia was granted observer status whereas Italy, Austria, Russia, 
Switzerland and the US are supporting states (Clement, 1999: 79).
The basic form of work of SECI has been the selection of projects chosen among proposals 
submitted by member states. The highest body of cooperation has been the Agenda 
Committee made up of high ranking officials from SECI members (SECI, 1996: Additional 
Statement). Chaired by a Special Coordinator - which to date has been a citizen from the 
supporting states - the committee meets every two months to define priorities and examine 
progress achieved in the implementation of projects (Lopandic, 2001: 127). A separate 
Working Group is formed for each chosen project in order to prepare technical and financial
In March 2004, for example, the Conference of Presidents t o f Parliaments o f Southeastern Europe met 
in Sarajevo (SEECP, 2004: 3).
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feasibility studies and look for sponsors. SECI projects are carried out by experts from the 
participating and supporting states with technical support from the UNECE and other 
international institutions including the European Commission, the World Customs 
Organisation and Interpol.
SECI also has some auxiliary bodies, such as the Business Advisory Council (BAC) 
launched in June 1997 with the aim of gathering prominent businessmen from the countries 
of the region and including the private sector in its activities.'** In addition, in September 
1998 an association of national trade facilitation committees was formed in Southeastern 
Europe (SECIPRO) aiming to simplify procedures and practice in international trade, 
administration and transport. Inspired by EUROPRO within UNECE, the participants of 
these committees are representatives of state bodies such as customs, administration and 
chambers as well as private associations such as freight forwarders and associations of 
contractors. Working Groups have also been formed identifying projects in the field of 
border crossings for trade and transport infrastructure, energy efficiency, credit schemes for 
SMEs, natural gas distribution and recovery programmes for rivers, lakes and adjacent seas 
(SECI, 1999).
The Trade and Transport Facilitation Working Group is the most active to date. Its most 
concrete project has been the physical improvement of around 30 border crossings in six 
Southeast European countries which in February 2000 signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Trade and Transport Facilitation in Southeastern Europe (TTFSE) 
(Lopandic, 2001:130).* *^  In addition, in April 1999 the Ministers of Transport of the region
'** SECI Business Support Offices were also set up in Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Udine and Vienna (SECI, 
2001:5).
Financed by the World Bank, the regional TTFSE programme will last until 2007 with the possibility of 
being prolonged for another seven years.
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signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Facilitation and Liberalisation of Road 
Freight Transport in Southeastern Europe. It provides for the gradual liberalisation of the 
quota regime in truck transport, the harmonisation of national regulations on truck 
dimension and weight as well as road taxes and the facilitation of the issuance of visas for 
drivers (SECI, 2001: 3). Finally, within the context of a project proposed by Turkey, a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Information Exchange amongst Securities Markets was 
signed in Istanbul in November 1999.
Within the context of activities aimed at regulating trans-border cooperation, an Agreement 
on Cooperation in the Prevention of and Fight against Trans-Border Crime was also signed 
in Romania in 1999. It provides for mutual cooperation among members in the prevention, 
detection, interrogation, pursuance and sanctioning of criminal activities as well as the 
formation of a Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime in Bucharest (SECI, 
2001). Financed by funds from the World Bank, the United States and other sources, the 
centre became operational in January 2001 and has set up a number of task forces in trade in 
human beings, drug trafficking and smuggling (Lopandic, 2001: 132). In 2003, an MoU on 
Cooperation between the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact and the SECI Regional 
Centre for Combating Transborder Crime concerning the Stability Pact Organised Crime 
(SPOÇ) Initiative was signed (SECI, 2003).
Although SECI is pragmatic in nature and has contributed to the establishment of some 
important projects achieving synergy between international organisations, its overall impact 
on the region has been limited. Its major drawback has been the lack of a special budget for 
its projects which are based on private sector financing or loans from IFIs, such as the World 
Bank, the EBRD and the EIB.*^° SECI has also done little it terms of its original goal of
Until 2001, US $ 500 million had been brought into the region through SECI (SECI, 2001: 2).
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enhancing environmental cooperation in the region. Above all, however, SECI has been 
viewed by other initiatives as a competitor given the weight of the American role in it. 
Whereas, for example, the US wanted to merge the initiative with the Stability Pact fearing 
that it would lose momentum after the launching of the latter, the idea was rejected by the 
EU and the OSCE (SECI, 2001: 6).
4.5 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE)*^*
Initiated by the European Union during the Kosovo crisis, the SPSEE was the West's major 
political and institutional response to the war and a renewed attempt to establish 
stabilisation in the Balkans under the auspices of the OSCE. Adopted in Cologne on 10 June 
1999 and endorsed in Sarajevo a month later, the Stability Pact is a multilateral framework 
which includes international organisations (NATO, UN, OECD, CoE, OSCE) and IFls 
(World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Investment Bank (ElB) and 
the EBRD), EU member states, accession candidates, all Balkan countries and regional 
initiatives. Participant countries are the Southeast European beneficiaries plus Hungary, 
Slovenia and Turkey whereas facilitators are the EU members, the US, Russia, Canada and 
Japan.
The declaration on the SPSEE stressed the aim of "strengthening countries in their efforts to 
foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to
The abbreviation SPSEE will be used interchangeably with the term Stability Pact.
The Stability Pact initially included sub-state participation through the representation o f entities with 
confused constitutional situations, namely Kosovo and Montenegro. FRY became a full member after the 
change of regime in Belgrade in October 2000 (Lopandic, 2001: 142). In May 2001, however, Bulgaria 
threatened to withdraw from the initiative fearing that it would become an obstacle to its relations with 
Brussels (Bechev, 2001: 15-16).
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achieve stability in the whole region" (SPSEE, 1999: 2)}^^ The implementation of these 
goals was seen as a step towards accession into the European and Euro-Atlantic community. 
The Stability Pact is headed by a Regional Table coordinating the activities of three 
Working Tables on a) Démocratisation and Human Rights b) Economic Reconstruction, 
Development and Cooperation and c) Security Issues. The main role of these Working 
Tables "is to discuss problems with the aim o f adopting agreements among participating 
states and to identify projects aimed at facilitating the achievement o f these arrangements" 
(SPSEE, 1999: Annex).
The Special Coordinator, appointed by the EU after consultations with the OSCE, presides 
over the Regional Table and is responsible for the overall functioning of the Pact providing 
guidance and reviewing its progress (SPSEE, 1999: 3). An ad hoc High Level Steering 
Group for Southeastern Europe (HLSG) is also attached to the Pact and is responsible for the 
coordination of donor activities. The HLSG consists of the President of the World Bank and 
a member of the European Commission Committee on Economic Issues as well as 
Ministers of Finance of G-8 countries, the Special Coordinator and representatives of the 
UN, EU, IMF, EIB and EBRD (Lopandic, 2001: 145).
Working Table I on Démocratisation and Human Rights identified seven areas for which 
specific Task Forces were created, incorporating as has already been mentioned activities of
To this end, participants pledged to cooperate towards a list o f goals including a^  the prevention o f crises 
through multilateral and bilateral agreements; b) bringing about mature democratic political processes; 
c) creating peaceful and good-neighbourly relations through observance o f the principles o f  the Helsinki 
Final Act, confidence-building and reconciliation; d) preserving the multinational and multi-ethnic 
diversity o f countries in the region and protecting minorities; e) creating vibrant market economies; f) 
fostering economic cooperation in the region and between it and the rest o f Europe and the world; g) 
promoting unimpeded contacts among citizens; h) combating organised crime and corruption; i) 
preventing forced population displacement; and j)  ensuring the safe return o f refugees and displaced 
persons (SPSEE, 1999: Objectives).
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the Royaumont Process. The Task Force on Human Rights and National Minorities 
focuses on the strengthening of civil society and promoting of democratic citizenship and 
the rule of law in the target region. It includes activities such as a campaign on multi-ethnic 
society (Link Diversity) and the establishment of the International Centre for Inter-ethnic 
Relations in Ljubljana in July 2001 (SPSEE, 2002a). The Task Force on Education and 
Youth (Enhanced Graz Process) focuses on reform of the educational systems in the region 
and has established the Southeast Europe Educational Cooperation Network (SEE ECN) 
with a hub in Ljubljana as its dissemination backbone. The Task Force on Parliamentary 
Cooperation includes the establishment of a Troika sponsorship system linking the Stability 
Pact, international parliamentary institutions and national parliaments in participant 
countries as well as NGO projects providing MPs and parliamentary staff in Southeastern 
Europe with knowledge, skills and tools to hold governments accountable and encourage 
dialogue with citizens (SPSEE, 2002c).
The Task Forces on Good Governance and Gender have concentrated their activities on 
public administration and law and the increase of women’s representation in political life 
respectively (SPSEE, 2002d). The Media Task Force works closely with groups of 
professionals in eight Southeast European countries to promote the flow of information and 
contributed to the adoption of the Charter for Media Freedom in Thessaloniki in June 2000 
and the Strategy for Media Assistance in October 2001 (SPSEE, 2002e). Sponsored by the 
UNHCR, the Task Force on The Return of Refugees saw the adoption of an Agenda for 
Regional Action for Refugees and Displaced Persons (AREA) in 2001 addressing a wide 
range of issues between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY with respect to 1,2 million 
displaced persons sponsored by the UNHCR (Anastasakis, 2001: 27; SPSEE, 2002f).
In addition to task forces, the Szeged Process was initiated in October 1999 in order to sustain through 
city-to-city mechanisms the Serbian local authorities which had a democratic leadership. These activities 
were restructured after the change o f regime in FRY in 2000 so as to include the cooperation o f all local 
authorities in Stability Pact countries (Lopandic, 2001: 149).
101
Working Table II on Economic Reconstruction, Development and Cooperation 
encompasses issues related to trade liberalisation, infrastructure and the environment as well 
as the development of a private sector in Southeastern Europe. It has already seen the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation 
(MoU) whereby the governments of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia, FRY, Bulgaria and Romania (SEE-7) plus Moldavia undertook to conclude 
mutual bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) by the end o f2002 thus creating a virtual free 
trade area (SPSEE, 2001). It called for FTAs to cover at least 90% of products, measured 
both in terms of tariff lines and value of trade, and permitted six years for attaining the 
standard (MoU, 2001: 2). It also committed the countries to standardise the rules of origin 
they use in the FTAs, simplify customs procedures especially at border crossings, include 
provisions related to public procurement, state aid and monopolies, consider the 
liberalisation of services, upgrade their legislation in the field of intellectual property, 
liberalise trade towards third countries and harmonise their legislation on company and 
banking law with that of the EU (MoU, 2001: 3-4).'^^ Its single most important contribution 
lies in laying down standards for product coverage both for existing and future FTAs among 
participating countries (Michalopoulos, 2001: 13).
Infrastructure development includes the promotion of transport, energy and 
telecommunications networks. Founded on a study by the EIB, the development of transport 
infrastructure has seen the identification of 400 projects, 35 of which were included in the 
Quick-Start Package of regional projects in March 2000 (EIB, 2000). Concrete examples
Rules of origin are the criteria used to define where a product was made and are designed to prevent 
goods from being imported into a FTA member with the lowest tariffs and then transhipped to the country 
with the highest protection. Because o f the different external tariffs, FTAs generally develop elaborate rules 
of origin. The application of a common set o f preferential rules o f origin, including diagonal cumulation of 
origin, is an important component of the development o f trade in the Balkan region (TDI, 1999: 33).
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include the cleaning up of the Danube and the rebuilding of the bridge at Novi Sad, the 
construction of another one between Vidin in Bulgaria and Calafat in Romania and a 
highway between Bucharest and Cema Voda (Rourke, 2003: 2). A Memorandum of 
Understanding for a Regional Electricity Market aligned with EU standards was also signed 
in Athens in November 2002 (SPSEE, 2002h). In 2003, an agreement was reached on the 
expansion of the Regional Electricity Market (REM) to the gas sector (Annual Report 2003: 
2) Finally, launched in Istanbul in October 2000, the e-Southeast Europe initiative (e-SEE) 
aims to support countries of the region in the development of the Information Society 
(Lopandic, 2001: 151).
A Regional Environmental Reconstruction Programme (REPR) has also been set up aiming 
to address problems that threaten the region in the field and is coordinated through a task 
force (Lopandic, 2001: 151). Furthermore, a strategy for encouraging the development of 
the private sector has been elaborated by the EBRD. It focuses on developing a system of 
bank guarantees, microcredits and insurance for the development of new small-scale 
entreprises. Encouraging foreign investment is founded on an Investment Compact which 
was prepared by the OECD and Great Britain. A key concern is to ensure that countries 
implement the agreed reforms designed to improve their investment climate. In addition, a 
BAC was created which in December 2002 decided to join efforts with SECl’s equivalent 
(SPSEE, 20021).
Finally, Working Table 111 on Security Issues has been divided into two groups. On the one 
hand, the Sub-table on Security and Defence aims to provide support for the implementation 
of Articles 11, IV and V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement in particular which
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was halted during the Kosovo crisis (Pandurevic, 2001)/^^ It deals with military reform and 
defence economics, combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, arms 
control and non-proliferation as well as humanitarian d e m i n i n g / T h e  most important 
project in the area of arms control and non-proliferation has been the Regional Arms 
Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) launched in 
Zagreb in October 2000 with the goal of contributing to a common understanding of current 
agreements and promoting CSBMs in the region (SIRPI, 2001: 568)/^* A few workshops 
have also been held on small arms which have led to the collection and destruction of40.000 
light weapons in Albania (Pandurevic, 2001:318). Finally, a Regional Mine Action Support 
Group (RMASG) was set up in Sarajevo in May 2000 aiming to assist in the removal of 
minefields in Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pandurevic, 2001: 318).
On the other hand, the Sub-table on Justice and Home Affairs is concerned with measures to 
fight corruption and organised crime, the promotion of transparent and efficient state 
institutions in the internal security sector, asylum and migration issues and disaster 
preparedness and prevention (Pandurevic, 2001). The Stability Pact has developed a series 
of platforms, including the Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAl), the Initiative Against 
Organised Crime (SPOC), the Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings, the Task Force 
for Cooperation and Development of Border Management as well as the Working Group on
Under the terms o f the Dayton Agreement's Annex 1-B on Regional Stabilisation, negotiations were 
launched with the aim o f agreeing on CSBMs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (article II), reaching an arms control 
agreement for the former Yugoslavia (article IV) and establishing 'a regional balance in and around former 
Yugoslavia' (article V) (SIPRI, 2001: 562).
With few exceptions, in 1997-98 defense expenditures o f Balkan states were at approximately 6,5% of  
GDP, well above the NATO average o f 2,8% (Lozandic, 1999: 63-64),
The 1996 Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control (Florence or Article IV Agreement) signed by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY and Croatia is the only 'hard' regional arms-control arrangement now operating 
below the pan-european level (SIPRI, 2001: 562). The other Balkan countries, except Albania, have been 
balancing their military forces through the Agreement on Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) (Vucadinovic, 
1999: 59).
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Regional Civilian Police Training (SPSEE, 2002j). A four-year project for the development 
of asylum and migration systems in Southeastern Europe has also been started through the 
Asylum and Migration Initiative (MAI). Finally, a Disaster Preparadness and Prevention 
Initiative (DPPI) was launched in April 2000 aiming to improve the efficiency of the 
national disaster management systems and endorse a framework for regional cooperation 
(Pandurevic, 2001: 319). In May 2003 it saw the launching of the Ohrid Conference on 
Border Management and Security aiming to improve the efficiency of border management 
in the region (Annual Report, 2003: 5)
Although the Stability Pact is the first international initiative in Southeastern Europe that 
recognised the intricate link between politics, economics and security, much criticism has 
been voiced against it and many obstacles have become apparent in its five years of 
operation. First, it has been argued that the activities of the Stability Pact and its Working 
Tables have neglected a clear strategy and have amounted to a mere distribution of financial 
support to projects (Papic, 2001: 42).'^^ Ambiguously conceived, the principal approach to 
regionalism within the Stability Pact was based on the development of regional 
infrastructure which received 70% of all funding and not on the developmental problems of 
the region which are related to the lack of internally driven growth. According to Lopandic, 
therefore, the Pact turned 'from a symbol o f hope, to a mere forum for registration o f  
projects initiated andfinanced elsewhere' (Lopandic, 2001: 157).
Many of its initiatives have merely touched the surface of problems confronting 
Southeastern Europe. To illustrate, the Stability Pact's Memorandum of Understanding on
At the first regional conference in March 2000, donors pledged Euros 2.4 billion and a Quick Start 
Package o f regional projects and initiatives was decided primarily for infi’astructure, security and civil 
society programmes. The focus o f the second regional conference in October 2001, which amounted to more 
than Euros 3 billion, was on long-term development of the infi-astructure sector, such as transport, air 
traffick, energy as well as SMEs, banking and refugee issues (Anastasakis 2002: 24).
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Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation (MoU) left a number of issues unanswered. These are 
related to the degree of liberalisation of Southeast European trade regimes and the type of 
trade agreements to be signed with CBFTA countries (Michalopoulos, 2001: 13-14). In 
addition, the MoU has not dealt with non-tariff barriers, an area that is under consideration 
by the Trade Working Group (TWO) but needs to be intensified. Finally, the efficacy of the 
FTA's needs to be improved through their increased harmonisation with EU regulations and 
WTO obligations as well as further options identified to liberalise trade in goods and 
services so that an economically efficient free trade area evolves in Southeastern Europe 
(Annual Report, 2003: 12).'^° To date, bilateral agreements have been the only generally 
acceptable way to liberalise trade among Western Balkan countries.
Finally, the Stability Pact has been criticised for being a cumbersome bureaucratic 
organisation the functioning of which remains problematic and slow. According to 
Kondonis, "the multi-collectivism o f the Stability Pact has created a rough polyphony and 
has imported competition among states and organisations within its structures" (Kondonis, 
2002: 56). To illustrate, a rivalry erupted between the Special Coordinator and Secretariat 
and the European Commission after its establishment (Lopandic, 2001: 156). In addition, 
competition between international and the weaker local NGOs has created delays in the
The effects for Southeast European economies o f the establishment o f a single FTA implying a uniform 
tariff o f 0% are still being analysed. The main arguments in favour o f it are related to increased political 
security through cooperation, the reduction o f corruption and bureaucracy and the subsequent increase in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The main economic arguments against a single FTA in the region involve 
foregone customs revenues and the possibility that tax competition and trade diversion may occur. The 
advantages and disadvantages o f a single FTA in the Western Balkan in particular are considered to be 
overlapping so that the final outcome is uncertain to the decision-makers within the affected countries, 
especially compared to the effects of trade liberalisation with the EU (Ranchev, 2002: 3-4).
According to Messerlin, the best option for the Western Balkans would be to adopt a fre-er trade 
approach, namely 'the same, uniform and moderately positive tariff between themselves' (Messerlin, 1999: 
4). The same tariff across the board on all products (equivalent to the EC tariff o f 5-10%) would allow the 
introduction o f one cumulated rule of origin and all intra-regional transactions would be taxed at a similar 
rate. A Tariff Union (SETU) would also allow for the healthy development o f Western Balkan comparative 
advantages and maintain a tax base in the short run (TDI, 1999: 17).
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implementation of many projects, especially within Working Table I (Kondonis, 2002: 56). 
Some observers have therefore suggested that “the real pact was between the competing 
international actors and agencies, a concordat for them all to be involved’ (Emerson, 2001 : 
2).
4.6 Multinational Peace Force for South-East Europe (MPFSEE)
The MPFSEE was established during the third ministerial meeting of the Southeast Europe 
Defense Ministerial (SEDM) in Skopje in September 1998 between Albania, Bulgaria, FYR 
Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, Romania and Italy. The force aimed to provide a 
contribution to NATO-led conflict-prevention and other peace support operations under the 
mandate of the UN or the OSCE for the period 1999-2003 (MPFSEE, 1998: Article ni.3).’^  ^
With headquarters hosted in descending order by Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey, 
MPFSEE has been the most serious example of military cooperation in the region 
numbering 3,000-4,000 troops initially under a Turkish commander (Lozandic, 1999: 66).
Six years after its establishment, however, the MPFSEE remains largely dormant. To 
illustrate, the force did not participate in Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox 
aimed at disarming the ethnic Albanian guerillas and protecting international observers
Initiated in Tirana in 1996 under the auspices o f the US, Russia and Italy, the SEDM is a high-level 
mechanism o f harmonisation o f the various southern Balkan viewpoints on security, defense and 
crisis-management (Pop, 2003: 140), Its membership includes Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Greece, 
Turkey, Romania and Italy. In addition, the US, Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer status 
(Lozandic, 1999:66). Some ambitious projects were initiated including the establishment o f a Civil-Military 
Emergency Programme entrusted with coordinating disaster response and humanitarian relief in crisis 
situations, the setting up of an interoperable Communication Information Network (CIN/CIS) for crisis 
management and the establishment o f a network for interconnecting o f the military hospitals in SEDM 
countries (Pop, 2003: 140).
"77/e Force will be available fo r possible employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led or WEU-led 
conflict prevention and other peace support operations. It could also participate in "coalition o f  the 
willing" type o f international initiatives. The Force will also function "within the spirit" o f Partnership for  
Peace (PjP)" (MPFSEE: Article III: 3).
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overseeing the implementation of the fragile peace accord respectively in FYR Macedonia 
in 2001 (Bourantonis, 2003:3), In addition, although the MPFSEE has potential for regional 
crisis management operations, challenges have still to be met with respect to questions of 
interoperability, differing capabilities, strained resources and complementarity with broader 
arrangements (Pop, 2003: 140). The MPFSEE has not developed an adequate institutional 
capacity to deal with tasks such as preventive diplomacy or aspects of peace-building. Its 
main operational unit - the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) - for example, has only 
been used for exercise and training activities and was not declared fully operational until 
May 2001 (Bourantonis, 2003: 4).
In addition, the member states of the region are not strongly committed to an organisation 
which owes its origin to a US initiative aimed at establishing a regional security agency that 
would prepare the ground for integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. To illustrate, 
Romania, FYR Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria saw their membership as a stepping stone 
on the way to full integration into NATO and it is the alliance's know-how that has served 
as the basis for MPFSEE's functioning (Bourantonis, 2003: 2). Thus far, the predominant 
role of NATO in the region has left no role for the MPFSEE, undermining its credibility and 
legitimacy. Although, therefore, the force has contributed to creating a sense of community 
among member states, the absence of shared interests has led to a further weakening of their 
commitment and is an additional reason why peace missions are not delegated to it. 
Incapable of fulfilling its original mandate, therefore, the MPFSEE has been called the 
region's 'sleeping beauty' (Pop, 2003: 140).'^ "^
In April 2001, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia founded the Civil and Military 
Emergency Planning Council for Southeast Europe (CMEPCSEE) with the presence of Albania, Romania 
and the US. Its task is to prevent conflicts and maintain stability in the region (Lopandic, 2001: 165).
108
4.7 South East Europe Initiative (SEEI)
Finally, launched at NATO's 1999 Washington Summit as a response to the Kosovo war, 
the SEEI is a series of programmes promoting regional cooperation and long-term security 
in the Balkans focusing in the participation of FRY, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia which 
were not at the time part of any cooperative relationship with the Alliance (Stefanova, 2000: 
86). Designed to add to the activities of PfP and the EAPC, which provided for cooperative 
security arrangements between individual partners in Eastern Europe and the Western 
Alliance, a Consultative Forum on Security Issues in Southeastern Europe was formed 
within the initiative consisting of NATO allies and the seven states neighbouring Serbia.
In addition, at the first EAPC meeting of political consultations after the 1999 
Washington Summit aimed to enhance partner coordination, Balkan regional cooperation 
in the security field was described as its primary objective and has come to be perceived 
as a precondition for NATO membership (Stefanova, 2000: 83).'^^
Little practical results, however, have followed the launching of the SEEI. These include the 
establishment of the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group 
(SEEGROUP), an advisory forum on security issues which benefits from the expertise of 
NATO's International Secretariat and is comprised of representatives of Albania, Austria, 
Bulgaria Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Italy, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia and Switzerland, Turkey and the US (NATO, 2001: 1). 
It aims to contribute to the support of NATO clearinghouse mechanisms, identify existing
"The central purpose o f cooperative security arrangements is to prevent war and to do so primarily by 
preventing the means fo r successful aggression from being assembled, thus also obviating the need for  
states so threatened to make their own counter-preparations" (Carter et al, 1992: 7). Military cooperation 
is an integral part o f the cooperative security concept (Lozandic, 1999: 75).
The 1999 Washington Summit also initiated the Membership Action Plan (MAP) which provides for a 
specific set o f activities that will bind would-be members close to the alliance.
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shortcomings in the international assistance for regional security and coordinate projects 
(Pop, 2003: 137). SEEGROUP participating countries, for example, have agreed to begin 
the exchange of liaison officials at border crossings in line with the Framework Guidelines 
for the Exchange of Border Security Personnel in Southeast Europe (NATO, 2001: 2).
In addition, endorsed on the margins of an EAPC meeting in May 2001, the Southeast 
Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security (SEECAP) aims to detail risk 
perceptions of regional countries (SEECAP, 2001). It forms the basis for security-sector 
reform in the region envisaging a follow up Comparative Study of National Security 
Strategies (SEESTUDY) within the context of the SEEGROUP (NATO, 2001: 2).’^  ^
SEECAP is the first comprehensive report on regional security perceptions and priorities 
with respect to bringing peace and stability to Southeastern Europe. It aims to support and 
complement the activities of the Stability Pact and other regional initiatives and contribute 
to building a secure and stable Euro-Atlantic area (Pop, 2003: 137).
In light of the limited impact of the SEEI as well as the impending expansion of NATO 
towards Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania in 2004, the Western Balkans were also included 
in the Alliance's Concerted Approach on Security and Stability promoted together with the 
European Union (NATO, 2003). It includes activities such as conflict prevention and crisis 
management, defense and security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, combating 
the threat of terrorism, border security and management as well as arms control (NATO, 
2003). Cooperative security arrangements in the region, however, have to date mostly taken
SEESTUDY aims to undertake a comparative study of national security strategies in Southeast Europe. 
It focuses on enabling participating countries to review and improve their capabilities for risk assessment, 
early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, defense and civil emergency planning and 
national security strategy formulation (Anghel, 2003: 2).
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place within the frameworks of NATO's Pff and the EAPC/^® That Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Serbia-Montenegro have not yet been deemed capable of joining these frameworks has 
obstructed the success of military cooperation over the entire peninsula.
4.8 Conclusions
In the post-Cold War era, Southeastern European countries have been connected through a 
'galaxy' of primarily externally driven regional initiatives (Lopandic, 2001: 157). These 
initiatives have had significant organisational flexibility and accommodated countries at 
different levels of development, such as post-Communist Balkan states as well as Greece 
and Turkey. They introduced a modality of regionalism related to a combination of activities 
on a high political level (inter-state) and concrete measures that are of programmatic use for 
the economies and societies of member-states. SECIPRO committees, for example, brought 
together state representatives and private associations. Similarly, the Stability Pact included 
the participation of representatives of international organisations, states and local 
authorities.
Launched in 1994, PfP intended to provide a multinational security framework for military cooperation 
between individual partners in Eastern Europe and NATO. It provided military assistance to non-NATO 
members in order to modernise their defense sectors and prepare armed forces for peace-keeping in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially focused on developing partner cooperation in search and rescue humanitarian 
operations, P ff’s terms o f reference were gradually expanded to include peace-enforcement and civil 
emergency planning (Stefanova, 2000: 87). In addition, launched at the Madrid Summit as a replacement 
to the 1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the EAPC’s wide ranging agenda includes 
cooperation on political problems, arms control, international terrorism, peace-keeping, defense economics 
and civil emergency planning (Foster, 2001: 115).
Whereas Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been able to participate in PfP and EAPC by the lack o f a single 
military and insufficient defense reform, Belgrade's membership has been further complicated by the 
ambiguous attitude towards the Alliance in light o f the bombing campaign against the FRY in 1999 
(Vucadinovic, 2000: 147-149). Solving the crisis in the Presevo Valley in cooperation with NATO and 
KFOR in 2001, however, helped change popular attitude and the new leadership in Belgrade has showed 
interest in acceding to the Alliance. Subsequent to the Istanbul Meeting o f June 2004, NATO’s conditions 
for Serbia-Montenegro’s PfP membership include defense sector reform, engagement in the resolution of 
the Kosovo problem as well as cooperation with the ITFY (NATO, 2004).
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In addition, regional schemes created special legal instruments, the MoUs, which provide 
'soft law' cooperation in the region. SECI, for example, saw the signing of MoUs on the 
Transport Facilitation and Liberalisation of Road and Freight in Southeastern Europe and on 
Information Exchange among Securities Markets in April and November 2001 respectively. 
Similarly, the Stability Pact put into place a series of bilateral FTAs through a MoU on 
Trade Liberalisation and Faciliatation and saw the signing of another one on a Regional 
Electricity Market aligned with EU standards. Cooperation initiatives also saw the 
implementation of some important projects such as the TTFSE improving border crossings 
between Balkan countries and various reconstruction activities such as the cleaning up of 
the Danube.
Finally, regional initiatives encouraged cooperation among business and other professional 
circles, facilitating communication and creating networks of contacts and institutions within 
Southeastern Europe. Implemented between 1998-2000, for example, the Royaumont 
Process achieved civil society dialogue among neighbouring states by organising meetings 
between journalists, academics, trade unionists, NGOs and parliamentarians thus increasing 
levels of societal interaction in the region. Similarly, the SEECP has served as an important 
forum for discussions where common positions are made at the level of political elites 
without external intervention. As such, cooperation schemes have contributed to the 
emergence of a regional identity and created a sense of a Southeastern European 
community. The use of the term Southeastern Europe also denotes a political project aimed 
at overcoming the pejorative legacy of the term Balkans (Bechev, 2001: 1).
Most initiatives, however, have had limited practical results. To illustrate, although the 
MPFSEE, established during the third ministerial meeting of the SEDM in 1998, comprised 
of 3,000-4,000 troops for peace support operations under the auspices of the UN or the
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OSCE, it has remained largely dormant. Its main regional unit - the SEEBRIG - has limited 
operational capability and did not take part in the NATO's operations aimed at disarming 
Albanian guerillas in FYR Macedonia in 2001. Similarly, despite the signing of a Charter 
for Good Neihgbourly Relations and an Action Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation, 
for example, the SEECP has not yet seen the implementation of many of its goals and has 
been limited to sectoral meetings among ministers of Southeast Europe. In addition, the 
SEEI, which aimed to promote regional cooperation on security issues also between 
countries not yet part of a cooperative relationship with NATO, has merely seen the 
establishment of SEEGROUP, an advisory forum on security issues in the region, and the 
publication of SEECAP, a report on regional threat perceptions (NATO, 2001:2).
The absence of considerable practical results has been attributed to the lack of clear 
mechanisms of implementation as well as self-generated financing. The Royaumont 
Process, for example, did not obtain a legal basis in European legislature as well as clear 
financing until the third year of its operation. Similarly, despite attempts to turn the SEECP 
into a regional organisation through the setting up of a troika formed by representatives of 
the current, past and future meetings, the initiative has not made significant progress in 
terms of institutionalisation. Although SECI has had a more flexible structure through 
Working Groups and Task Forces, it has lacked a special budget for its projects which were 
based on private sector financing or loans from IFIs. The Stability Pact has been criticised 
for being a cumbersome bureaucratic organisation that has acted merely as a forum for 
registration of projects funded elsewhere (Kondonis, 2002: 56). Finally, although the 
MPFSEE has potential for regional crisis management, challenges have still to be met with 
respect to questions of interoperability, differing capabilities, strained resources and 
complementarity with broader arrangements (Pop, 2003 140).
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Moreover, competition and duplication of activities often emerged between regional 
initiatives which had similar goals as well as between actors within individual schemes. 
An antagonism, for example, developed between the Stabilty Pact and SECI given that 
both claimed ownership to trade and transport facilitation programmes as well as the fight 
against organised crime. In addition, within the Stability Pact rivalries emerged between 
the Special Coordinator and the European Commission as well as the various 
international organisations involved it its implementation.
Finally, some Southeast European countries have shown scepticism towards joining 
regional initiatives fearing that they will become obstacles to their European and 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Croatia in particular remained an observer to SECI, MPFSEE and 
the SEECP and only applied to join the latter as a member subsequent to the European 
Commission’s positive Opinion of its EU membership application in June 2004. Similarly, 
in May 2001 Bulgaria threatened to withdraw from the Stability Pact fearing it would 
become an obstacle to its relations with Brussels (Vucetic, 2001: 124; Bechev, 2001: 
15-16).
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Chapter 5 
Differentiated Integration
5.1 Introduction
Despite promoting cooperation in Southeastern Europe through the Royaumont Process and 
the Stability Pact and supporting all regional initiatives in the Balkans, in the post-Cold War 
era the EU also pursued bilateral relations with countries of the reg ion .C hapter 5 will 
examine these relations in order to assess other types of systemic pressures on Southeastern 
European countries. It will find that whereas Bulgaria and Romania have since the early 
1990s been involved in the enlargement process through EAs and their participation in 
CEFTA, most Western Balkan countries, namely Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, have not yet been granted accession prospects and were 
only included in the SAP in 1999 whereas Croatia was also granted candidate status in June 
2004. Finally, Turkey has been incorporating substantial Single Market legislation in its 
internal order through the Customs Union and was granted candidate status without 
negotiations in 1999. By pursuing differentiated integration with Southeast European 
countries, therefore, the EU exacerbated dividing lines in the region further contributing to 
its heterogeneity and creating a pull-out effect.*"^ ’
'^°In 1997 the European Commission prepared a report on regional initiatives in Europe including the 
CSSC, SECI, BSEC, Royaumont and CEL It stated that "the EU perceives regional cooperation in South 
East Europe as a crucial complement to the specific ways which countries in the area follow in their 
relations with the Union, as an element o f rather than an obstacle to, their European vocation" (COM 
1997, 659: 4).
As an EU member state, Greece will not be considered in the analysis. Similarly, although Slovenia was 
subject to the same bilateral policies by the EU as Bulgaria and Romania, it is generally considered to have 'left' 
the Balkans given that it was in the frontline of accession candidates which joined the EU in 2004. It will 
consequently also be omitted from the analysis.
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5.2 Bulgaria and Romania
Subsequent to the collapse of COMECON in 1990 and the SFRY in 1991, the EC signed 
TCAs with Bulgaria and Romania in September 1990 and March 1991 respectively 
(Lopandic, 1996:31)/"*^ TCAs were based mainly on certain general political and economic 
principles, such as respect for democracy, human rights, minorities and 
good-neighbourliness as they have been described in the Final Act of Helsinki and the Paris 
Charter for a new Europe (Kotios, 2000: 244). Their main goals, beyond the strengthening 
of bilateral relations, were support for the transformation process of post-communist 
countries, the strengthening of economic development, promotion of harmonised trade, 
sectoral diversification, regional cooperation and the establishment of new types of trade 
and economic relations (EC, 1990; EC, 1991).^ '^ ^
Similar to all of the 'first generation' agreements between Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) and the EEC, however, the TCAs with Bulgaria and Romania were less 
favourable than preferential agreements with other countries (Kotios, 2000: 246). They 
provided for the gradual removal of all EC quantitative restrictions on industrial products, 
but Brussels retained the right to impose preferential duties on imports originating from 
these countries. In addition, agriculture, textiles and products contained within the ECSC 
were excluded from the agreements (EC, 1990; EC, 1991). In the early 1990s, therefore, the 
EC kept a protectionist guard in sectors that would have benefited CEECs so as to placate 
vested interests within the Community. Finally, 'first generation' agreements lacked a 
specific target such as EU accession (Kearns, 1999: 34).
TCAs had previously been signed with Hungary and Poland in September 1988 and 1989 respectively and 
with Czechoslovakia in May 1990 (Kazakos, 1996:161).
Economic cooperation refers to areas such as industry, agriculture, mining, fisheries, infi-astructure, 
economic policy, transfer of technology and know-how, energy, transportation, research and development, 
tourism, the environment, the financial sector and the PHARE Programme (Poland and Hungary Assistance for 
Economic Restructuring) (EC, 1990: Title III).
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In response to pressure from the CEECS for a more substantial relationship with the EU, 
relations between the EEC and Central and Eastern European countries were upgraded 
through the Association Agreements -  otherwise known as Europe Agreements - with view 
to the latter's eventual membership. Bulgaria and Romania were in the first wave of 
negotiations together with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and signed AAs in 
February and March 1993 respectively. The decision in September 1991 to open 
negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania was dictated by events in the former USSR related 
to the August coup against Gorbachev as well as by the escalation of the war in Krajina 
(Papadimitriou, 2001: 84). The enforcement of all AAs, however, was delayed by a few 
years due to slow action by member-state parliaments (Kazakos, 1996: 161). In the 
meantime, trade between the CEECs and the EU was governed by Interim Agreements 
which did not include political provisions (Baldwin, 1994: 125).
EAs provided for asymmetric free trade in manufactures with a variety of transition periods 
and aimed to establish a FTA between the signatories within ten years (World Bank, 2000: 
22). Exceptions, however, applied to some sectors such as steel, coal and textiles and more 
limited preferential arrangements were granted to agricultural products (EU, 1994a; EU 
1994b). Although liberalisation in industrial goods moved rapidly increasing trade between 
the EU and CEECs, the former did not hesitate to impose contingent protection such as 
anti-dumping and Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) on certain Central and East 
European products (Lippert, 1994: 116-17). In addition, EAs were accused of promoting 
hub and spokes bilateralism at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe (Baldwin, 1994: 
124).*^ ^
Romania and Bulgaria in particular confronted problems in the application of the agreements and the EU 
was criticised for not granting them the same preferences as it did towards the Visegrad countries, namely 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Kazakos, 1994: 124).
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Apart from trade, however, EAs contained provisions on political dialogue, movement of 
workers, the establishment and supply of services, payments, capital, competition and 
institutional provisions, approximation of laws as well as economic, cultural and financial 
cooperation so as to provide an appropriate framework for the integration of Bulgaria and 
Romania in the EU (EU, 1994 (a); EU 1994 (b)). The list of economic cooperation issues 
embodied in the EAs is the longest that has ever been included in association between the 
EU and third countries. It encompassed support for sectors such as industry, investment, 
agriculture, energy, transport, regional development and tourism. To illustrate, in the 
agricultural sector, cooperation was directed towards support for private producers, the 
creation of distribution networks for agricultural goods, innovations in agricultural 
infrastructure, the improvement of productivity and health. In addition, industrial 
cooperation supported the establishment of new enterprises or the transfer of technology 
(EU, 1994a; EU 1994b: Title VI).
In practice, however, only cautious steps were taken towards the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Internal Market, namely the free movement of capital and services as well as labour 
(Lippert, 1994: 116). To illustrate, limited free movement of capital was allowed for the 
payments arising from trade between the two parties as further liberalisation would have 
been harmful for CEEC economies (Baldwin, 1994: 127). As for the free movement of 
labour, the agreements merely recommended to EC member states to provide 
non-discriminatory treatment of workers from contracting parties (Lippert, 1994: 116).^ "^  ^
Overall, therefore, although EAs were a solid foundation for pan-european integration, they 
were limited in scope and both sides were reluctant to go as far as the European Economic
That economic cooperation with the CEECs was of greater importance than the promotion of the 'four 
freedoms', was attributable to the fact that in transition certain prerequisites, such as infrastructure, 
restructuring, administration, modernisation, new investments and macroeconomic stabilisation, must first be 
established before the benefits from economic integration and the freedoms associated with it can be realised 
(Kotios, 2000: 252).
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Area (EEA) model in the short term/"^^
The goal of pan-european integration was further promoted at the Essen European Council 
of December 1994 which established a pre-accession strategy for the CEECs.Betw een 
1994-1996, Bulgaria and Romania together with the other Central and East European 
countries put forward their membership applications to Brussels. In 1997, the European 
Commission offered Opinions on applicant countries through Agenda 2000 and an 
‘enhanced pre-accession strategy’ based on Accession Partnerships (APs). The goal of APs 
was to bring together in a single framework all the various forms of EU financial assistance. 
They outlined the available economic means aimed to help countries satisfy the terms that 
would be in effect once aid was rendered. Within 1998, both Bulgaria and Romania 
submitted their national programs for the adoption of the 'acquis' which were subsequently 
examined within the framework of the bilateral relations with the EU (Kotios, 2000: 252).
Whereas other CEECs opened accession negotiations with the EU at the London 
Conference in March 1998, Bulgaria and Romania, however, were relegated by Agenda 
2000 to the slow track of candidate countries because of limited progress in meeting the 
criteria for membership set out by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, namely the 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, a functioning market 
economy and the ability to take on obligations of membership including monetary union. In 
the aftermath of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, however, the EU
Established in 1994 between Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, the EEA is a 
Single Market arrangement that does not, however, include agriculture and the Common External Tariff 
(CET). Austria, Finland and Sweden left the arrangement when they joined the EU in 1995 (Baldwin, 1994: 
12-13).
The pre-accession strategy consisted of a) improved market access for CEEC exports; b) multilateral 
structured dialogue with European institutions; c) the formulation o f a White Paper for the alignment to the 
internal market and d) restructuring of PHARE financial assistance (Tsoukalis, 1997:250).
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abandoned the two-speed strategy for accession negotiations for an all-inclusive 
enlargement process. Bulgaria and Romania were, therefore, eventually invited to initiate 
negotiations for full membership at the Helsinki European Council summit in December 
1999 and are expected to join the EU in 2007 (Papadimitriou, 2001: 78).
5.2.1 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
Biased opening to EC economies as well as the desire to alleviate the hub and spoke 
bilateralism imposed on the CEECs by the EAs led to the inclusion of Bulgaria and 
Romania in the CEFTA in 1997 and 1999 respectively (Lopandic, 2001: 94). Signed in 
Krakow by Visegrad Group countries Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1992, the 
CEFTA aimed to establish a FTA among members by 2001. Eliminating all customs and 
other restrictions on industrial products was to be achieved through a system of bilateral 
free trade agreements functioning in a framework of common rules (Dangerfield, 2000:46). 
The prime body of such a type of inter-state cooperation was the Joint Committee of 
Ministers of the Economy or Economic Relations supervising the implementation of the 
Agreement. No institutional framework was, therefore, introduced although in 1995 
CEFTA became an organisation by treaty amendment (Lopandic, 2001: 95).
Trade liberalisation of industrial products was accelerated throughout the 1990s and the 
elimination of duties on industrial goods was in some cases achieved earlier than 2001. A 
duty free area for industrial goods, for example, was in place for the Czech and Slovak 
Republics as well as Slovenia by 1997 (Dangerfield, 2000: 47). By their very nature, 
however, trade issues provoked constant disputes during the transition period. Economic 
problems, such as the occurrence of negative trade balances, provoked the implementation 
of protectionist measures or temporary withdrawals from the liberalisation process. Poland,
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for example, restored tariffs on some types of telecommunications equipment and banned 
imports of combine harvesters and utility vehicles in 1994 while introducing customs duties 
for steel in 1997 (Kupchan, 1999: 104; Lozandic, 2001: 100). Moreover, CEFTA 
mechanisms at times exacerbated discrimination as preferential tariffs granted to each 
partner were often different and triggered counter-productive actions, such as safeguard 
measures and escape clauses. Plagued by many exceptions, CEFTA liberalisation also 
generated economic costs related to trade diversion in the absence of a convergence of 
regional and EC tariffs (Messerlin, 1999: 3).
In addition, the CEFTA did not encompass a central mechanism for eliminating non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) which remain the main elements of protectionism of domestic industry and 
have not been removed by modifications to the Treaty (Kupich, 1999: 94). Moreover, 
although some members, such as the Czech Republic, were in favour of liberalising capital 
flows and trade in services, these steps were slow to materialise and were eventually put off 
the agenda (Dangerfield, 2000:90). Finally, introduced in 1995, the liberalisation of trade in 
agricultural products was suspended in 1998 due to the sensitivity of certain items and the 
fear of Hungarian competition (Dangerfield, 2000: 42; Kearns, 1999). During the 
nine-year transition period, therefore, intra-CEFTA trade was beset by traditional 
restrictions, lack of flexibility and disregard of partners while manufacturing trade with the 
West was gradually liberalised through the Europe Agreements (Kupich, 1999: 102).)
There is general academic agreement that CEFTA contributed to an effective rebuilding of 
trade ties within Central Europe (Lozandic, 2001: 99).^ "^  ^Since its accession, for example.
The liberalisation o f trade in agricultural products requires a comprehensive policy approach including 
subsidies and other financial supports, quality certification, health and sanitary regulations (Kupich, 1999: 
106).
The bulk of intra-COMECON trade comprised of bilateral exchanges with the Soviet Union. As a result, 
during the Cold War trade between Central European countries was limited and not conducive to 
complementary economic structures (Kupich, 1999: 91).
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Romania experienced an expansion of its overall intra-CEFTA trade. Despite the 
progress in implementing CEFTA, however, the big trend in the post-Cold War era was the 
massive reorientation of trade away from the former Soviet markets towards the West. 
Dominated by the Visegrad Group, intra-CEFTA trade amounts to only 10% of the 
signatories' total trade, a figure which is boosted by the high levels of commercial activity 
within former Czechoslovakia (Kearns, 1999: 39). For example, Slovakia's share in Czech 
foreign trade is around 15%, making the former one of the latter's most important trading 
partners (Kupich, 1999: 105). Trade with other CEFTA states, however, constitutes barely 
6% of Polish and 4% of Hungarian foreign commercial activity (Kupich, 1999: 105). 
Slovenia's intra-CEFTA trade is minimal reflecting the country's small size. The impressive 
steps to free trade contained within CEFTA, therefore, affected only a small part of the 
region's overall economic activity (Keams, 1999: 39).
Above all, CEFTA's importance has been related to its political role in facilitating the 
incorporation of the CEECs into the EU (Dangerfield, 2000:76). In the early 1990s, the EU 
supported the implementation of free trade along the framework of the agreement believing 
that CEFTA yielded practical experience of multilateral cooperation (Dangerfield, 2001: 
77). That CEFTA membership required signature of an AA, however, meant that the 
intention to go beyond a classic free trade area in Central and Eastern Europe predominated 
primarily in the aftermath of the 1993 Copenhagen Council which set the principle of 
enlarging the European Community (Dangerfield, 2001: 131).^^  ^ Following the Essen 
European Council of December 1994 which established a pre-accession strategy for the
Romania's intra-CEFTA trade is centred on Hungary. The large deficit which developed in agricultural trade 
with the latter in 1998, however, created political tension in Bucharest and even prompted calls for Romania's 
withdrawal fi-om the agreement (Dangerfield, 2000:125),
Preconditions for CEFTA membership were a) WTO membership; b) EA with the EU and c) FTAs with 
each CEFTA member (Lozandic, 2001: 94)
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CEECs, CEFTA states have been further engaged in the process of adopting the rules and 
regulations of the EU's Single Market. Thus, the EU pre-accession strategy formed part of 
CEFTA's deepening and extended regulatory alignment to Central and Eastern Europe 
(Dangerfield, 2000: 114). CEFTA therefore was not an end in itself, but rather a means to 
the strategic goal of EU integration.
In addition, the political role of CEFTA is related to its impact on the stability of Central and 
Eastern Europe and has been discussed in terms of its contribution to the various layers of 
the new system of security governance in the post-Cold War era (Cottey, 1999). In the early 
years after the end of the Cold War, Central European countries were not keen to cooperate 
and a lack of trust of neighbours predominated (Keams, 1999: 31).*^  ^Despite the existence 
of certain factors conducive to economic cooperation such as territorial proximity, an 
affinity of economic systems and an existent network of communications and transport, in 
the early 1990s "establishing a strong network o f intra-regional orientation in investment 
and trade would require a contradiction o f the historical and structural economic realities 
within which cooperation developed' (Keams, 1999: 33). Nevertheless, trade liberalisation 
eventually ameliorated regional relations because CEFTA acted as an important forum for 
top-level political dialogue. To illustrate, during the Visegrad Group's dormant years 
1992-94 following the Slovak separatist policy and the Czechoslovak split of 1993, CEFTA 
acted as a platform for the resolution of disputes between members (Dangerfield, 2000: 81). 
According to Dangerfield, therefore, apart form acting as an indirect instmment to support 
EU accession, CEFTA's contribution in the political sense is related to the '"economic 
interdependence dimension of'soft security'' (Dangerfield, 2000: 79).
The Slovak-Hungarian bilateral relationship, for example, suffered from the long-standing dispute over the 
Gamcikovo-Nagymaros hydro-electric power project and disputes over the status of the large Hungarian 
minority living in Slovakia (Keams, 1999: 31).
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5.3 The Western Balkans 153
The fragile security situation in the former Yugoslav space in the early 1990s did not, 
however, allow the development of advanced contractual relations with the warring parties 
until after the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995. Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia were thus only subjected to the enforcement of Autonomous Trade Preferences 
(ATPs) on an annual basis whereas FRY suffered a series of embargoes and bans such as on 
oil, arms, visa, export credit and investment. Croatia in addition saw negotiations 
concerning the signing of a TCA. These were nevertheless suspended after the attack against 
the Serbs ofKraJina in September 1995 (Lozandic, 1996:31). Only Albania saw the signing 
of a TCA with the EC in 1992 whereas FYR Macedonia's application was put on hold 
because of a dispute with Greece over recognition of the state under the constitutional 
designation Republic of Macedonia (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 16).
These agreements primarily governed trade relations between the EU and the Western 
Balkan countries and relied on European unilateral exemption from customs duties and the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on many industrial products (TDI, 1999: 20). 
Therefore, a high degree of duty-free access to the EU market existed as approximately 80% 
of tariff lines were free (World Bank, 2000: 60). But trade concessions on the part of the 
EU, however, were subject to significant uncertainty and reversibility for the majority of 
exports from South East European Countries (SEECs). A large portion of 'managed' 
liberalisation annexes were included in these agreements. Tariff ceilings and quotas 
(managed trade) governed industrial products like textiles, coal, steel and chemicals which
The Western Balkans are also referred to in the literature as South East European Countries (SEECs),
The substance of these unilateral preferences was inherited from the 1980 TCA with former Yugoslavia 
which gave preferential treatment to Yugoslav exports to the EU without reciprocity. It was denounced, 
however, in 1991 wfren the EC introduced sanctions against the FRY (World Bank, 2000: 59),
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were particularly important for Western Balkan countries. 155
To illustrate, in the case of Albania although only 5% of products were subject to managed 
trade, they represented 62% of exports to the EU (World Bank, 2000: 60). Moreover, most 
products assumed into the annexes of the agreements were at times subject to anti-dumping 
actions by the EU (TDI, 1999: 21). Finally, all agricultural products were subject to a 
number of restrictions given the protective nature of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) (Daskalov et al, 2000: 5). Thus, during the early 1990s, the European Union was 
more liberal towards the Western Balkans on products that did not represent a significant 
share of the region's exports to its market while being more protective on major imports 
fi*om the SEECs (Daskalov et al; 2000: 7).
In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords in December 1995, the EU presented a new policy 
towards the Western Balkans based on the principle of regionality. In early 1996, the 
European Commission reported to the Council that "the need to foster a regional approach 
must he the fundamental principle informing the relationships that the Union is planning to 
develop with the countries o f the region and must guarantee that the instruments available 
to the Union are used accordingly" (SEC (96) 252:2). On 26 February 1996 the EU General 
Affairs Council defined a Regional Approach with five countries of the region that did not 
at the time have Association Agreements with the EU. It stated that future agreements with 
each of these states "will be subject, particularly where economic cooperation is concerned, 
to the readiness o f each o f the countries concerned to cooperate with its neighbours" 
(COM, (96), 476:1).
A large proportion of'managed' liberalisation annexes relating to textiles were drafted without reference to 
the EU commitment to eliminate all quantitative barriers in this sector by 2005 included in the WTO Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing (TDI, 1999: 21).
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The Regional Approach advocated the successful implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Agreements and the creation of an area of political stability and economic prosperity 
between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY, FYR Macedonia and Albania (COM (96), 
476:1). It was accompanied by a detailed and explicit political and economic conditionality 
established by the General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997, compliance with which formed 
the basis for the development of bilateral relations with the Western Balkan countries in the 
fields of trade (autonomous trade preferences), financial and economic assistance 
(OBNOVA/Reconstruction and PHARE programmes) as well as contractual relations. 
Included among general conditions to all five countries were issues of démocratisation and 
the rule of law, the development of a market economy, respect for human rights, the return 
of refugees and displaced persons as well as cooperation with neighbours (General Affairs 
Council, 1997). Among the specific conditions which referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia and FRY were issues concerning respect of the Dayton and Erdut Accords (General 
Affairs Council, 1997).
Nevertheless, the long list of conditions imposed on Western Balkan countries made it 
difficult for aid and agreements to come through (SEC (98), 586). To illustrate, no TCAs 
were signed with any of the three signatories of Dayton in the aftermath of the 
implementation of the Regional Approach. ATPs were not renewed with the FRY after 
1998 for political reasons related to the suppression of the rights of the Albanian population 
of Kosovo. In addition, after the attack against the Serbs of Krajina in August 1995, Croatia 
was not deemed eligible for receiving PHARE aid (Lozandic, 1996: 31). Only FYR 
Macedonia was found to be respecting the political and economic conditionalities and 
eventually signed a TCA with the EU in 1997 (COM (99) 235: Annex 2: 15) (EU, 1997).
It was the 1999 Kosovo war which gave a new dynamic and sense of urgency to Europe’s
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relations with the Western Balkans through the revision of its trade policy vis-a-vis the 
Western Balkan countries and the launching of the SAP. With respect to trade policy, in 
June 2000 the Commission drafted a radical proposal to the European Council to renew the 
ATPs by removing the ceilings and tariff quotas, including in the agricultural sector 
(Michalopoulos, 2001: 10). In late 2000, the EU established a uniform and generous ATP 
scheme, which provided duty and quota-ft-ee access for practically all exports of the five 
SEECs to EU markets (EU, 2000). Unilateral liberalisation covers most industrial goods 
and the exceptions in agriculture concern some meat, wine and fisheries products 
(Daskalov, 2000: 7). The scheme is even more generous in providing market access 
opportunities to SEECs than the preferences provided by the EU to candidates under the 
EAs, putting the five Western Balkan countries at the top of the EU preference pyramid 
(Michalopoulos, 2001: 11). At present, 95% of exports fi'om the region enjoy duty-free 
access to the EU (CARDS, 2001:13).'“
The SAP is an ambitious policy seeking to promote stability within the region while also 
facilitating closer relations with the EU. Its main feature is the offer of enhanced contractual 
relations - the SAAs - which include the perspective of closer integration into EU structures 
in return for compliance with the relevant conditions expressed through the General Affairs 
Council of 29 April 1997 (COM (99) 235). SAAs constitute the main tool for the 
implementation of increased and reoriented assistance and support for démocratisation, 
development of trade relations and political dialogue including at a regional level as well as 
cooperation in new fields such as justice and home affairs.^^^ The one incentive that the 
SAP did not provide, however, was an explicit promise for membership. Rather, in the
156 The above further unilateral liberalisation does not affect the EU market since Western Balkan countries
accounted for only 0,6% of imports in 2000 (EU, 2000: 1),
More limited cooperation in 
for SAAs (COM (99) 235: 7).
 these fields, however, is also available to counh'ies which are not yet eligible
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conclusions of the Feira European Council in June 2000 it was stressed that the five Western 
Balkan countries are ‘potential candidates’ for EU membership (Lopandic, 2001: 186). 
That conditionality in the Western Balkans is exogenous to the Union's relationship with 
these countries as no membership prospects accompany it, however, does not provide 
adequate incentives for its fulfillment locally (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003).
With respect to trade, the SAA is a new type of measure which aims to establish a FTA 
between the EU and the signatories over a period of ten years. It involves asymmetric 
liberalisation based on improved preferences and is conditioned on individual countries' 
actions in support of structural adjustments. Western Balkan countries are, therefore, able to 
delay the opening of their markets to imports from the EU, rendering the SAA a useful tool 
for promoting bilateral integration while providing some space for restructuring 
(Michalopoulos, 2001: 11). SAAs also require signatories to start negotiations towards the 
conclusion of a FTA with any country with which the EU signs a similar agreement in the 
future so as to avoid a hub and spokes system that would favour investment in the EU at the 
expense of the SEECs (Baldwin, 1994).'^* As the EU signs individual SAAs with Western 
Balkan countries, therefore, over time the SEECs themselves should be linked through free 
trade arrangements with each other (World Bank, 2000: 61).^^^
To date, SAAs have been signed with FYR Macedonia and Croatia in February and October 
2001 respectively and negotiations were opened with Albania in February 2003 (COM
The FTA between FYROM and Croatia applied in June 1997 and revised through the Stability Pact 
Working Table II, for example, will form one of the pillars o f the bilateral cooperation convention that as SAA 
signatories Skopje and Zagreb are required to agree with each other. It will also serve as a model Wiile the 
network of conventions between SAA signatories expands (CARDS, 2001: 14).
The European Institute in Sofia and the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels recommended that 
trade liberalisation between the EU and the Western Balkans should be promoted through CEFTA membership 
which could subsequently lead to a FTA between these countries, EFTA and Turkey (Daskalov et al, 2000).
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(2001), 90; COM (2001), 371; COM 2001, 300). Serbia-Montenegro and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, have not yet been deemed ready to initiate negotiations due 
to their inability to meet the SAP criteria. Instead, Consultative Task Forces have been 
focusing on national and EU oriented reforms for these countries (COM, (2002) 163: 6). 
That the SAP is applicable on a country by country basis, however, stimulates jealousy and 
resentment among the signatories and further contributes to the region’s heterogeneity.^^^ 
In addition, it contradicts those elements of EU conditionality which promote a greater 
degree of regional cooperation (BeCei, 2003: 11). In practice, therefore, the regional 
strategic principle has had little influence on the SAP despite the fact that it was repeated at 
a summit between the EU and Western Balkan countries in Zagreb in November 2000.^^^
Finally, the SAP is supported by a substantial financial assistance programme through the 
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Démocratisation and Stabilisation (CARDS) 
which replaced the PHARE and OBNOVA programmes that were introduced in 1989 and 
1996 respectively. The new community instrument is endowed with EURO 4,65 billion 
over the period 2002-2006 in order to accompany and support the democratic, economic and 
institutional reforms of the five countries concerned. As envisaged in the Regional Strategy 
Paper which complements the national support programmes, however, only 10% of the 
available funds will be directed to supporting regional cooperation (CARDS, 2001). 
Integrated border management, institutional capacity-building, democratic stabilisation and
The SAA with FYR Macedonia, however, was signed as ethnic violence erupted in the country, thus failing 
to provide stability and discrediting Brussels’ policy in the region (BeCei, 2003: 3),
Croatia and FYR Macedonia also applied for membership of the EU in February 2003 and March 2004 
respectively. The former was granted candidate status at the Brussels European Council in June 2004.
It was at the Zagreb summit where Southeast European leaders stated that their basic aim was '7o establish 
between their countries regional cooperation conventions providing fo r a political dialogue, a regional free 
trade area and close cooperation in the field o f justice and home affairs" (EU, 2000:2),
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infrastructure development have been identified as the four areas where support can best be 
delivered at a regional level (CARDS, 2001).
5.4 Turkey
Turkey's contractual relations with the European Union date back to the 1964 Association 
Agreement -  otherwise known as Ankara Agreement - which aimed at promoting Turkey's 
economic development as well as strengthening the country's commercial ties with Western 
Europe (EC, 1973a: 4 (Article 2)). The 1964 Ankara Agreement identified the Customs 
Union as the final of a three stage association with the EC.*^  ^ It was a sui generis 
association as Turkey is one of the few countries in Europe - apart from Andorra, San 
Marino, Cyprus and Malta - that was expected to establish a Customs Union without being 
a member of the Community (Aybak, 1996: 64; Sapir, 2000: 154).'^ The significance and 
details pertaining to the agreement’s implementation were adopted in the 1970 Additional 
Protocol which provided that the EU would unilaterally abolish all tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions on Turkish exports of manufactured products from 1973 onwards. In return, 
Turkey would abolish tariffs and quantitative restrictions on EU exports of manufactured 
products over a period of 22 years, that is to say by 1995 (EC, 1973b).
The relationship between the two parties, however, deteriorated after 1976 when Turkey 
suspended further tariff reductions as a result of financial problems and an increasing trade
The three stages envisioned by the Association Agreement were: a) preparatory until 1969 granting Turkey 
unilateral advantages with regard to exports; b) transitional progressively establishing a Customs Union and c) 
final based on the Customs Union and requiring a strengthening of the coordination of both parties' economic 
policies (EC, 1973a: 4. (Articles 3,4,5)).
Article 28 o f the Ankara Agreement stated that when Turkey would undertake all the obligations mentioned 
in the relationship with the Community, it could become possible to investigate the question o f full membership 
(EC, 1973a: 7).
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deficit with the EC (Yigit, 1996: 55)/^^ Despite the disharmony in EU-Turkey relations in 
the 1970s and 1980s also due to the political situation in Turkey, the Customs Union entered 
into force punctually in 1996 abolishing Turkey's tariff protection against the EU for all 
industrial and processed agricultural goods. It is also progressively aligning Turkey to the 
CET on imports from third countries and includes the adoption of free trade agreements 
with the EU's preferential partners including EFTA, the CEECs and Mediterranean states 
(EU, 1996: 9).
The present scope of the Customs Union, however, is more comprehensive than originally 
foreseen by the Additional Protocol. Not restricted to tariffs and quotas, the final phase goes 
beyond conventional border controls into addressing new regulatory areas such as 
competition policy, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and other administrative procedures 
(EU, 1996). That elements of deep integration are embraced in the final phase of the 
Customs Union is attributable to the fact that its implementation today requires measures 
dealing with such issues as intellectual property, patent rights and anti-monopoly laws 
(Lawrence, 1996). Since 1996, therefore, Turkey has been incorporating substantial Single 
Market legislation into its internal order (Aybak, 1996: 64).*^ ^
The usefulness of the Customs Union, therefore, “stems from the fact that it possesses such 
a multitude o f issues that are central to the further integration o f Turkey into the EU" 
(Yigit, 1996: 60). That the implications of the Customs Union are more political than
In sensitive products like textiles which dominated its exports to the EC, for example, Turkey was a 
vulnerable partner that was affected by the Community's export restraints (Aybak, 1996:66),
A Customs Union is a form of economic integration that removes all barriers to trade among members while 
harmonising commercial policies towards the rest o f the world (Balassa, 1961: 2).
Embodying elements of both old and new approaches to economic integration, the Customs Union is a clear 
example of the 'new regionalism'.
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economic can also be demonstrated by the fact that in the aftermath of its implementation 
Turkish exports to the EU grew but not nearly as much as the imports. The poor 
performance of Turkey's export trade has been attributed to the fact that industrial goods, 
which constitute its majority, were already exported to the EC without tariffs fi'om the 1970s 
(Neuwahl, 1999: 45). Nevertheless, agricultural products as well as the free movement of 
capital and labour are not covered by the agreements that guide EU-Turkish relations (Yigit, 
1996: 52).
For Ankara, however, the Customs Union is a means that will lead to EU membership and 
the result of its long and persistent interest in European integration. Further to its first 
application for membership of the European Community in 1958, which led to the signing 
of the Ankara Agreement in 1964, Turkey reapplied in 1987. Its application, however, was 
turned down by the European Commission two years later due to still large gaps in the 
country's economic and political standards. Turkey's eligibility for membership, however, 
was confirmed and the Community's interest in closer ties with Ankara were underlined 
(Cameron, 1997). In addition, the 1997 Association Council reaffirmed Turkey's eligibility 
to join the EU and stated that Ankara would be judged according to the Copenhagen criteria 
set for Central and East European countries (CEECs).
It was the 1999 Helsinki European Council which decided to convene bilateral 
inter-govemmental conferences to begin negotiations with the second wave of CEECs, 
however, that granted Turkey candidate status on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria 
(Papadimitriou, 2001: 98). In Helsinki it was agreed that the EU would review reforms in
The Copenhagen criteria are a) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; b) a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces with the EU; c) the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European Council, 
1993).
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the end o f2004 in order to evaluate whether it can start accession negotiations with Ankara. 
At the Copenhagen summit of December 2002, the EU went as far as to decide to withdraw 
assistance for Turkey from the pre-accession budget even though it has not been decided 
whether accession negotiations can start (ESI, 2003: 10).
In recent years, many far-reaching reforms have been adopted by Turkey in an effort to 
persuade the EU that the country is eligible to start negotiations for membership. To 
illustrate, in October 2001 a significant constitutional reform was introduced aimed at 
strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
restricting the grounds for capital punishment and in November 2001 a new Civil Code was 
adopted (EU, 2003). August 2002 also saw the lifting of the death penalty and the state of 
emergency in two provinces in South East. Finally, in July 2003 the executive power of the 
National Security Council (NSC) was removed (Financial Times, 2003).
Although these reforms provide the ground for strengthening Turkish democracy and the 
protection of human rights, Turkey nevertheless does not fully meet the political criteria for 
membership as the reforms contain certain limitations, such as restrictions on the freedom 
of expression, peaceful assembly, association, religion and legal redress (EU, 2003). Until 
2003, therefore, EU annual reports concluded that Turkey was not yet in a position to meet 
the economic and political criteria for membership and has not supported a firm 
commitment towards closer relations with view to Turkey's accession. Meanwhile, the 
strain of adapting Turkish law and industry to the requirements of the Single Market without 
a direct voice in the formulation of European legislation often creates tensions in 
EU-Turkish relations (Neuwahl, 1999: 61).^^^
Such tensions were experienced, for example, between 1996-99 when Greece blocked the resumption of  
financial aid to Turkey aimed at alleviating the negative impact o f the Customs Union (Neuwahl, 1996:48).
133
5.5 Conclusions
Chapter 5 has examined the bilateral policies that the EU pursued with Southeastern 
European countries in the post-Cold War era which created distortions and divisions in the 
region exacerbating its heterogeneity and having a negative impact on the region-building 
attempt. Since the early 1990s, on the one hand, Bulgaria and Romania have been 
signatories to TCAs and subsequently AAs with the EU. Whereas TCAs provided for the 
establishment of new types of trade and economic relations with countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, they kept a protectionist guard in sectors that would have benefited the 
CEECs and lacked a specific target for membership. Since February and March 1993, 
however, EAs provided for asymmetric free trade in manufactures and gradually established 
a free trade area with the EU while granting Sofia and Bucharest an accession prospect. 
They were a solid foundation for pan-european integration even though only cautious steps 
were taken towards the freedoms guaranteed by the Internal Market, namely the free 
movement of capital and services as well as labour (Lippert, 1994: 116).
In addition, Bulgaria and Romania were also included in the CEFTA in 1997 and 1999 
respectively. Although CEFTA trade was beset by traditional restrictions and disregard of 
partners representing only a small part of economic activity of the CEECs while trade with 
the EU was gradually being liberalised through the EAs, it's contribution to EU accession 
lay in acting as an indirect instrument for encouraging the countries to adopt the rules and 
regulations of the Single Market as well as ameliorating regional relations (Dangerfield, 
2001). As such, it has been facilitating the incorporation of the two countries in the EU 
expected to be achieved in 2007.
The Western Balkans, on the other hand, were in the mid-1990s subjected to a policy of
regionality through the Regional Approach advocating the creation of an area of political
stability and economic prosperity between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY, FYR
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Macedonia and Albania (COM (96), 476: 1). The detailed political and economic 
conditionality that accompanied the Regional Approach, however, made it difficult for aid 
and agreements to come through to the successor states of Yugoslavia which in the case of 
FRY even took the form of sanctions. Only FYR Macedonia was found to be respecting the 
political and economic conditionalities and eventually signed a TCA with the EU in 1997 
(EU, 1997).
In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the EU established a uniform ATP scheme 
which provided duty and quota-free access for practically all exports to the Western Balkans 
and introduced the SAP in order to facilitate closer relations with the region. The main 
feature of the SAP is the offer of enhanced contractual relations through SAAs which 
include increased and reoriented assistance for démocratisation, asymmetric trade 
liberalisation within ten years as well as political dialogue and cooperation in new fields 
such as justice and home affairs. The SAP, however, did «o/provide an explicit promise for 
membership of the Western Balkan countries depriving its conditionality from the ability to 
create incentives for its fulfillment.
In addition, although some countries such as Croatia and FYR Macedonia signed a SAA 
with the EU in 2001 and the former was granted candidate status by the European Council 
of June 2004, others such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro have not yet been 
deemed capable to do so given their economic and political situation whereas Albania is still 
negotiating one with Brussels. Differentiation of EU contractual relations is, therefore, even 
greater within the SAP countries than between the rest of Southeastern Europe and the 
Western Balkans creating further distortions and spawning a climate of antagonism between 
those countries that have signed SAAs and those not yet deemed capable to do so.
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Finally, Turkey has been a signatory to an AA with the EC since 1964. Since 1996, it has 
also been incorporating substantial Single Market legislation in its internal order through 
the establishment of a Customs Union with the EU. The Customs Union is the result of 
Turkey's long and persistent interest in European integration that goes back to the early 
years of the Community. It embodies elements of both shallow and deep integration 
despite the fact that agriculture is not yet covered by the agreement. At the same time, 
Turkey was granted candidate status and pre-accession aid by the EU at the Helsinki 
Council of December 1999. Until the 2003 Annual Report, however, Ankara was not 
deemed capable of initiating negotiations for membership given its lack of progress in 
satisfying the political criteria set out in Copenhagen in 1993.
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Chapter 6
‘Stateness’ in the Yugoslav Successor States and Entities
6.1. Introduction
In the theoretical chapter it was shown that the viability of states is a prerequisite for the 
success of regionalism and that in the developing world the infancy of the states combined 
with the simultaneity of their state-making and démocratisation processes contributed to the 
lack of cooperation (Ayoob, 1995). The complex relationship between state, nation and 
democratization has been called ‘stateness’ problem by political scientists (Linz and Stepan, 
1996). The majority of successor states or entities of former Yugoslavia have experienced 
severe ‘stateness’ problems in the post-Cold War era. The double transition to market 
economies and democracies was, therefore, turned into a ‘triple transition’, adding the 
aspect of post-communist state and nation-building (Kopecky and Mudd, 2000: 58).* °^
Chapter 6 will examine the problem of ‘stateness’ in the Yugoslav successor states in the 
post-Cold War era -  or else how state and nation-building proceeded - in order to 
demonstrate a significant barrier to regional cooperation. Although in the same period other 
Balkan countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania confronted 'stateness' problems, 
they will not be considered in the ensuing Chapter as their borders had already been finalised 
by the end of World War II and mechanisms to mitigate ethnic problems were successfully
State and nation-building are closely related phenomena but they are not the same. While state-building 
focuses on the establishment o f state institutions in a newly defined territory, nation-building is a longer 
process that concentrates on the emergence of a national identity, that is to say the creation o f a positive 
identification o f citizens with the state. The nation-state appears as the ultimate goal o f the state and 
nation-building agenda (Kopecky and Mudd, 2000: 529),
137
applied in the 1990s preventing the outbreak of violence. The analysis will include 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the FRY -  renamed Serbia-Montenegro in 2003 - Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia but will not consider Slovenia which was the only one of the former 
Yugoslav republics where nation-building was completed during communism before it 
sought independence from Belgrade (Woodward, 2001: 5)/^^
6.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina
Although its external sovereignty is de jure recognised by the international community and 
neighbouring states, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still at the early stages of establishing state 
structures and faces the greatest difficulties in nation-building of all Yugoslav successor 
states. Bosnia-Herzegovina was set up as an international protectorate by the Dayton Peace 
Accords which ended the three and a half year territorial conflict between Bosniaks, Croats
To illustrate, in Albania hostility towards ethnic Greeks in the early 1990s was mitigated by the advent 
to power o f the Socialists in 1997 who allowed minority representation in parliament (Psalidas, 1999), In 
Romania, although the ethnic concept o f state is still reflected in the post-communist Constitution, ethnic 
Hungarians - who represent 7% of the country's population and constitute a majority in Transylvania and 
Banat - have successfully participated in coalition governments and state administration since 1996. The 
introduction o f consociational democracy in Romania can be traced to the signing o f the Treaty of 
Friendship between Bucharest and Budapest in 1996 (Mungiu-Pipidi, 2003: 264), In Bulgaria, although 
Article 11 o f the 1991 Constitution banned autonomy and political parties founded on an ethnic basis, in 
1992 a separately elected assembly ruled that the Movement o f Rights and Freedoms (MRF) should not be 
excluded from the country’s political life. Drawing its electoral support from the Turkish and Muslim 
minorities representing around 10% of Bulgaria's population, the MRF was consequently granted 
legitimate representation in the country's political order (Bell, 1999: 261), Finally, Turkey's serious 
'stateness' problem, which led to the outbreak o f violence in the country in the 1990s, relates to the Kurdish 
question which does not directly affect Ankara's relations with Southeastern European countries (Taspinar, 
2003: 29-33),
Slovenia, the population o f which is 90% ethnic Slovene, is the only republic o f former Yugoslavia where 
the state created the nation following the West European nineteenth century pattern o f state-building 
(Woodward, 2001:5), The Slovenian War o f Independence in June-July 1991 lasted only 10 days and ended 
with the withdrawal o f the Yugoslav Federal Army from the country at little human cost (Ripley, 2001).
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and Serbs and patron states Croatia and Serbia in December 1995.*^  ^Formally known as the 
GFAP, the Dayton Agreement assigned 51% of the country’s territory to the Croat-Bosniak 
dominated FBiH and 49% to the Bosnian-Serb controlled RS/^"  ^Its military provisions 
empowered a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to guarantee peace and mandated 
the parties to negotiate a series of CSBMs. IFOR successfully deployed 60.000 troops in 
Bosnia (20.000 US) and 5.000 in Eastern Slavonia which was to be returned to Croatia. It 
was succeeded in 1996 by SFOR (Ripley, 2001). The civilian provisions of the agreement 
representing the nation-building mandate, however, were not as stringent as the military 
ones and were more difficult to implement (Consens and Cater, 2001).
The Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Annex 4 of GFAP) created one 
state, two entities - the FBiH and the RS - and three nations (Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks) in 
order to satisfy all existing interests on the ground. The central government is responsible 
for foreign affairs, trade and monetary policies, immigration, international and inter-entity 
law enforcement, but the entities were granted defense, policing and judiciary powers and 
have their own constitution, parliament, army and government. Both entities were 
granted their own citizenship in addition to a common one and both were allowed to 
establish 'special parallel relationships with neighbouring states' (Constitution of
Socialist Bosnia-Herzegovina had the most complex ethnic and religious configuration in former 
Yugoslavia (44% Muslim, 31% Serb and 17% Croat). Once internationally recognised in April 1992, the 
constitutional relationships guaranteed by the SFRY were called into question. The ensuing conflict over the 
restructuring o f the republic saw the most violent fighting and ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War 
II. It is estimated that over 200.000 people were killed and more than 2.000.000 were rendered homeless 
(Cviic, 1995: 87; Consens and Cater, 2001: 25)
The Dayton Agreement is a voluminous international document with which several different actors are 
involved, namely states, sub-state entities and international organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE, EU). All 
have been assigned different roles such as contracting parties, guarantors and witnesses. It contains 11 
articles, 11 annexes, numerous appendices and 102 maps (GFAP, 1995).
A complicated state structure includes four major assemblies with legislative authority: a) the State-level 
Parliamentary Assembly; b) the bicameral parliament of the FBiH; c) the unicameral National Assembly of 
the RS and d) the Brcko District Assembly. In addition, legislative authority is granted to the cantonal 
parliaments o f the FBiH (SEC, (2002) 340: 5).
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Bosnia-Herzegovina: Article I, Paragraph 7; Article III, Paragraph 2). Effective sovereignty, 
therefore, was reserved for the en titie s /T o  illustrate, the national government does not 
have its own revenue but has to rely on transfers from the entities (Talentino, 2002: 34). In 
the words of Consens and Cater, therefore, "Dayton's mediators crafted an accord based on 
a fundamental ambivalence between its partitionist and integrative elements" (Consens and 
Cater, 2001: 44)
In addition, Dayton reaffirmed ethnic as opposed to civic principles of political organisation 
reinforcing the values that sustained the war and institutionalising ethnicity (Einagel, 1997: 
245).*^  ^That the preamble of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, defines 
only Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as 'constituent people' of the republic did not allow the 
Jewish, Roma, Czech and Albanian population of the country the right to hold public office 
(Caplan, 2000: 224). In addition, the rights of all constituent peoples were not initially 
guaranteed throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina given that the Constitutions of the RS and the 
FBiH referred to the 'State o f the Serb people' and to 'Bosniaks and Croats along with others' 
respectively (Perry, 2002:2).*^* Finally, although the consociational multi-tiered model can 
be detected in the institutional framework of the Bosnian state, such as in the chambers of 
Parliament and the Presidency, most political decisions can be blocked by one of the three
Although the state is not officially defined in the constitution, some analysts have called post-Dayton 
Bosnia-Herzegovina an 'asymmetric confederation' as one entity is a bi-cameral federal structure (FBiH) and 
the other a unicameral body (RS) and legislation has to be translated internally in each state in order to be 
binding to its citizens (Malesevic, 2000: 161).
'Civic' principles o f political organisation define citizenship through a particular territory whereas 
'ethnic' ones by common ethnicity. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two variations, often referred 
to as the 'French' and 'German' models of nationalism respectively, is complex and modem constitutions 
usually consist o f both civic and ethnic elements. Civic nationalism is overall considered to be more 
inclusive but it is harder to achieve as it requires well developed political institutions that distribute power 
across ethnic boundaries (Taspinar, 2003: 27).
In July 2000, however, the Constitutional Court o f Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded that these references 
were unconstitutional (Perry, 2002: 2).
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ethnie groups if their vital interests are at stake (Bieber, 2001: 115; Bieber, 2003:1). 179
Above all, however, the Dayton structure established a protectorate. De facto the country is 
not sovereign as it does not have the monopoly of legitimate coercion, such as a Bosnian 
army. The structure of the state is guaranteed by the presence of an international army - 
SFOR - and at the few joint institutions, such as the Central Bank and the Constitutional 
Court, foreign nationals were appointed. For example, out of the nine members of the 
Constitutional Court three cannot be citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and are appointed by 
the President of the European Court of Human Rights (Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
1995. Article VI, Paragraph I). In addition, the UN High Representative was granted 
authority over the civilian regulation of the economy, judiciary and political institutions 
under the guidance of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Finally, the OSCE was 
granted a special role in election monitoring and media regulation. Dayton, therefore, 
contained significant powers for international institutions in the governance of the Bosnian 
state.
In the first years after the end of the war, joint institutions were hardly functioning and 
Bosnian society was deeply divided. The 1996 and 1998 elections witnessed the emergence 
of nationalist politicians and ethnic politics opposing state institutions. The representatives 
of the tripartite presidency and national legislature were not able to agree on policies. Little 
progress was achieved on consensual decisions and entity authorities obstructed the 
unification of institutions, minority return and war crimes indictments (Consens and Cater, 
2001: 129-30). In addition, de facto the FBiH was divided in two territories with
Consociational democracy, or else "’'government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a 
fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” has been defined by Lijphart as a combination of the 
following elements: mutual veto rights o f the societal or political segments, segmental autonomy, grand 
coalitions and proportional representation (Lijphart, 1969: 216), In the 1990s, consociational models are 
more commonly referred to as 'power-sharing',
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Bosniak-controlled Sarajevo and Croat-controlled Mostar as their respective centres 
(Gligorov, 2002: 133). That Dayton was interpreted differently by each side also hindered 
the functioning of the main institutions.
The response of the international community to the continuing polarisation in the country 
was the expansion of its role in the reconstruction of a common Bosnian state. In 1997, the 
High Representative's mandate was widened through the 'Bonn Powers' including authority 
to develop and enact laws that the Bosnian leadership was blocking and to take action 
against those parties who were not abiding by the Dayton agreement (Consens and Cater, 
2001: 131). Since the 1997 PIC, almost all significant decisions such as the selection of the 
new flag and state symbols, joint currency and passports as well as joint car plates, were 
decided solely by the Office of the UN High Representative (OHR) (Malesevic, 2000: 163). 
In his first term of office, for example. High Representative Carlos Westendorp dismissed 
the President of the Serb Republic Nikola Poplasen with the excuse that he was supporting 
partition (Bugajski, 2000: 10).
The trusteeship that was established in the country, however, has been viewed by many 
analysts as a model that undermined the objective of fostering institutions and a culture of 
democratic accountability (Consens and Cater, 2001:134). In the words of David Chandler, 
"instead o f strengthening the central institutions o f the new state and facilitating
Having been the largest group of Socialist Bosnia-Herzegovina (44% o f the population), Bosniaks, for 
example, were dissatisfied with the outcome of the war which obliged them to cede almost half the country 
for the sake o f a decentralised federal state. They were in favour o f strong integrationist policies for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and expected and Western support for their agenda (Consens and Cater, 2001: 43). 
Bosnian Croats, who had constituted a minority population o f 17% before the war, fared well in Dayton by 
sharing power and land within the FBiH. But their leadership was more committed to the Croat parallel state 
that was set up during the war than real integration with the Bosniaks and would welcome a change in the 
constitution that would divide the country in three ethnically defined territories. Finally, Bosnian Serbs who 
were granted proportionately more territory (49%) than their percentage to Bosnia's pre-war population 
(31%) but saw their entity divided at Brcko anticipated external commitment to wane so that their eventual 
unification with Serbia would become possible (Talentino, 2002: 34).
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compromise and negotiation, the international administration has removed policy-making 
capacity from all popularly accountable Bosnian institutions. This has weakened the state 
and entity bodies that are central to unifying society and has reinforced ethnic 
identification" (Chandler, 2001: 118). The two-entity protectorate system, therefore, may 
have outlived its usefulness in pacifying all three national groups in the early stages of 
peace-making and may actually be undermining the efforts at institution-building, fostering 
division and delay. Many analysts have consequently argued that the original internationally 
imposed peace agreement requires restructuring (Bugajski, 2000: 190; Dassu and Whyte, 
2001: 127).
Other analysts, nevertheless, have argued that the problems related to the structural 
weaknesses of the agreement can be overcome by reinterpreting its terms, from the pursuit 
of war criminals and general enhancement of public safety to the conditioning of aid and 
inter-party cooperation (Caplan, 2000: 230). In support of this view is the fact that in recent 
years some progress has been reported with respect to the implementation of the Dayton 
Accord on such issues as human rights (Annex 6), refugee returns (Annex 7) and police 
reform (Annex 11) (SEC, (2003): 340: 13).^ *^  The fact that the international military 
presence has been downsized considerably and that SFOR is expected to be fully replaced 
by an EU-led peace-keeping force (EUROR) at the end 2004 also attests to the growing 
stability of the country. In addition, in light of the EU conditionality for the opening of 
negotiations for an SAA, in 2003 the RS and the FBiH agreed to cede taxation and defense 
to the central state (Noutcheva, 2004: 1). Many, therefore, are arguing in favour of
By the end o f 2002, almost one million refugees and displaced persons had returned to their homes. 
Estimates put the number o f remaining displaced persons registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina at 367.000 
(SEC, (2003): 340: 12).
In 2003, SFOR was downsized to 12,900 troops from the original 60,000 and the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) - the first crisis management operation under the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) - assumed security responsibilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SEC, (2003): 340: 9).
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'consolidating a functioning central state without reopening other issues' (Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2002)/^^
6.3 Croatia
Croatia was internationally recognised as a sovereign state for the first time in its history in 
January 1992. International recognition followed the June 1991 declaration of independence 
from the former Yugoslavia, an event which sparked the rebellion of the Serbian population 
of Krajina and the subsequent war with Belgrade between 1992-95. During the so-called 
"homeland war", large parts of Croatian territory came under Serb control including some 
natural gas and oil deposits in Eastern Slavonia. Although most territories were recovered 
by Franjo Tudjman's offensive in the summer of 1995 which saw the exodus of 600.000 
Serbs from Krajina in less than a month, the fragmentation and economic disruption of 
Croatia resulting from the Serbian rebellion shaped the country's post-communist political 
developments during the next decade. Coupled with the imperatives of military defense, the 
new regime's insecurity encouraged the formation of a defensive world view and a siege 
mentality in Croatia including a tendency to mythologise the war against the Serbs (Cohen, 
1997: 84).
The fact that Croatia was initially a garrison state motivated and provided justification for 
the regime's adoption of many illiberal practices. One of the most pronounced features of the 
semi-authoritarian modes of government was the concentration of power in the hands of 
President Tudjman and the executive branch of the Croatian Democratic Community's
According to the European Commission, "all communities must build constructively on foundations laid 
at Dayton. Sustainability and integration into European structures must consider that a strong state is 
compatible with a strong entitÿ\S>EC, 2002: 340).
Constituting 12% of the population o f Croatia, the large Serbian minority was a majority in the region of 
Krajina and declared independence from Zagreb in December 1991 (Cviic, 1995: 83).
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(HDZ) paternalistic government (Cohen, 1997: 84). The 'democratic deficit' that prevailed 
saw the establishment of state interference in the workings of the judiciary, firm control of 
the military by hardliners which served as officers in the Croat Herzegovinian army, 
violations of human rights towards the Serb community as well as Croat population, 
manipulation of state-controlled media and the absence of freedom of association (Cviic, 
1996: 211). According to Vesna Pusic, Tudjman created a "dictatorship with democratic 
legitimacy" (Pusic, 1994: 397).
In addition, the early phase of nation-building undermined the entire process of 
démocratisation in Croatia (Agh, 1998: 200). In its concept of statehood, for example, the 
1990 Croatian Constitution envisaged a constituent nation reinforcing the ethnic idea of the 
nation-state: “TTze Republic o f Croatia is hereby established as the national state o f the 
Croatian nation and the state o f members o f other nations and minorities who are its 
citizens” (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia: 2).**^  Although a Constitutional Law of 
Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities was also 
adopted in 1991, in practice minorities were not represented in State administration and 
were relegated to the status of second class citizens. In the late 1990s, minority rights 
remained an area of concern for the international community (COM, 99 (235): 14).
Tudjman's death in 1999, nevertheless, coupled with the war in Kosovo, which triggered an 
enhanced interest on the part of the international community towards Southeastern Europe 
and the introduction of the EU's SAP, sparked the beginning of a transition process towards
’ In addition, under the 1990 Constitution it was expected that "Parts of the Croatian nation in other states 
shall be guaranteed special concern and protection by the republic o f  Croatia" (Constitution o f the 
Republic o f Croatia: Article 10).
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liberal democracy in C roatia /T he  coalition of parties that won the elections in January 
2000 represented a deep resentment within public opinion against many of President 
Tudjman's policies. Constitutional reform was therefore introduced in November 2000 and 
March 2001 changing a semi-presidential bicameral system into a parliamentary 
mono-cameral one (Vucadinovic, 2003: 1997).
Much of the progress towards liberal democracy was achieved due to the requirements of 
the SAA with the EU signed in October 2001. In December 2002, for example, the rights of 
minorities were eventually guaranteed with the adoption of the Constitutional Law on 
National Minorities (CLNM) which had been overdue since the postponement of Croatia’s 
accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 in light of the expulsion of Serbs from Krajina 
in August 1995. The law provides guarantees for minority representation not only in 
national and local-level bodies, but also in the judiciary and other state institutions (SEC, 
2003, 341: 10).**^  Moreover, under pressure from the international community, Croatia lay 
down the basis for two autonomous regions with a Serbian majority, namely Knin and 
Glina, which to date have only been guaranteed cultural rights. Finally, the election of 
minorities in Parliament as well as the redefinition of the role of Diaspora Croats, has been 
regulated by the new Election Law (SEC, 2003,341: 5).^ *^
Liberal democracy or else constitutional liberalism "is a political system marked not only by free 
elections but also by the rule o f law, a separation o f powers and protection o f basic liberties o f  speech, 
assembly, religion and property" (Zakaria, 1997: 22).
According to the 2001 Census, minorities take up 7,47% of the population of Croatia. These include in 
descending order: Serbs (4.5%), Bosnians (0,47%), Italians (0,44%), Hungarians (0,37%), Albanians 
(0,34%) and Slovenes (0,3%) (SEC (2003) 341: 10).
In addition, the new state faces increasing demands for autonomy from regions with a distinct identity 
such as Dalmatia, Slavonia and Istria (Malesevic, 2000: 166).
Until the late 1990s, only three seats were guaranteed for the Serbian minority in parliament (Malesevic, 
2000: 166).
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Despite guarantees granted to minorities by the CLNM as well as the requirements of the 
1995 Dayton and Paris Peace Agreements, the return of Serb refugees and displaced persons 
to Croatia has been proceeding slowly. According to the European Commission, 108.000 
out of 550.000 Croatian Serb refugees had returned to Croatia by the end of 2003. Figures 
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), however, show that
189.500 refugees from Croatia remain displaced in Serbia-Montenegro and approximately
19.500 in Bosnia-Herzegovina (COM, 2004, 257: 27).^^° Despite the fact that physical 
obstacles no longer obstruct the return of refugees to Croatia at the borders, the difficulty of 
obtaining housing as well as the lack of economic opportunities still constitute significant 
barriers to their social re-integration in the country (SEC, 2003, 341: 10-11).^^^
In addition, Croatia's borders are still undergoing clarification. Under the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Agreement, for example, Serb-held territories in Eastern Slavonia (4,5% of Croatian 
territory) were scheduled to be returned to Zagreb in 1996. But the accelerated relocation in 
the area of Serb refugees from other parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, rendered the 
settlement difficult to apply (Cviic, 1996: 211). In 2002, therefore, Zagreb maintained that 
a small slice of Croatian territory in the Baranja county was still under Serbian control 
(Southeast European Times, 2002). In addition, the border demarcation of the Danube river 
with Serbia-Montenegro made only modest progress since the establishment of the 
Inter-State Border Commission in December 2001 (SEC, 2003) 341: 13).*^  ^Finally, a
It is estimated that 150,000 refugees previously obtained Croatian citizenship thus loosing their refugee 
status (SEC, 2003:341: 10).
The Law on 1 
these problems.
Relations bel 
Relations (Vucadinovic, 1999: 8).
the Areas o f Special Concern amended in July 2002 is, nevertheless, expected to address
tween Croatia and FRY were normalised by the 1996 Agreement on Normalisation of
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remaining bilateral issue of land and sea border definition also remains with Slovenia (SEC, 
(2003)341:13).'”
Subsequent to applying to be a member in February 2003, however, the EU awarded 
Croatia candidate status in June 2004 arguing that it has satisfied the political and economic 
conditions for membership. Although cooperation with the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ITFY) has improved significantly, the Commission’s Opinion also 
made it explicit that Croatia's institutions require substantial strengthening. The judiciary, 
for example, remains an area of concern suffering from organisational problems, long 
delays and the lack of expertise. These weaknesses directly impact on the rule of law which 
remains problematic. Finally, certain issues of state and nation-building require further 
clarification, such as the delimitation of borders and the rights of minorities and refugees 
(COM, 2004: 257).
6.4 FRY/ Serbia-Montenegro
The FRY was founded on 27 April 1992 as a result of the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia subsequent to the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
FYR Macedonia between 1991-92. It consisted of the two remaining republics of the SFRY, 
Serbia and Montenegro. That there was no ethnic antagonism between Serbs and 
Montenegrins as well as the initial alliance between leaderships of the two republics explain 
why Belgrade and Podgorica remained together during the 1990s (Coppieters et al, 2003:4). 
Although the 1992 constitution was loosely defined allowing the republics to conduct their
Nevertheless, an agreement for a temporary border regime of the Prevlaka peninsula on the Adriatic coast 
- which since the end of the war had been under the authority of the UN Mission o f Observers (UNMOP) - 
was signed in December 2002. A permanent regime is expected to be agreed upon subsequent to the 
establishment of a final demarcation line (SEC, 2003: 341: 13).
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own foreign policy, join international organizations and enter into agreements with other 
states, the Serbian leadership gradually attempted to integrate the federation and strengthen 
the powers of Belgrade and the President in particular (Malesevic, 2000:164).
The advent to power of Milo Djuganovic in Montenegro in October 1997 exacerbated 
relations between the two republics as Podgorica requested seccession from Belgrade. 
Engaging more intensively in privatisation, Montenegro increasingly came to operate as a 
de facto separate state adopting the Deutsche mark - and later the euro - as its currency and 
low tariff protection in its trade policy and striving for economic integration with Europe 
(CEPS, 2002). The narrow victory of Djuganovic's coalition in the parliamentary elections 
of April 2001, albeit with only a margin of 10%, prepared the ground for a referendum on 
independence in Podgorica (Rupnik, 2001: 22). Fearing that early Montenegrin 
independence would bring about the so-called 'domino effect' in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, the EU intervened pressuring Montenegro into retaining a 
joint state with Serbia (Coppieters et al, 2003; IGC, 2003).
Subsequent to the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002 which put an end to the 
existence of the FRY as well as cumbersome negotiations between November 2001 and 
December 2002, the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
was eventually adopted in February 2003. It established a loose federal structure in which 
the common state was granted limited competences. Serbia-Montenegro has a single 
international representation and a number of joint institutions, namely a unicameral 
Parliament, a President and Ministerial Council seated in Belgrade and a Court with its base 
in Podgorica (Constitutional Charter of the State Union: Article 6). Federal government is 
responsible for defense, foreign affairs, human rights and international economic policies 
whereas a Single Market was established between the two republics (Constitutional Charter
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of the State Union: Article 12).
Although the Belgrade Agreement and the adoption of the Constitutional Charter 
temporarily alleviated the potential for a renewed crisis in Southeastern Europe, the 
formation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro failed to resolve the future 
relationship of the two republics. Since the majority of the Montenegrin electorate was in 
favour of independence, the Constitutional Charter of the State Union allows for a 
referendum on the future status of the republic three years after its establishment 
(Constitutional Charter, Article 60). In addition, the fact that the republic is 
over-represented in the bipolar structure of the federation may create further future 
conflicts.Finally, within Serbia there are some who believe that Belgrade would reform 
faster independently (Coppieters, 2003: 5; Janjic, 2003: 291).
The State Union of Serbia-Montenegro, therefore, lacks popular legitimacy and the artificial 
entity survives under pressure from the international community. The delay in 
implementation of reforms in many important sectors is indicative of its problematic nature 
(COM, 2003, 139 final). To illustrate, the refusal of Podgorica to recognise the new federal 
institutions obstructed the implementation of new legislation, such as the Law on Minorities 
and the Criminal Procedure Law, throughout 2003. In addition, the country is still split into 
two economic systems despite the establishment of a Common Market as required by the
As stated in Article 60 of the Charter 'Upon the expiry o f a three-year period the member states shall 
have the right to initiate the procedure for a change o f the state status, that is to say fo r the withdrawalfrom 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro' (Constitutional Charter, Article 60). The interim solution was the 
result o f a compromise between EU officials who preferred relations between Serbia and Montenegro to be 
tested after five years and President Djuganovic who requested a referendum after one year from the signing 
of the agreement (Pop, 2003: 118).
Although the population o f Montenegro is less than one tenth that of Serbia - 650.000 out o f 8 million - 
the Court o f Serbia and Montenegro has been granted an equal number o f judges from both member states 
(Constitutional Charter, Article 47). This numerical balance is fiirther complicated by the fact that there are 
many in Montenegro who consider themselves to be Serbs (Woodward, 2001: 22).
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constitution (COM, 2003, 139 f i n a l ) . These delays have also obstructed the Union’s 
international aspirations such as accession to PfP and the signing of a SAA with the 
European Union.
Above all, however, the Constitutional Charter of the State Union does not provide a stable 
solution for Belgrade's territorial question as it fails to take into account the status of Kosovo 
which the Serbs still consider an autonomous province of Serbia but in practice has been a 
UN protectorate since the end of the bombing campaign against the FRY in June 1999. 
Although it has legally detached the Kosovo issue from the future of the FRY by defining 
Serbia as successor state regarding UNSC Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Charter is 
nevertheless unclear with respect to how the issue will be resolved (Bertelsmann, 2002: 3; 
Coppieters, 2003: 5).^ ^^  So long as Kosovo’s future remains unclear, however, the territory 
and constitutional make up of Serbia-Montenegro will remain undefined (IGC, 2003: 1). In 
addition, uncertainty over the borders of the country led Albanian guerillas to contest 
southern Serbia’s Presevo Valley, an area which links Belgrade to FYR Macedonia and the 
Mediterranean.^^*
Finally, the Constitutional Charter did not clarify the relationship between the federal and
Miroljub Labus, one o f the signatories of the agreement, has gone so far as to describe the text of the law 
on the Charter's implementation as 'grotesque' (www.invest-in-serbia.com accessed on 18/1103).
"If Montenegro withdraws from the State Union o f Serbia and Montenegro, the international 
documents related to the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, particularly UNSC Resolution 1244, shall pertain 
and apply fiilly to Serbia as its successor" (Constitutional Charter, Article 60).
The Presevo valley bordering FYR Macedonia is inhabited by 70.000 Albanians who in the 1992 
referendum declared 'peaceful attachment' to their ethnic kin in Kosovo. In 1999, the Kumanovo Agreement 
established a 'ground security zone' inside the Serbian side o f the border where the presence of the Yugoslav 
Army is prohibited, triggering the establishment of an Albanian rebel base. Subsequent to international 
involvement, negotiations were held between the two sides and political measures established the return of 
the Serbian army to the Kosovo border. Existing legislation on local self-government passed by the Serbian 
Assembly in March 2002, however, is obstructing full implementation o f the negotiated plans so that a 
reactivation o f violence cannot be ruled out (Janjic, 2003: 100-102).
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the republican levels within Serbia which constitute a source of continuous conflict for 
Belgrade. The assertiveness of Montenegrin President Milo Djuganovic over the past few 
years led politicians in Vojvodina, the northern multi-ethnic province bordering Hungary, to 
demand immediate attention to their constitutional autonomy and status. In addition, in 
the Sanjak - an area of overwhelmingly Muslim population divided by the 
Serbia-Montenegro border - the leading political party declared in 1994 its voters to be 
Bosniaks and has thereafter advocated the right to self-determination despite the current 
absence of a separate administrative status (Woodward, 2001: 22). The regional dimension 
of Serbian politics, therefore, which at present exists only in programmatic form, needs to 
be redefined and constitutionally guaranteed (Janjic, 2003).
6.4.1 Kosovo
Inhabited primarily by Albanians, Kosovo was granted ‘extended autonomy’ within former 
Yugoslavia by the 1974 Federal Constitution. The revocation of this special status by 
Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 led the Kosovar Albanian authorities to declare the province a 
republic within Yugoslavia in 1990 and full independence in 1991. The declaration of 
independence was accompanied by the development of a unique parallel state apparatus 
under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. Intensified Serb repression, however, led to the 
discrediting of Rugova’s non-violent resistance movement in the second half of the decade 
and the emergence in 1997 of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which engaged in a
Although Vojivodina has its own Assembly since together with Kosovo it constituted one o f the two 
semi-autonomous provinces linked to Serbia under the SFRY, its competences were significantly 
diminished under the Milosevic regime (Janjic, 2003: 274).
Representing a symbol of national aspirations for both Albanians and Serbs, Kosovo was granted to 
Serbia in 1913 by the Treaty o f Bucharest which ended the Balkan Wars o f 1912-13. In 1945, it became a 
semi-autonomous province linked to Serbia in the newly founded SFRY. ‘Extended autonomy’ granted in 
1974 accelerated Albanian political activities and demands for their recognition as a constituent nationality 
within the SFRY.
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limited guerilla campaign. Subsequent to the escalation of the internal war between the KLA 
and the Serb security forces 1998, the international community intervened at Rambouillet 
with the aim of reaching an Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government of Kosovo. 
It was the failure of negotiations to reach the interim settlement between February and 
March 1999 that led to NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslav forces between 
March and June of the same year (Allin, 2001: 7).
Since the end of the bombing campaign against the FRY in June 1999, Kosovo has been de 
facto an international protectorate under UN administration. Resolution 1244, into which 
was written the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government of Kosovo, established 
UN civil administration of the province - UNMIK - and a security presence on the ground 
under NATO command - the Kosovo Force (KFOR) - consisting of 35.000 troops (6.000 
US) (nCK, 2000: 103). °^  ^The Resolution also envisaged the appointment of a Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to administer Kosovo and to ensure that 
UNMIK and KFOR would work towards the same goals (Resolution 1244 (1999). It 
mandated UNMIK to establish a functioning interim administration, develop provisional 
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government and facilitate a political 
process designed to determine Kosovo's future status (Resolution 1244 (1999) paragraphs 
10 and 11).
Operation Allied Force was the biggest wartime deployment in Europe since World War II and 
represents the only case in modem history o f the reversal o f a systematic removal o f ethnic groups 
(Triantaphylou, 2001). The stated aim of the 79-day bombing campaign, which destroyed Serbia's 
infrastructure and industrial capacity, was to stop the organised oppression o f Kosovar Albanians and 
prevent massive ethnic cleansing by the Serb security forces, thus introducing the doctrine of humanitarian 
m/erve/ïhon (Roberts, 1999; 103),
UNMIK is an unprecedented experiment for the United Nations as it was granted more authority than any 
of its previous missions, even that delegated to the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IICK, 
2000: 114). Similarly, its structure was a novelty for the organisation given that it has been divided in four 
pillars headed by different international institutions. Humanitarian assistance is led by the UNHCR; civil 
administration by the UN, démocratisation and institution-building by the OSCE and reconstruction and 
economic development by the EU (Yannis, 2001).
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Implementation of Resolution 1244, however, has been difficult. The uncertainty over the 
status of Kosovo is one of the major reasons that crippled UNMIK's initial efforts to create 
a modus vivendi in the province. Resolution 1244 is based on an intentional ambiguity 
aimed at satisfying the diametrically opposed goals of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs (Whyte 
and Dassu, 2001: 126). By stating the goal of "substantial self-government for Kosovo, 
taking full account o f the Rambouillet accords and the principles o f sovereignty and 
territorial integrity o f the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia and the other countries o f the 
region", the international community intervened militarily in support of Albanian claims 
while refusing to satisfy them politically (UN Resolution 1244: Annex 1). The UN 
Resolution, therefore, allowed for the continuation of the conflict by other means since the 
Kosovars continued to promote their cause for independence whereas the Serbs wanted to 
remain part of Serbia thus "leaving Kosovo in limbo " (Yannis, 2001:36).
In addition, the dualism at the top of the international administration created friction on the 
ground. As UNMIK was slow to arrive in Kosovo, in the summer of 1999 KFOR found 
itself entirely responsible for administering the province, maintaining law and order and 
repairing physical infrastructure (IICK, 2000: 105). °^  ^When UNMIK eventually arrived in 
the province, overlap and duplication arose and made the civilian effort look less impressive 
than KFOR's operations (IICK, 2000: 101). Coupled with the departure of Yugoslav 
security forces, the deployment of NATO troops allowed more than a million refugees who 
had fled the province during the bombing campaign to return to Kosovo. Nevertheless, 
KFOR was unable to prevent widespread attacks by Kosovar Albanians on Serb civilians 
and their exodus to Serbia proper (Roberts, 1999). Thus, although the military campaign
The responsibilities o f the international security presence were to maintain and enforce peace, deter 
renewed hostilities, demilitarise the KLA and establish a secure environment in Kosovo (Resolution 1244 
(1999) paragraph 9).
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averted ethnic cleansing of Albanians from the province it failed to prevent the persecution
of Kosovar Serbs and other minorities.^ "^^
In light of these developments and the questions raised with respect to the wisdom of 
transforming the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the intransigence of the 
Serbian side became one of the major problems during the first year of implementation of 
UN Resolution 1244 (1999) (Y annis, 2001:39). The fall of the Milosevic regime in October 
2000, however, and the positive relationship established by the new government in Belgrade 
with the major external actors in Kosovo eased the Serbian unwillingness to cooperate with 
the international presence. A year after their arrival in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR 
eventually managed to achieve the cooperation of both Kosovar Albanians and Serbs 
(Yannis, 2001: 43). Negotiations were therefore initiated over the conclusion of an interim 
legal framework for the province.
In May 2001 and subsequent to a difficult negotiation process, the SRSG Hans Haekkerup 
signed the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. It 
foresees the creation of a 120-seat Parliament or Assembly with 10 seats reserved for Serbs 
and 10 for other minorities such as Roma, Ashkali, Bosniak, Turkish and Gorani 
(Constitutional Framework, Chapter 9)}^^ Competences ceded to local institutions include 
economics and finance, trade, education, culture and sports, social policy, the development 
of infrastructure, justice and general civil administration. In addition, the new constitution 
provides a prominent list of human rights and the imposition of Ombudsman institutions
The expulsion o f Serbs and other non-Albanians such as Roma, Gorans, Turks and Bosniacs from 
Kosovo was aimed at reducing the minority population so that it would not be possible to grant them 
constitutional rights (Woodward, 2001: 17).
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo does not define the people 
enacting the legal text and retrains fi"om clearly dividing institutions between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. 
The term used throughout the text is 'communities' which avoids ascribing the status o f majority or minority 
to either o f the two principal national groups in Kosovo (Constitutional Framework; Chapters 4 and 9).
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(Chapters 3 and 10). UNMIK, however, retains responsibility for justice and law 
enforcement as well as defense and security and will have the right to veto any law not in 
conformity with Resolution 1244 (Constitutional Framework: Chapter 8).
As with Resolution 1244, therefore, the final legal status of Kosovo has been left open in the 
hope that democratic consolidation within the province will ease tensions and allow a new 
relationship to emerge between Belgrade and Pristina. The leaders of the Albanian 
community criticised the provisional constitution for ignoring the Rambouillet Accord's 
provision for a revision of Kosovo's status after three years on the basis of a referendum 
(Veremis, 2001: 93).^°  ^ They have taken a pro-independence stance despite the victory of 
moderate forces in the parliamentary elections of November 2001.^°^ Similarly, the 
Kosovar Serb leadership initially rejected the Constitutional Framework arguing that the 
document did not provide Serbian members of the Assembly with a veto or mention the 
state sovereignty of Yugoslavia and called for refugee returns to the province and its 
reintegration into Serbia (Judah, 2001: 61). The Constitutional Framework, therefore, "w 
not an imaginative document taking Resolution 1244forward hut rather a proposal horn 
out o f the lack o f a viable alternative'' (Judah, 2001: 67).
Meanwhile, in April 2002 SRSG Michael Steiner introduced a complicated delaying 
mechanism - the standards before status policy - which focuses on the transfer of power to
In the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government o f Kosovo, it is stated that "Three years after 
the entry into force o f this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a 
mechanism fo r  a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis o f the will o f the people, opinions o f relevant 
authorities, each party's efforts regarding the implementation o f this Agreement and the Helsinki Final Act 
and to undertake a comprehensive assessment o f the implementation o f  this Agreement to consider 
proposals by any Party fo r additional measures" (Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government of 
Kosovo: Chapter 8-Article 1:3).
In November 2001, the first Kosovo-wide Parliamentary Assembly elections saw the victory o f Ibrahim 
Rugova's moderate party with 58% o f the votes cast. Whereas a Bosnian representative joined Prime 
Minister Rexhepi's government, the Serb coalition Povratak did not (Pop, 2003: 119).
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local government, establishing direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade and preparing 
Kosovo for European integration (Pop, 2003: 121). °^* In October 2002, he publicised his 
plan for decentralisation of Kosovo to be administered by the international community (Pop, 
2003: 120). Incidents against minorities, however, continue to take place as was witnessed 
by the outbreak of violence in the province in March 2004, the northern city of Mitrovica - 
where UNMIK and KFOR have not been able to fulfill their mandate - is divided into two 
sections and parallel courts continue to exist in municipalities with a Serbian majority (IGC, 
2003:3). In addition, privatisation of previously socially owned entreprises is being blocked 
for fear of prejudicing the final status and criminalisation of economic activities has become 
endemic (IGC, 2003: 3).
The stalemate over the question of Kosovo's status has wider regional and international 
repercussions and has provoked significant academic debate (Triantaphyllou, 2001). Some 
policymakers adhere to the argument that de jure independence would destabilise the 
Balkans by undermining efforts to hold together multi-ethnic states like 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia (Altman, 2001; Dassu, 2001). Those analysts in 
favour of independence, however, argue that statehood is needed in order to solidify the 
political, institutional and economic reconstruction of Kosovo (Bugajski, 2000: 185; 
Triantaphyllou, 2001; Allin, 2001; Rupnik, 2001). The debate, therefore, has progressed to 
analysing the impact of an independent Kosovo on regional stability and the kind of 
measures that need to be introduced in order to prevent fiirther secessions in Southeastern 
Europe (Triantaphyllou, 2001: 3).
The 'standards before status' approach is based on eight benchmarks: a) functioning democratic 
institutions; b) rule o f law (police/judiciary); c) freedom o f movement; d) returns and integration; e) 
economy (legislation, balanced budget and privatisation); f) respect for property rights; g) dialogue with 
Belgrade and h) Kosovo Protection Corps (http://usinfb.state.gov/topical/pol/usandum/03052105.htm).
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The decision on Kosovo's status will have far reaching implications for the conduct of 
International Law, repeating the precedent set during the 1992 recognition process of former 
Yugoslav republics without the consent of central government on the basis of concern for 
human rights and wider regional security (Redman, 2002: 338),^°  ^Given that the province 
is an international protectorate established by the UN Security Council, only a new 
Resolution can decide its final status (Judah, 2001: 66). Having intervened on an uncertain 
legal basis, therefore, the international community is ""struggling to deal with the Kosovo 
exception” (Triantaphyllou, 2001: 1).^ *°
6.5 FYR Macedonia
Established as a unitary state in September 1991, in the post-Gold War era FYR Macedonia 
experienced a severe 'stateness' problem given the strained inter-ethnic relations between 
the Slav Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority.^^ * Considering themselves 
in relative deprivation in comparison to their position under the former Yugoslav 
Constitution, ethnic Albanians felt discriminated by the Macedonian state which practiced 
less than inclusive citizenship and language policies (Pop, 2003: 122). To illustrate, the
In light o f the absence o f any internationally agreed provisions with respect to the creation o f new 
borders or the establishment of new independent states, the dissolution o f Yugoslavia took place in a legal 
vacuum. For instance, no mechanisms exist for negotiations between a federal state and its constituent 
republics, or for the voluntary separation o f ethno-cultural communities that have unilaterally opted for 
national independence through elections or a referendum (Bugajski, 1993: 215).
Although it expressed the purpose o f implementing UN resolutions, the military intervention in Kosovo 
between March-June 1999 did not, nevertheless, receive prior approval by the Security Council because of 
anticipated Chinese and Russian opposition, thus provoking a controversy in International Law. NATO's 
intervention highlighted a tension between two principles enshrined in the UN Charter, namely state 
sovereignty and the defense o f human rights (Guicherd, 1999).
According to the 1994 census, 66% of FYR Macedonia's 2,2 million inhabitants are Slav Macedonian 
and 22,7% are ethnic Albanian, living mainly in the north western parts o f the country and the capital 
Skopje. Ethnic Albanians claim that the census is incorrect and that in reality they constitute 40% o f the 
population. Given current demographic trends, however, the Albanian minority could become a majority in 
the future (Judah, 2001: 12).
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preamble of the 1991 Constitution contained the statement "'‘Macedonia is established as a 
national state o f the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent 
coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlacks, 
Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic o f Macedonia'^ (Constitution of the 
Republic of Macedonia). In addition, Macedonian was designated as the official language 
of the republic (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 7).
Although since its establishment the new state was ruled by a coalition of moderate 
Macedonian and Albanian parties, power-sharing between the two communities was not 
sufficient and was the result of necessity rather than a genuine determination to develop a 
pluralist democracy. The application of a majoritarian electoral system, the resistance to any 
form of territorial autonomy and local self-government to the Tetovo and Kumanovo 
regions inhabited primarily by ethnic Albanians and the lack of a mutual veto in relation to 
the vital interests of the two communities indicate that the Macedonian case was far from 
being a true consociational democracy (Malesevic, 2000: 167). Deep ethnic divisions 
existed and society was de facto segregated. As as result, ethnic Albanians constantly 
demanded equal constitutional status and the establishment of a bi-national federal state. In 
1992, for example, minority politicians went as far as to call for autonomy of lllirida', the 
self-proclaimed Albanian dominated region (Judah, 2001).
In addition to its internal problems, in the post-Cold War era FYR Macedonia's external 
position also contributed to the radicalisation of the 'national question'. Greece, for example, 
argued that the use of the term Macedonia implied an usurpation of Greek identity and 
cultural heritage and opposed international recognition of the republic with its constitutional
159
name?^^ In addition, Bulgaria did not recognise the existence of a separate Macedonian 
language and nationality although it accepted the existence of a Macedonian state and the 
FRY engaged in a territorial dispute with Skopje over the demarcation of their common 
border (Sijl and Succoni, 2002: 2). That neighbours had different claims on various aspects 
of FYR Macedonian statehood, therefore, had a significant impact on the predominance of 
ethnic discourse in the country (Malesevic, 2000: 167). So long as their definition of the 
nation was challenged, leaders of the major Macedonian parties in Skopje did not feel secure 
to grant significant concessions to ethnic Albanians and pursued neo-patrimonial tactics of 
corruption (Woodward, 2001: 20).
It was the influence of developments in Kosovo, however, that led to the outbreak of 
inter-ethnic fighting between the National Liberation Army (NLA) and government forces 
in the republic in February 2001 confirming pessimistic fears of a ’domino effect' created by 
the spillover of crises in the Balkans (Allin, 2001 (b): 20). Catalysts for the crisis were the 
agreement on the demarcation of the border between Skopje and Belgrade and the defeat of 
the Albanian rebellion in the Presevo Valley spilling over the conflict into the northern areas 
of the republic as well as the message delivered to Albanian militant groups by the West's 
support of Kosovar Albanians (Sijl and Zucconi, 2002). The guerilla activities
Greece went as far as to impose a unilateral trade embargo on its northern neighbour between 1993-95 
arguing that the name, flag and constitution o f the republic implied territorial claims on its northern 
Macedonian province. Relations between the two countries were normalised with the signing o f the Interim 
Agreement in 1995 but the name o f the new state is still being negotiated within the framework o f the United 
Nations (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 18).
As early as December 1992, the UN Security Council had authorised the deployment o f peacekeepers in 
the republic out o f fear that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina might spread south. The 750-strong 
Prevention Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was the first preventive mission in the history o f the United 
Nations directed more against a potential international destabilitsation of FYR Macedonia by outside forces 
than against domestic turmoil (Clement, 1997: 27).
No mainstream Albanian political party whether in Kosovo, Albania or FYR Macedonia publicly 
espouses the idea o f Greater Albania. The KLA, however, interpreted the international community's support 
of Kosovar Albanian case in 1999 as legitimation for a change of borders in the Southern Balkans (Judah, 
2001).
160
penetrating FYR Macedonian territory radicalised the inter-ethnic agenda and obstructed the 
peaceful dialogue carried out within the legitimate political institutions. The Macedonian 
state, therefore, entered a period of crisis and its political model of democratic coexistence 
was cast into doubt.
Fighting was eventually contained short of full-scale war in light of international mediation 
which culminated in the Framework Agreement of August 2001 requiring constitutional 
changes in the republic and the deployment of a NATO force aimed at disarming ethnic 
Albanian fighters through Operation Essential Harvest Under the terms of the Ohrid 
Agreement, NLA fighters handed 4.000 weapons to NATO and an amnesty was declared. 
Although tensions eventually ensued between NATO and the EU over the management of 
the international peace-keeping force, the 2001 Macedonian crisis was the first Balkan 
conflict to have seen a role played by the CFSP (Whyte, 2001). De facto, therefore, FYR 
Macedonia became the third international protectorate in the region after 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (Framework Agreement: Annex
The Framework Agreement, signed by the Macedonian President and leaders of the four 
major political parties, initiated a process of inter-ethnic cooperation. Although the unitary 
character of the state was preserved, the constitutional amendments agreed upon improved 
the individual and collective rights of the ethnic communities that are larger than 20% of the 
country's population and ensured a more efficient parliamentary procedure that excludes the 
simple majority voting (Framework Agreement: Annex A). The Framework Agreement 
also provided for a significant increase - from 5% to 25% - in Albanian participation in
In Annex C of the Ohrid Accord it is stipulated that "The parties invite the international community to 
facilitate, monitor and assist in the implementation o f the provisions o f  the Framework Agreement and its 
Annexes and request such efforts to he coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement" (Framework Agreement: Annex C).
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public offices including the police as well as the extensive use of the Albanian language in 
public institutions. In addition, references in the preamble suggesting minorities as second 
class citizen were removed (Framework Agreement; Annex A). Finally, in July 2001 the 
Macedonian government passed laws related to the Albanian community's long-standing 
request regarding university education in their ethnic tongue (Janjic, 2003: 107).
The successfiil application of the accord and the viability of the Macedonian state, however, 
remain uncertain (Triantaphyllou, 2001). Although steps have been made towards the 
legalisation of Tetovo University and the use of the Albanian language in Parliament and on 
passports, many key components of the agreement such as security sector reform, 
decentralisation and efforts to boost Albanian employment in public institutions have 
lagged. In addition, the institutions of the state were given strong ethnic qualifiers, 
institutionalizing ethnicity (Bieber, 2003: 1). Tensions have also emerged between 
Albanians and Turks who fear that the Ohrid Agreement is producing a bi-national state 
dominated by Albanians and Slav Macedonians (IGC, 2003; 1-2). Moreover, the NLA - 
which has made the unification of all Albanian territories its strategic aim - has not 
recognised the agreement, undermining attempts to appease former members by granting 
them an amnesty law. Whereas, therefore, a process of political consolidation of ethnic 
Albanians is under way which even allowed the country to apply for EU membership in 
March 2004, many challenges lie ahead with respect to implementing SAP reforms (Sijl and 
Zucconi, 2002: 2)?'*
In June 2003, Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski even advocated the partition o f the country along 
ethnic lines (Pop, 2003: 123; IGC, 2003: 2).
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6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that a major political barrier to regional cooperation in the Balkans 
in the post-Cold War period has been related to the delayed state-making in the former 
Yugoslav space further complicated by the simultaneous démocratisation of the successor 
states. All successor states or entities of former Yugoslavia except Slovenia have been 
internally divided over questions of national identity and/or the delimitation of their borders 
(Woodward, 2001). The ‘stateness’ problem has been so acute that violence often erupted 
threatening their internal and external security (Gligorov, 2003).
Bosnia-Herzegovina faces the greatest difficulties of all Yugoslav successor states in state 
and nation-building. Created by the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the 3,5 year 
conflict between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats and patron states Croatia and Serbia in 
December 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina was set up as an 'asymmetric confederation' between 
two entities - the FBiH and the RS - and three nations (Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks). 
Effective sovereignty, however, rested with the entities and common decisions were 
difficult to implement. In addition, the Dayton Agreement institutionalised ethnicity 
blocking beneficial reforms for all Bosnians and preventing the emergence of a common 
national identity for Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bieber, 2001).
Above all, however, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a protectorate. Although internationally 
recognised, de facto the country is not sovereign as it does not have the monopoly of 
legitimate coercion such as a Bosnian army and the structure of the state has been 
constitutionally guaranteed by the presence of an international army - SFOR. At the few 
joint institutions, such as the Central Bank and the Constitutional Court, foreign nationals 
are appointed. In addition, the expansion of the role of the international community after
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1997 through the OHR's Bonn Powers disempowered Bosnian institutions, weakening state 
and entity bodies central to unifying society (Chandler, 2001). Although recent years have 
seen progress with respect to the implementation of the civilian parts of the Dayton 
Agreement, the objective of a multi-ethnic sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina is being 
implemented due to the requirements of negotiating an SAA with the European Union.
In the early years of its state and nation-building process, Croatia alienated its minority 
populations pursuing ethnic nationalist policies. The Serb population of Krajina in 
particular - representing 12% of the country's population before the war - was obliged to flee 
the country during the military campaign of August 1995. Although President Tudjman's 
death and the Kosovo war in 1999 sparked the beginning of a transition process towards 
liberal democracy in the country which even applied for EU membership in October 2003 
and was granted candidate status in June 2004, many issues regarding the definition of 
citizenship, however, still remain unsettled. As was recognised by the European 
Commission’s Opinion of April 2004, for example, Croatia still needs to make substantial 
improvements in ensuring the return of refugees from Serbia-Montenegro and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and to resolve border issues with neighbouring countries (COM, 2004: 
257).
In the post-Cold War era, constitutional and legal uncertainty also characterised the FRY. 
Founded in 1992 between Serbia and Montenegro as a loosely defined bi-federal state, the 
FRY gradually came to be dominated by Belgrade in light of Milosevic's centralising 
policies. Attempts by the Serbian leadership to strengthen the powers of the federal state, 
however, coupled with the fact that Podgorica was also subjected to economic sanctions 
aimed at Milosevic's regime, triggered Montenegrin separatism. Subsequent to the coming 
to power of Milo Djuganovic in October 1997, Montenegro increasingly came to operate as
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a de facto separate state adopting the Deutsche mark - and later the euro - as its currency and 
low tariff protection in its trade policy and striving for economic integration with Europe. 
The victory of the separatist party in the elections of 2001 prepared the ground for a 
referendum on independence.
Under pressure by the international community fearing further balkanisation of the region, 
however, the FRY was dissolved by the Belgrade Agreement of March 2002 and the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro was formed in March 2003. It is a loose federal structure 
in which the common state has limited competences such as foreign affairs. The 
implementation of the Constitutional Charter for the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
however, has been problematic and many delays have become apparent in important 
reforms such as the Law on Minorities. Above all, however, state borders have remained an 
issue of open dispute for Serbia-Montenegro. The Charter has failed to resolve the future 
relationship of the two countries which will be decided by a referendum in 2006 as well as 
that between the federal and republican levels within Serbia, especially the status of 
Vojvodina and the Sanjak. Finally, although the Constitutional Charter legally detached the 
status of Kosovo from the future of the FRY by defining Serbia as successor state regarding 
UNSC Resolution 1244, the new constitution does not provide a roadmap for resolving the 
problem.
Since the end of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in June 1999, Kosovo has been 
de facto a protectorate of the international community under UNMIK. That UN Resolution 
1299 - upon which UNMIK's mandate is based - introduced an intentional ambiguity 
supporting both substantial self-government for Kosovo and the territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia-Montenegro), has rendered resolution of the 
status question a zero-sum game for both Kosovar Albanians who will accept nothing less
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of independence and Kosovar Serbs who do not want to see the secession of their former 
autonomous province. Kosovo’s ’stateness’ problem, therefore, primarily revolves around 
the fact that there are still profound and irreconcilable differences over its territorial 
boundaries.
In addition, although the Constitutional Framework for Self-Government in Kosovo signed 
in May 2001 granted many competences to local institutions in an attempt to render the 
province a self-administered political unit, it has failed to make power-sharing a reality or 
provide for a revision of the status problem. Meanwhile, incidents against minorities 
continue to take place culminating in the outbreak of violence in the whole province in 
March 2004. In addition, many aspects of the standards before status policy introduced by 
the international community in April 2002, such as the privatisation of previously 
state-owned property, remain blocked and UNMIK still retains responsibility for justice and 
law enforcement as well as defense and security.
Finally, established in 1991 as a unitary state, in the post-Cold war era FYR Macedonia 
experienced a severe ’stateness’ problem given the strained inter-ethnic relations between the 
Slav Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority as a result of the less than 
inclusive citizenship and language policies of the Macedonian state. Although moderate 
forces prevailed throughout the 1990s, the Kosovo conundrum radicalised the inter-ethnic 
agenda in FYR Macedonia by spilling over the conflict into the north of the country. The 
outbreak of violence in 2001 led to international intervention and the signing of the 
Framework Agreement through which constitutional changes were agreed upon promoting 
the collective and individual rights of the ethnic Albanian community.
Although, however, a process of political consolidation of ethnic Albanians is under way
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that allowed to country to apply for EU membership in March 2004, the viability of the 
state is uncertain as an ongoing partition between the two communities is also taking 
place. Many of the components of the Ohrid Accord, such as ethnic Albanian employment 
in public institutions and security sector reform, have lagged whereas extremists continue 
to present a threat to law and order. In addition, the institutions of the state have been 
given strong ethnic qualifiers. Meanwhile, FYR Macedonia has become the third 
protectorate in the region given the role ascribed to international institutions by the 
Framework Agreement
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Chapter 7 
Delayed Economic Transition
7.1 Introduction
Early theorists of integration such as Schmitter and Haas argued that economic size and 
power, which they defined as '‘the relative weight o f industrial capacity in the specific 
functional context o f the union'\ was one of nine conditions for successful regionalism 
(Schmitter and Haas, 1964: 711). Barrera and Haas expanded on the argument by stating 
that the more homogeneous the countries are in per capita GNP, the greater the chance of 
a successful union (Barrera and Haas, 1969: 155). Similarly, Joseph Nye argued that the 
more equal the level of development measured by per capita GNP, the higher the regional 
trade integration (Nye, 1971: 79).
Although the relationship between economic development and regionalism has to date 
been underdeveloped and the necessity of economic homogeneity for the success of 
regional cooperation has been treated by schemes such as the European Union through 
policies of redistribution, national economic performance was shown in Chapter 2 to be 
a precondition for regionalism. Post-war European integration, for example, was based on 
the growth experienced in the continent after World War II and matured in conditions of 
economic liberalisation and stable macro-economic and institutional environments 
(Tsoukalis, 1997). More recently, Bjom Hettne defined sustained economic dynamics 
together with political stability as the two basic criteria of core regions, a category in
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which he included Europe, North America and East Asia (Hettne, 2001:
In the post-Cold War era, however, economic development in post-communist 
Southeastern Europe was characterised by a negative output performance (Tables 1-8).^ ** 
The lack of growth in the peninsula in the 1990s has been attributed to a painful and 
uneven transition to market economies that has seen a number of internal 
macro-economic and micro-economic constraints, such as trade, current account and 
fiscal deficits, high unemployment, incomplete privatisation and a protracted process of 
de-industrialisation as well as inappropriate international assistance policies (Uvalic, 
2003).^’^  Chapter 7, therefore, will trace the process of economic reform in the 
post-communist countries of the region, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FRY, FYR Macedonia, Romania as well as Kosovo, in order to demonstrate that 
in the post-Cold War era the delayed and multi-speed transition experience that sapped 
growth in the peninsula has been another barrier to regional cooperation in Southeastern 
Europe.
7.2 Albania
Albania entered the 1990s with a serious macro-economic imbalance rooted in its 
self-sufficient economic practice and the rigorously centralised economy of the Cold War
Similarly, Sheila Page has found that these regions, which have institutionalised their activities through 
the EU, NAFTA and APEC, have the highest average income per capita rates in the world at Purchasing 
Power Parity (Page, 2000: 67).
In 2003, for example, none o f the countries in the region except Albania which had high growth rates in 
the 1990s, reached its 1989 GDP level. Whereas Croatia and Romania approached it, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Serbia Montenegro are still at slightly above half those rates (EBRD, 2004: 16).
The failed transition experience in the Balkans has been attributed by analysts to initial conditions, such 
as the economic backwardness thesis and the communist legacy, systemic weaknesses such as deficient 
institutions, policy failures as well as transition traps and the impact o f the wars in former Yugoslavia 
(Dobrinsky, 2000: 69-71).
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period. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, a significant decline in production characterised 
the initial phase of transition and the country’s macro-economic situation worsened. 
Output declined by more than 50% from the end of 1990 to mid-1992. External debt 
became dangerously large at 30% of GDP and foreign exchange reserves were completely 
exhausted. The budget deficit reached 44% of GDP by the end of 1991 and widened to 
more than 50% in the first half of 1992. It was financed by monetary expansion and 
inflation rose to 104,1% in 1991 and 237% in 1992. Unemployment reached 30.3% in 
1992 (EBRD, 1997: 185) (Table 1).
Short and medium-term reforms were introduced in mid-1992 through an IMF standby 
emergency programme and an all inclusive Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) aimed at stabilising the economy, liberalising prices and trade as well as 
privatising and restructuring state properties. Macro-economic stability was achieved in 
a relatively short time. Inflation and the budget deficit were brought under control to 31% 
and 16% of GDP in 1993 respectively. Subsequent to a large privatisation strategy for 
small and medium-sized enterprises including auction, tender, a buy-out process, direct 
sale and Joint ventures with foreign capital, unemployment slowly decreased (Muco, 
2001: 122).
Despite these successes, however, many real economy problems plagued the transition. 
These were primarily related to the micro-economic development of the country. Private 
governance and the restructuring of the newly privatised firms did not follow the same 
path as macro-economic reform and the largest number of private entities operated in 
trade. Under mass privatisation with voucher schemes, few of the large scale enterprises 
were privatised and industry and manufacturing sectors remained problematic. Financial 
sector reform and the strengthening of institutions remained minimal (Muco, 2001: 122).
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During the first half of 1997, Albania entered a deep crisis. The budget deficit had reached 
12.1% by the end of 1996. Data on the current account and trade balance situation show 
an even greater deficit. Popular discontent over the government’s ability to stop 
corruption and the collapse of pyramid schemes led to an eruption of violence. The 
ensuing anarchy and collapse of state which saw the arrival of a multi-national force and 
new parliamentary elections in June 1997 has subsequently been interpreted as a rebellion 
against management (Vaughan-Whitehead, 1999). The year ended with a drop of 7% in 
GDP, 42% inflation, a budget deficit that accounted for 12.9 % of GDP and the highest 
current account deficit since 1991 (EBRD, 2004: 27) (Table 1).
A new ESAF programme was introduced in 1998 and due to substantial efforts the year 
ended with a more positive macro-economic performance. GDP growth reached 8% and 
inflation dropped to 8.7% whereas the budget deficit returned to pre-crisis levels of 
-10.4% of GDP. Unemployment, however, rose to 17.5 % and macro-economic 
performance remained unstable in subsequent years so that Albania did not achieve 
sustainable growth. Real GDP growth fell from 7.8% in 2001 to 4.7% in 2002. In 2003 
macroeconomic performance remained strong with a growth rate of 4% owing to a 
gradual recovery from an energy crisis, improved government revenue collection and 
revived large scale privatisation (EBRD, 2004: 27).
Although in 2003 Albania surpassed its 1989 GDP levels, however, poverty is increasing 
and in some areas of the country it has reached levels that are characteristic of the 
underdeveloped world (EBRD, 2004: 17). Distorted deregulation and the weak 
functioning of market mechanisms which promoted and facilitated the thriving of the new 
small business during the initial phase of transition, have subsequently been turned into
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obstacles for development. Various monopolies, the lack of supervisory mechanisms and 
the informal economy are barriers to foreign as well as domestic investment. The level of 
cumulative FDI is one of the lowest among transition countries (Ruli, 2003: 157).
In addition, agriculture that became the main engine for growth after the collapse of the 
industrial sector has been showing signs of slowing down because of structural 
deficiencies linked to the small size of farms and the embryonic status of the land market 
(Ruli, 2003: 157).^^° Finally, technical and financial assistance by donors have 
concentrated more on drafting laws and establishing agencies rather than at training and 
supervising them (Ruli, 2003: 157). Ongoing SAA negotiations with the EU have not yet 
led to the expected consolidation of reforms. Political instability and the slow pace of 
reforms are significant sources of risk. The present economy is almost entirely 
import-oriented and the external deficit remains huge (EBRD, 2004: 26).
7.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina
As a result of the three and a half year war between Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs and patron 
states Croatia and FRY between 1992-95, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s economy shrunk to 30% 
of its pre-war size while industrial output was a little more than 1/10 of Yugoslav era 
capacity by the end of the conflict. In 1995 GDP per head had fallen to $600 from $2.400 
in 1990. The current account deficit was at 10% of GDP and the budget deficit at 0.3% 
whereas external debt was 180%. Inflation had reached 12.9% in RS (EBRD, 1997: 218; 
2004: 35) (Table 2).
Albania has one o f the highest shares of agriculture and lowest shares o f industry and services in the 
world (Petrakos and Totev, 2001: 12),
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The transition package that was implemented in the aftermath of Dayton was based on the 
Washington Consensus led by the IMF, the World Bank and USAID. Priority was given 
to macroeconomic stability to stimulate the private sector and attract investment. The 
governance of the official economy was to be dominated by the presence of international 
agencies wielding economic resources and executive power over monetary policy and 
economic development. Donor support primarily through bilateral donations averaged $I 
billion a year in the first five years (Pugh, 2002 473).^^^
Although the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina reached an output of 80% in 1996 and 
37% in 1997, growth was due to a boom in services and public consumption depending 
on the inflow of money form abroad and was more evident in the FBiH than the RS 
(EBRD, 2004: 35). Local industrial production failed to recover and FDI was almost 
non-existent. Unemployment rose to around 50% and in 1997 the country was importing 
close to four times more than it was exporting. Inflation remained around 10%. A CBA 
and a Central Bank, however, were established in August 1997. Under the CBA inflation 
fell to around zero while reserve coverage was boosted by the conversion of German 
marks to local currency (Lewis and Sevic, 2000).
Constitutional arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina proved to be an impediment to 
reconstruction and development. While the Dayton Accord placed banking and customs 
regulation at the central state level, fiscal policy was transferred to the entities and cantons 
and no instruments were provided for shaping country-wide macro-economic policy. The 
hands of the central state were therefore tied with respect to the formulation of a uniform 
strategy for economic development, including industrial, incomes and social welfare
The World Bank lent $860 form July 1996 to June 2001 mainly for infrastructure, agricultural recovery 
and jump-start projects (Pugh, 2002: 473).
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policies. Until June 1998, inter-entity trade was regulated by FBiH and RS and the 
country was not even a firm Customs Union. According to Stojanov, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constitutional arrangements led to a ‘Frankestein’ economy 
(Stojanov, 2001: 66).
In addition, privatisation was only seriously initiated at the end of 2000 when the High 
Representative introduced wide ranging laws and amendments designed to maintain 
market reforms that would meet the demands of the IFIs (Pugh, 2002: 467). The process, 
however, was heavily politicised and focused on SMEs rather than large industrial 
enterprises which were the main source of employment and output before the war 
(Gligorov et al, 1999: 25).^^  ^To illustrate, in 2001 the private sector accounted for only 
40% of GDP (EBRD, 2001: 12). According to Pugh ^^Entrepreneurs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina secured the spoils o f peace by transferring the clientist system into 
the post-conflict political economies and by accommodating the conditionalities imposed 
by external “protectors” within the process o f privatisation and deregulation‘s (Pugh, 
2002: 477).
In 2001, the economic situation was officially described as ‘dire’. A grey economy 
enabled the majority of the population to subsist on diaspora remittances, foreign aid, 
barter, back pay for demobilised soldiers and undeclared earnings (Pugh, 2002: 472). It 
deprived the government of revenue that could have been used for social protection. In 
May 2000, however, the World Bank’s country assistance strategy for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina included the strengthening of the social safety net through $14.6 
million credit repayable over thirty-five years for educational development and welfare
Privatisation o f strategic industries was particularly difficult in the RS.
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policies for the most vulnerable (Pugh, 2002: 476)/^^
In 2003, the economic base was still at 50% of pre-war levels, less than half the IMF 
projections. Growth decreased due to the effects of declining foreign aid and a drought in 
the agricultural sector.^ '^* Official unemployment remained at around 40% and although 
many found Jobs in the informal sector the actual rate is still high around 20%. 
Macroeconomic policy continued to be constrained by the strict currency board but fiscal 
performance improved significantly, notably in the areas of tax collection and spending 
control. As a result, overall fiscal balance moved from a deficit 5,7% of GDP in 2000 to 
an estimated small surplus in 2003 (EBRD, 2004).
In late 2003, plans for a comprehensive settlement of domestic debt to around 10% of 
GDP claims were approved by governments at all levels. Other economic issues include 
a further reduction in the size of government, moves towards a single economic space 
between the two entities and the conduct of the currency board (EBRD, 2004: 34). The 
European Commission has issued a partially positive feasibility study and presented 
conditions on Bosnian authorities to keep them focused on reforms. Introduction of VAT 
at state level and customs unification are core elements of its conditionality (Noutcheva, 
2004: 1). The difficult business environment and persistent external deficits, however, 
cast doubts over medium-term growth and investment including FDI (EBRD, 2004: 34).
This amount, however, represents only a third of the sum committed to managing the privatisation 
process.
The IMF standby credit o f $119 million expired in May 2001 and there was a shift away from assistance 
for emergency projects conditional on adherence to Dayton towards development assistance conditional on 
adherence to structural adjustment (Pugh, 2002: 473).
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7.4 Bulgaria
After 1989, Bulgaria faced a post-socialist recession registering negative growth until 
1994. In 1991, for example, growth was -11,7%, inflation rose to 333% and the budget 
deficit accounted for 3.2% of GDP (EBRD, 1997:189). The decline resulted from the loss 
of former CMEA markets and the official foreign debt restricting the economy’s 
investment capacity. Attempts to launch economic reforms in 1992-93 were inconsistent 
especially regarding privatisation and led to a policy limbo. Until 1996, privatisation was 
almost suspended, signs of renewed central planning emerged and attempts to restore the 
socialist cooperatives system in agriculture led to an acute clash between the National 
Assembly and the Constitutional Court (Popov, 2003: 185).
By 1997 the country faced a hyperinflation shock of 1000% combined with a steady 
decline of GDP by 5,6% (Table 3). The mass protests that followed saw the collapse of the 
socialist government. The new centre-right Union of Democratic Forces introduced of a 
CBA anchoring the Bulgarian lev to the Deutschmark and restoring monetary stability. 
The CBA allowed authorities to practice prudent fiscal policies. In 1998 Bulgaria 
successfully concluded a three year contract with the IMF and developed a programme 
with the World Bank for supporting crucial socio-economic sectors such as public health, 
the transportation system, education and infrastructure.
Growth recovered 4% in 1998 and inflation dropped to 22% (EBRD, 2004: 37). 
Furthermore, significant steps were taken towards mass privatisation such as distributions 
to Management Employee Buyout (MEBO) companies. In 1999, all loss-making 
state-owned enterprises were closed or sold except for the railway, the state gas company 
and the National Electric Company (NEC) (Stanchev, 2001: 151). By the end of the
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government’s mandate in 2001, 65-70% of the economy was already private although the 
institutional environment remained unpredictable (Popov, 2003: 185).
Subsequent to being invited to initiate negotiations with the EU at the European Council 
of Helsinki in December 1999, Bulgaria accelerated its reform programme. It achieved a 
high degree of macroeconomic stability and market mechanisms working to allow for a 
better allocation of resources. Progress was also made in structural reforms, especially as 
regards procedures for market entry, the restructuring of the financial sector and 
privatisation, thus setting the microeconomic basis for sustained growth. In 2003, the 
European Commission found that Bulgaria should be able to cope with competitive 
pressures and market forces within the Union in the medium term provided it continues 
implementing reforms (Commission Strategy Paper, 2003).
Although growth was at 4,2% in 2003, however, external deficits widened due to higher 
imports fuelled by increased bank lending (EBRD: 2004: 35) (Table 3). In addition, the 
flexibility of markets remains unsatisfactory. In particular, the administrative and judicial 
system is inefficient and procedures affecting the enterprise sector, such as bankruptcy, 
have not been streamlined.^^^ Specific deficiencies in the land market also affect the 
economy’s performance. Finally, pension reform and public health management are also 
crucial areas that need to be addressed (Popov, 2003: 186).
7.5 Croatia
After declaring independence from SPRY in June 1991, Croatia confronted war with
According to Manoiova, the institutional environment in Bulgaria is corrupt and detrimental to the 
growth of entrepreneurial firms which react through informal networking, opportunism and surplus 
extraction (Manoiova, 2002).
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Belgrade which lasted until 1995. The combination of the war impact and economic 
transition initially led to significant imbalances such as declining growth which reached 
-20% in 1991, -10% in 1992 and -3.7% in 1993, high inflation of 249%, 937% and 
1.150% in the same years and external and fiscal imbalances. The budget deficit, for 
example, was 5%, 4% and 1% for 1991, 1992 and 1993 respectively (EBRD, 1997: 190) 
(Table 4).
Subsequent to the establishment of a successful stabilisation programme implemented in 
October 1993, Croatia achieved price and exchange rate stability. Modest growth of 0.8% 
resumed in 1994 which reached 5% by 1995 and the budget was balanced while inflation 
declined to negative rates in 1993 and 3.7% in 1995 (EBRD, 1997: 190). The mix of price 
and exchange rate stability together with accommodating policies and rising balanced 
budgets remained the foundation of economic policy except for a brief period in 1999 
when the currency depreciated. Average inflation between 1994-98 was 3.6% and average 
growth was around 6%.
Price and exchange rate stability, however, were not enough to produce a sustainable 
economy and growth without changes in the real sector. Financial sector instability began 
in 1998 and negative growth started in the second half of the year and continued through 
1999 to reach -0.9%. Unemployment increased to 11% together with the current account 
deficit that was -7% in 1999. The second banking crisis of 1998/99 was attributable to a 
combination of tight monetary policy, a drop in domestic demand and deteriorating loan 
portfolios of banks. Mounting structural problems also emerged, for example, from the 
failed privatisation process (Bicanic, 2001: 170).
To illustrate, whereas the 1991 privatisation legislation replaced the laws inherited from
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Yugoslavia whereby firms were socially owned, insider by-outs did not allow the 
modernisation of corporate governance and corruption was rampant in the way 
prospective buyers gained funds (Bicanic, 2001: 170)/^^ The state kept many firms 
outside privatisation, especially public enterprises. In addition, until the late 
1990s,Croatia’s banking system was dominated by state-owned banks operating in an 
insufficient regulatory framework with weak supervision and vulnerability to political 
influence (COM, 2004,237: 42).
Subsequent to the change of regime in 2000, however, the Croatian economy achieved a 
considerable degree of macroeconomic stability and some structural reforms. After 2000, 
fiscal policy, for example, gradually contributed to a stable macro-economic environment 
with expenditure cuts including the reduction of the public wage bill. The banking sector 
was consolidated and supervision and capital requirements were strengthened (COM, 
2004: 237: 42). Consequently, Croatia saw sustainable growth of 5.2% and 4.5% in 2002 
and 2003 respectively and low inflation of around 2% although fiscal and current account 
deficits continued to be large (Table 4). Subsequent to applying for membership of the EU 
in February 2003, the European Commission found that Croatia satisfied the economic 
criteria set out by the Copenhagen Council of June 1993 (COM, 2004: 237).
The working of market mechanisms, however, still needs to be improved and progress in 
restructuring the business sector and increasing competitiveness has been modest. The 
performance of the judicial sector as well as the cadastre and land registry systems, for 
example, are inadequate. Privatisation has been slower than expected and some large 
state-owned enterprises still play an important role in the economy. Reforms of the public
The Yugoslav system o f self-management involved collective ownership often generated by workers 
savings,
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administration, social security and fiscal systems are delayed and the agriculture and 
shipbuilding sectors have not yet been modernised (COM, 2004, 257).
7. 6 FRY/ Serbia-Montenegro
After the break up of former Yugoslavia in 1991, FRY’s economy virtually collapsed. It 
was affected by the state of emergency dictated by the war, the burden of financing the 
Serb-held territories in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the international 
sanctions and bans on oil, arms, trade, export credit and investment.^^^ By the end of 
1993, GDP had fallen to 43% of its 1989 level and growth was at -30.8%, whereas 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies necessary to finance the war triggered one of 
the highest hyperinflations ever recorded in world history (Table 5). To illustrate, the 
average inflation in 1993 reached 32.700.700% annually or 1.880% a month (Pashko, 
1998: 336).
The monetary reconstruction programme implemented in early 1994 by the governor of 
the Central Bank Dragoslav Avramovic initially succeeded in halting hyperinflation, 
introducing a convertible dinar and reversing the trend of declining output to 2.5% 
(Uvalic, 2001:178). These positive results, however, were soon undermined by problems 
caused by the absence of systemic change. Growth rates were higher than in other 
Southeastern European countries at 6.1% in 1995 and 7.8% in 1996 but so was inflation 
that reached 78.6% and 94.3% for the same years. Official unemployment was at around 
25% for the period 1995-1997 (EBRD, 2003: 145). Due to the country’s status in
The UN imposed its first embargo in late 1991 because o f Serbia’s involvement in the war in Croatia, 
Sanctions were re-inforced in May 1992 after the war had spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina and were partially 
removed after the signing o f the Dayton Accords in December 1995. An outer force of sanctions, however, 
preventing the country fi-om joining international organisations remained throughout the 1990s (Uvalic, 
2001: 177-78).
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international financial institutions and its high political risk, there was a very limited 
infiow of foreign finance. From 1990 to 1998, for example, FDI amounted to a bit over $1 
billion, almost entirely due to the privatisation of Serbian Telecom of which 49% was 
sold to Italian and Greek partners (Uvalic, 2001: 178).
Progress in institutional reforms was also unsatisfactory. Although many privatisation 
laws were passed in the pre-1999 period, their implementation was slow and many 
enterprises were excluded from the process. At the end of 2000, only 40% of Yugoslav 
GDP was from the private sector (EBRD, 2001: 12). In addition, some of the most 
profitable Serbian enterprises were excluded from privatisation and came to be dominated 
by the political elites close to the Milosevic regime. According to Vladimir Gligorov, the 
Yugoslav government’s economic policy in the 1990s was aimed at avoiding transition 
with centralisation, nationalisation, anti-liberalisation, anti-stabilisation and corruption as 
its main features (Gligorov, 1999).^^*
After the Kosovo conflict, all economic indicators worsened. Real GDP declined by 18% 
in 1999 and inflation increased to 37.1%. The government decreed a price freeze thus 
provoking shortages and repressing inflationary pressures. Sluggish export performance 
determined a large current account deficit, which remained above the high level of $1.2 
billion in 1999 corresponding to 7.5% of GDP. Foreign exchange reserves were only 
around $300 million while the country’s gross external debt in 1999 was $14,1 billion 
(EBRD, 2004: 67). According to the G17 group’s initial calculations, the 1999 war costs 
for Serbia amounted to $30 billion. Estimates, however, vary significantly and were
Montenegro, however, tried to implement more radical measures in areas that were under its own 
competence and not those o f the federation. As was shown in Chapter 6, Podgorica came to operate as a c/e 
facto separate state adopting the Deutschemark as its currency and low tariff protection in its trade policy 
and engaging more intensely in privatisation (CEPS, 2002).
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subsequently lowered to $2 billion/^^
Since 2000, the authorities have operated strict monetary and fiscal policies. The efforts 
to stabilise the economy after the excesses of the Milosevic years have met some 
successes. In Serbia, monetary policy continues to be based on a stable dinar, although the 
dinar/euro rate depreciated gradually during 2003. Annual inflation was in single digits 
for both Serbia and Montenegro where the euro is the sole legal currency. Recent fiscal 
performance has improved with increased revenue collection and hardened budget 
constraints for public enterprises. Trade and current account deficits, however, are large, 
the latter being at 11.6% of GDP in 2003 (EBRD, 2004: 66) (Table 5).
Macroeconomic stability, therefore, was achieved without transformation in the real 
sector, that is micro-economic stabilisation. Strong anti-reform forces remained 
influential in the country and vested interests impeded radical change. A new privatisation 
law was adopted in Serbia in June 2001 but few companies have been privatised and the 
process is particularly slow with respect to the large state-owned entrerprises. Little 
progress was also made in reforming banks and other financial institutions which faced a 
liquidity crisis (Prokopijevic, 2002).^^° In addition, the pace of structural reforms has 
slowed considerably due to the political disputes between Serbia and Montenegro 
(Country Report, 2004). To illustrate, whereas under the Constitutional Charter of the 
State Union of Serbia-Montenegro that came into force in 2003 Belgrade is expected to
The bombing campaign against FRY between March and June 1999 included targets in the 
military-industrial infrastructure of the country. Fifty nine bridges, nine major highways and seven ports 
were destroyed. Most o f the telecommunications transmitters were damaged and two thirds o f the main 
industrial plants were seriously damaged. According to NATO, 70% o f the country’s electricity production 
and 80% of oil refinery capacities were also destroyed (IICK, 2000: 93).
To illustrate, in the end o f 1999, the merger o f 22 banks within BEOBANKA was imposed (Uvalic, 2001 : 
181).
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^^coordinate and harmonise the economic systems o f the member states^\ in practice 
Podgorica has retained competence over taxation and economic policy (Constitutional 
Charter, Article 11).
7.6.1 Kosovo
In the 1990s, Kosovo faced economic crisis and industrial collapse as a result of the sharp 
fall of the federal funds that had sustained it during the Cold War for political reasons.^^  ^
In 1990, for example, Kosovo’s official GDP per capita was 22% that of former 
Yugoslavia. The revocation of autonomy by the Milosevic regime in 1989 saw the 
emergence of a parallel state and economy by Albanian Kosovar authorities who as was 
shown in Chapter 6 declared full independence in 1991. Little progress was subsequently 
made in the field of privatisation and many industries remained under inefficient control 
(Korovilas, 2002: 110). Unemployment rose significantly during the decade and 
emigration was estimated to be the highest in former Yugoslavia (Pashko, 1998: 345).
Subsequent to the outbreak of violence in the province in 1998 and NATO’s bombing 
campaign against Belgrade in 1999, Kosovo’s economy entered a period of reconstruction 
of infrastructure. It was the inflows of international assistance under the UN protectorate 
that provided Kosovo with the level of economic support needed to ensure its survival. In 
1999, two donor conferences were held during which the international community 
pledged to contribute $2.3 billion for reconstruction for the period 1999-2003 (Mustafa, 
2001: 16). Large investments were subsequently made in the rebuilding of houses as well
During the Cold War, Kosovo’s economy was an ‘appendix’ o f Serbia. Its industrial output depended on 
the Yugoslav market and operated primarily as a supplier for manufacturing industries in other Yugoslav 
republics (Pashko, 1998: 342).
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as the rehabilitation of the energy sector and the reparation of roads and bridges that had 
been destroyed (Mustafa, 2001: 17).^^^
The international organisations that assumed the civil administration of Kosovo in 1999 
also set the conditions for the province’s sustainable development. They aimed to reform 
the province into an open market economy with particular emphasis on privatising 
state-owned enterprises, removing restrictions on the free flow of capital and trade and 
establishing the Deutschmark, and subsequently the Euro, as its official currency. As part 
of UNMIK, the EU assumed responsibility for the departments of reconstruction, trade 
and industry, public utilities and finance. It established the Customs Assistance Mission 
(CAM-K), a service providing Kosovo with its first self-generated income and put into 
place the institutional and legislative framework for public sector finance allowing for the 
collection of domestic revenues (europa.eu.int, 2004). In 2001, the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo prepared by UNMIK granted to 
provisional institutions competences in areas such as economic and financial policy, 
fiscal and budgetary issues, domestic and foreign trade, industry and investments as well 
as labour and social welfare (Constitutional Framework, Chapter 5).
Since the arrival of UNMIK, Kosovo’s economy has been growing strongly, with a 
growth rate of 26% in 2000, 16% in 2001 and 10.4% in 2002 (Gligorov, 2002) (Table 6). 
Growth has primarily been driven by the service sector boosted by the inflow of aid and 
reconstruction activities in the construction sector. As a result of the decline of the
233industrial and agricultural sectors, however, exports virtually collapsed. The current 
account deficit was equivalent to over a third of national income for 2002. GDP per capita
During the war, for example, 130.000 houses are estimated to have been damaged (Mustafa, 2001: 17), 
In the absence o f processing and package plants, agricultural production, for example, has turned into 
subsistence farming (Korovilas, 2002: 114).
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is the lowest in Europe estimated at around $1000 for the same year and unemployment 
at around 50% (Gligorov, 2002). Although the international administration carried out 
intense activity for economic transformation, the privatisation programme was not 
implemented successfully and the financial infrastructure is underdeveloped.^^"^
The unresolved question of Kosovo’s status impacts negatively on economic 
development perpetuating insecurity and uncertainty. To illustrate, privatisation of 
previously socially-owned enterprises is being blocked for fear of prejudicing the final 
status (IOC, 2003: 3). Criminalisation of economic activity has consequently become 
endemic. Finally, the disruption of economic links with Serbia also raise questions with 
respect to the sustainability of Kosovo as an independent economic unit given its previous 
significant dependence on the FRY (Korovilas, 2002).^^^
7.7 FYR Macedonia
After the declaration of independence in 1991, FYR Macedonia’s reforms were initially 
concentrated in attaining macro-economic stability. The country faced high inflation rates 
of 115% in 1991 and 1.690% in 1992 due to a large budget deficit that was monetised 
(EBRD, 1997: 193). Under an IMF programme, the government tightened both fiscal and 
monetary policy in 1994. Inflation gradually fell to 16% in 1995 and 2.6% in 1996. 
Expenditure cuts also helped lower the budget deficit from 14% in 1993 to 3% in 1994 
and 1% in 1995 (EBRD, 1997: 193) (Table 7).
A new banking system is still being built in Kosovo, Following licencing o f the first bank with foreign 
capital (MEB) in February 2000, six other banks started operations in 2001 (Mustafa, 2001: 22).
Despite the official disruption of economic activity with Serbia, Belgrade is still expected to repay 
Kosovo’s dept o f $1 billion.
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Structural reforms, however, did not advance at the same pace. A new privatisation law 
was not adopted until June 1993 and its implementation was delayed until late 1994. In 
addition, most enterprises were privatised on the basis of MEBOs which were criticised 
for creating little extra capital and solidifying insider control (Kekic, 2001: 192).^^  ^
Expected gains from privatisation were limited by the lack of transparency, institutional 
weaknesses such as unsatisfactory legal protection and an inefficient financial sector. 
Finally, criminalisation of large parts of the economy was promoted by the various 
sanctions and embargoes that affected the country in the period 1992-1995.^^^
In 1997, the IMF granted FYR Macedonia a three-year ESAF to support structural 
reforms. Growth picked up to 3.4% in 1998,4,3% in 1999 and 4,5% in 2000 and inflation 
fell to insignificant rates (Table 7). Little progress, however, was achieved in liquidating 
large-scale industries and the sale of the public telecommunications operator was delayed. 
A new bankruptcy law was passed in 1998 but its application was slow. Banks continued 
to lend to loss-making enterprises and financial reform did not proceed rapidly. As a result 
of stagnating exports, the current account deficit rose to 10% in 1998 and unemployment 
to over 30% (EBRD, 2003: 59).“ *
It was the armed conflict that erupted in the country in 2001 between government forces
According to Kekic, however, ^'nomenclature privatisation tapped into valuable social capital and 
know-how preservedfrom the previous quasi market under former Yugoslavia" (Kekic, 2001: 199),
The imposition of UN sanctions on FRY in 1992 meant that FYR Macedonia could not trade legally with 
Belgrade which had been its largest market during the Cold War, In addition, as has been shown in Chapter 
6 between February 1994 and September 1995 Greece imposed a unilateral trade embargo on the country 
arguing that the name, flag and constitution o f the republic implied territorial claims on its own Macedonian 
province (Papahadjopoulos, 1998; 18),
Unemployment is higher among the ethnic Albanian community than among Slav Macedonians and 
reservations are often voiced about official data,
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and the NLA, however, that caused a significant deviation in macro-economic policy. 
GDP fell to -4.5%, inflation rose to 3.7% and the budget deficit to 7.2%. An IMF staff 
monitoring programme from January to June 2002 aimed to provide a basis for financial 
support. As a result of disagreements with the government for raising wages of employees 
in the public sector, however, Euro 300 million was received in pledges at the donors 
meeting of March 2002. These aimed to be used for debt servicing, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of areas affected by the conflict and for the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement signed in August 2001(Donev, 2003: 232).
Macro-economic stability was subsequently re-established. Growth rose to 0.7% in 2002 
and 2.8% in 2003 and inflation fell to 2.4% and 1.1% respectively (EBRD, 2004: 45). An 
IMF Standby Arrangement was approved in April 2003 after which a significant part of 
the funds committed at the donor conference of March 2002 were released. Although the 
budget deficit was reduced, however, FYR Macedonia continues to run large trade and 
current account deficits, the latter being 10% for 2002 and 8% for 2003 due to a 
continuous fall in industrial output. Reported unemployment continues to be one of the 
highest in the region at over 30% and the pace of structural reform is slow. Large 
loss-making companies are still owned by the state and the fact that their employees are 
mostly ethnic Macedonians has further politicised economic problems in the country 
(Donev, 2003: 232)
7.8 Romania
The early years of transition in Romania were marked by severe economic difficulties 
including a serious fall in output which reached -12% of GDP in 1991, a collapse of the 
old institutional structures and policy incoherence. Confronted with the economy’s rapid
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deterioration and unable to contain growing disequilibria such as unsustainable trade 
deficits, rising prices and the lack of investment, the government introduced a 
stabilisation plan supported by the IMF at the start of 1991. It included a tightening of 
fiscal and monetary policy, a tax based incomes policy, a new devaluation and the 
introduction of a two-tier exchange rate system (Daianu, 2001: 201).
Rising inflation of over 200% in 1992 and 1993 and a persistent trade imbalance forced 
the government to reconsider its policies. A breakthrough occurred during the last quarter 
of 1993 when several key decisions were made to contain and reverse the dynamics of 
inflationary expectations, to start remonetisation of the economy and create a transparent 
foreign exchange market. Romania enjoyed positive growth of 3,9% and 6.9% in 1994 
and 1995 respectively but at the same time inflation declined to unsustainable levels of 
61,7% and 27,8% (Table 8). A clearer definition of property rights and privatisation did 
not accompany the government’s reform programme (EBRD, 1997: 202).
The new government that came into power in 1996 liberalised the foreign exchange 
market and prices that were still regulated. Although the current account shrank in 1997, 
GDP fell by 6.1% and the budget deficit rose to 4.6%, inflation to 154.8% and 
unemployment to 8.9% (EBRD, 2003: 77) (Table 8). Many opportunities to sell 
state-owned companies to strategic investors were lost. Poor and confusing legislation in 
the field of property restitution as well as the ineffectiveness of the judiciary in handling 
property proceedings prevented the creation of a land market until late in the transition, 
hindering the emergence of farmers as a distinct category (Mungiu-Pipidi, 2003:257). By 
1999, the country faced the risk of external payments default, the danger of a banking 
crisis due to low foreign exchange reserves as well as a possible financial crisis as a result 
of high interest rates.
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Romania’s experience is a glaring example of the importance of structural reforms and of 
reducing an economy’s distortions for durable macro-economic stabilisation (Daianu, 
2002: 202). At the same time, it is proof of the pains of such reforms. Unless financial 
discipline is imposed, pressure on the central bank and the banking sector becomes a 
general constant feature of the way the system functions and leads to widespread 
rent-seeking. An erroneous consensus also emerged in Bucharest over the causes of 
inflation which were viewed as an acceptable alternative to reform (Mungiu-Pipidi, 2003: 
257). According to Daianu, it was the absence of institutional frameworks of society that 
led to erroneous policy making (Daianu, 2002: 216).^^^
In August 1999, however, a standby agreement was signed with the IMF validating a 
deficit of 3.8% and including privatisation revenues of 1% (Daianu, 2001: 212). 
Significant gains in macro-economic stabilisation were subsequently achieved. In 2001, 
for example, the country recorded significant progress and its 4,9% growth rate was the 
highest in the region. A more appropriate policy-mix helped decrease inflation while the 
external position remained sustainable. The ongoing overhaul of the banking sector, the 
successive improvements in the supervisory and regulatory framework for financial 
markets and the advances in privatisation progressively tightened entrerprises financial 
discipline. Price and trade liberalisation coupled with a significant adjustment of energy 
tariffs and important reforms of the tax system set the stage for a more efficient allocation 
of resources (Strategy Paper and Report, 2003).
Inflation, however, still remained at 14% in 2003 and structural reforms of unviable 
state-owned companies were postponed. Although growth remains strong, the current 
account deficit has widened with real wage increases and fast credit growth. The
According to the World Bank, institutions are defined as *'the rules o f the game that emerge from formal 
laws, informal norms and practices and organisations’ structures” (World Bank, 2000: 94).
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privatisation of the banking sector has not been completed and regulatory frameworks 
require improvement. Fiscal relaxation and a slowdown in privatisation ahead of the 2004 
elections are risks to stability and EU accession (EBRD, 2004).
7.9  Conclusions
The above analysis has shown that in the post-Cold War era, Southeastern European 
countries were laggards in transition to market economies and confronted serious 
developmental problems that sapped growth and negatively affected prospects for 
successful regionalism. Although some analysts have focused on the role of initial 
conditions, such as economic backwardness and the communist legacy, for explaining the 
failed transition experience, policy failures had a significant impact on economic 
performance in the region. In Romania, for example, there was a tacit acceptance of 
inflation and the absence of systemic change and restructuring.
Whereas macro-economic stabilisation was achieved by the mid-1990s in most Balkan 
countries, micro-economic performance was neglected and all states faced serious 
institutional problems. Privatisation of publicly owned companies in particular proceeded 
badly for all post-communist states in the region and failed to produce a strong and 
competitive sector early on in the transition. In all countries, ruling elites were initially 
able to preserve positions of power in relation to ownership and control of economic 
assets which had negative consequences for corporate governance. In addition, banking 
sectors were plagued by lack of competition and state interference.
Furthermore, international actors often worsened external indebtedness by covering 
imbalances through capital inflows from abroad such as foreign aid often granted in
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commercial terms. The problem of aid dependency was particularly acute in the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unsustainable external deficits, however, also led to exchange rate 
or banking crises as in the cases of Bulgaria and Albania in 1996 and 1997 respectively. 
Finally, in the post-Cold War Southeastern Europe also faced serious developmental 
problems related to the collapse of industrial output and the increased dependence on the 
agricultural sector through subsistence farming. Albania was particularly affected by the 
process of de-industrialisation affecting the entire Balkan peninsula.
Since the late 1990s, however, many countries in the region experienced a ‘second 
transition’ after a breakthrough with structural change. Bulgaria and Romania accelerated 
their reform programmes subsequent to being invited to initiate negotiations for EU 
membership in 1999. Croatia also saw improved growth rates and macro-economic 
stability after the change of regime in 2000 and the signing of an SAA with the EU in 
March 2001. Subsequent to applying for EU membership in February 2003, Croatia was 
invited to become a candidate by the Brussels European Council in June 2004.
Most of the Western Balkans countries, however, still face significant macro-economic 
imbalances. The social cost of transition has been significant so that in 2002, for example, 
unemployment rates are much higher than in other transition countries, especially in the 
FYR Macedonia (31.9%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (40.6%) and Serbia-Montenegro (28.9%). 
Their external sectors are also highly unbalanced given that they import three to four 
times more than they export and run large trade and current account deficits. In 2003, for 
example, Albania had a current account deficit of 8.4%, FYR Macedonia of 8.1%, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina of 17.8% and Serbia-Montenegro of 11.6 %. Finally, Western 
Balkan countries have also been plagued by fiscal imbalances and in 2003 faced large 
budget deficits equivalent to 5.6% for Albania, 4.5% for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2.5% for
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Serbia-Montenegro, 1.6% for FYR Macedonia.
The impact of the wars in former Yugoslavia contributed significantly to a continuing 
fragile economic situation in the Western Balkans. FRY’s economy, for example, was 
particularly damaged by the effects of sanctions and bans on oil, trade, export credit and 
investment throughout the 1990s. In addition, Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet fully 
moved into a single economic space whereas Serbia-Montenegro officially encompasses 
two economic systems while also still responsible for repaying Kosovo’s external debt. 
Finally, FYR Macedonia’s macro-economic performance also deviated significantly from 
its reform path during the outbreak of violence between government forces and the NLA 
in the spring of 2001.
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Table 1
Albania: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -10 -27.7 -9.7 11.0 9.4 1S.6 9.1
Unemployment (%) 7.6 11.7 30.3 22.4 19.2 13 9.3
Consumer prices 0 104 237 31 16 6 20
Government Balance -3.7 -44 -22 -16 -14 -9.4 -12.1
Current Account (% GDP) -30.1 -14.4 -7.2 -9.1
Industry (% GDP) 37 32 17 14 13 13 12.2
Agriculture (%GDP) 40 44 54 56 56 54.6 51.5
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 205 229
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 680 921
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change -7.0 12.7 8.9 7.7 6.8 4.7 6.0
Unemployment 14.9 17.8 18.0 16.8 14.6 15.8 15.0
Consumer prices 42.1 8.7 -1.0 4.2 3.5 5.4 3.3
Government Balance -12.9 -11.4 -12.1 -9.1 -8.2 -6.9 -5.6
Current Account -12.3 -6.8 -7.7 -7.4 -6.2 -9.0 -8.4
Industry 12.4 11.9 11.9 11.5 11.7 11.4 na
Agriculture 56.0 54.4 52.6 51.0 49.0 48.1 na
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 167 205 275 256 305 309 341
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 685 826 1.121 1.070 1.332 1.405 1.470
Source: EBRD (1997): 185; EBRD ( 2004): 27
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Table 2
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -9 -20 na na na 8 50
Unemployment (%) na na
Consumer prices
FBiH na na na na na na 7.7
RS na na na na na na -17.7
Government Balance 0.3 -4.4
Current Account na na na na na -10.3 -27.3
Industry 23.9 21.4
Agriculture 24.6 20.5
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 7 91 152 336
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 60 894 1.082 1.882
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change 37 15.6 9.6 5.6 4.5 3.8 4.0
Unemployment na 38.0 38.5 39.7 39.7 na na
Consumer prices
FBiH 13.6 1.8 -1.0 4.0 2.4 -0.7 -0.3
RS -10 5.6 14.0 16.0 6.2 2.3 0.2
Government Balance -0.5 -8 -9.1 -9.9 -6.0 -4.1 -4.5
Current Account -31 -16.2 -15.5 -10.1 -■14.8 -18.9 -17.8
Industry 22.6 22.5 na na na na na
Agriculture 17.5 16.0 na na na na na
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 575 697 831 932 975 1.059 1.273
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 2.333 3.780 4.126 2.610 2.750 3.148 3.700
Source: EBRD, (1997): 218 and EBRD, (2004): 35
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Table 3
Bulgaria: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -2.4 1.8 2.6 -9.4
Unemployment 1.5 11.5 15.6 16.4 12.8 10.5 13.0
Consumer prices 72.5 338.9 9.4 63.9 121.9 32.9 310.8
Government Balance na na 13.0 -10.9 -5.8 -5.7 -10.3
Current Account -0.2 0.2
Industry 43 47 45: 39 33 :31 29
Agriculture 18 15 12 10 11 13 14.2
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 5.345 '$.890
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 5.224 4.703
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change -5.6 4.0 2.3 5.4 4.0 4.8 4.5
Unemployment 14.5 15.0 15.7 16.1 19.7 18.2 13.2
Consumer prices 578.6 0.9 6.2 11.4 4.8 3.9 5.6
Government Balance -2.0 1.3 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7
Current Account 4.1 -0.5 -5.3 -5.6 -6.5 -4.3 -5.1
Industry 25.0 22.3 25.1 25.8 25.2 24.5 na
Agriculture 23.4 16.8 14.5 12.3 12.1 na na
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 4.940 4.193 4.006 4.812 5.099 5.578 7.439
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 4.559 4.574 5.087 5.988 6.665 7.197 9.912
Source: EBRD, (1997): 189 and EBRD, (2004): 37
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Table 4
Croatia: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -8.6 -20 -10 -3.7 0.8 5 6.8
Unemployment na na 12.9 12.8 12.8 13.4 10.0
Consumer prices 136 249 937 1.150 -3 3.7 3.4
Government Balance na -5 -4 -1.0 1.7 -0.9 -1.0
Current Account -7.7 -5.5
Industry 31.3 30.7 28.3 28.5 25.7 23.8 21.6
Agriculture 10.4 10.8 14.1 12.9 13.3 12.4 8.4
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 4.633 4.546
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 7.892 8.169
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change 6.5 2.5 -0.9 2.9 3.8 5.2 4.0
Unemployment 9.9 11.4 13.6 16.1 15.8 na na
Consumer prices 3.8 5.4 4.4 7.4 2.6 2.9 3.7
Government Balance -1.9 -1.0 -6.5 -6.9 -6.8 -6.2 -5.0
Current Account -11.6 -7.1 -7.0 -2.3 -3.8 -4.9 -3.9
Industry 21.9 21.1 21.1 20.7 20.7 na na
Agriculture 7.8 7.9 8.1 7.4 7.1 na na
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 4.210 4.605 4.395 4.567 4.759 4.995 5.369
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 9.407 8.652 7.693 7.771 8.860 10.274 11.610
Source: EBRD (1997): 190 and EBRD (2004): 39
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Table 5
FRY/Serbia-Montenegro: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -30.8 2.5 6.1 7.8
Unemployment 23.1 23.1 24.6 25.8
Consumer prices 120.4 58.6
Government Balance na na -4.3 -3.8
Current Account -11.6
Industry 43.1 41.1 40.1 38.6
Agriculture 32.3 31.4 31.1 29.4
Merch Exports ($ mil) 1.531 1.842
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 2.666 4.102
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change 10.1 1.9 -15.7 5.0 5.5 4.0 2.0
Unemployment 25.9 26.8 25.5 25.6 26.8 28.9 na
Consumer prices 9.5 44.5 36.5 113.5 39.3 14.3 7.7
Government Balance -7.6 -5.4 -8.3 -1.0 -1.3 -4.5 -2.5
Current Account -9.4 -4.8 -7.5 -8.4 -9.7 -12.3 -11.6
Industry 39.3 39.7 38.2 na na na na
Agriculture 29.4 19.0 25.1 na na na na
Merch, Exports ($ mil) 2.756 3.033 1.676 1.923 2.003 2.075 2.477
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 4.826 4.849 3.295 3.711 4.837 5.614 7.324
Source: EBRD, 2002: 145 and EBRD, 2004: 67
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Table 6
Kosovo: Selected Economie Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -19.8 -11.0 -25.3 -24.8 0.0 8.1
Unemployment 49.1
Consumer prices
Government Balance
Current Account
Industry
Agriculture
Merch. Exports ($mil) 171.0
Merch. Imports ($mii) 191.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change 16.0 10.4
Unemployment 64.7 74.0 51.0
Consumer prices 11.1 6.5
Government Balance -6.1 -0.7
Current Account 0.2 -3.6
Industry
Agriculture
Merch. Exports ($mil) 10 20
Merch. Imports ($mil) 1140 1314
Source: Gligorov, (2002): 12
198
Table 7
FYR Macedonia: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change -9.9 -12.1 -21.1 -8.4 -4.0 -1.5 1.2
Unemployment na 19.2 19.8 20.0 23.7 37.7 31.9
Consumer prices 606 115 1.935 230 55 9 -0.6
Government Balance na na -10.0 -14.0 -3.0 -1 -1.4
Current Account -5.0 -6.5
Industry 19.6 19.5
Agriculture 10.6 10.7
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 1.113 1.150 1.199 1.056 1.086 1.204 912
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 1.531 1.375 1.206 1.227 1.272 ]i.439 1.435
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.6 -4.1 0.7 2.8
Unemployment 36.0 34.5 32.4 32.2 28.9 31.9 na
Consumer prices 2.6 0.8 2.3 6.0 3.7 1.1 2.5
Government Balance -0.4 -1.7 0.0 1.8 -7.2 -5.7 -1.6
Current Account -7.7 -10.1 -3.4 -3.1 -9.8 ■10.5 -8.1
Industry 20.7 21.8 20.7 18.1 17.5 na na
Agriculture 10.7 10.0 9.2 10.0 9.8 na na
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 1.237 1.292 1.190 1.321 1.155 1.113 1.354
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 1.623 1.807 1.686 2.011 1.677 1.877 2.123
Source: EBRD, (1997): 193 and EBRD, (2004): 44
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Table 8
Romania: Selected Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP % change 8.1 -16.2 -9.2 -2.1 3.9 6.9 4.0
Unemployment na 3.0 8.1 10.2 11 8.9 6.6
Consumer prices 37.7 222.8 199.2 295.5 61.7 27.8 56.9
Government Balance na -1.7 -4.4 -2.7 -3.0 -4.1 -3.9
Current Account -5.0 -7.3
Industry 40.6 37.9 38.3 32.4 32.3 na 34.2
Agriculture 21.8 18.9 19.0 21.0 20.1 19.8 19.1
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 7.910 8.061
Merch. Imports ($mil) 9.478 10.555
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP % change -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 1.8 5.3 4.9 4.5
Unemployment 8.9 10.3 11.8 10.5 8.6 8.1 7.2
Consumer prices 151.4 40.6 54.8 40.7 30.2 17.9 14.1
Government Balance -4.6 -5.0 -3.5 -3.7 -3.5 -2.7 -2.4
Current Account -6.1 -6.9 -3.6 -3.7 -6.0 -3.6 -4.2
Industry 35.6 26.3 24.8 27.3 28.2 na na
Agriculture 18.8 14.5 13.9 11.4 13.2 na na
Merch. Exports ($ mil) 8.431 8.302 8.503 10.366 11.385 13.869 14.650
Merch. Imports ($ mil) 10.411 10.927 9.595 12.050 14.354 16.482 17.740
Source: EBRD (1997): 202 and EBRD, (2004): 63
2 0 0
Chapter 8
General Conclusions
8.1 Findings
The main argument of the thesis is that in the post-Gold War period there has been a lack of 
appropriate extra-regional and intra-regional environment conducive to regionalism in 
Southeastern Europe/"*° Although the international community has promoted regional 
coopearation through externally driven schemes such as the Royaumont Process, SECI, the 
MPFSEE, the SPSEE and the SEEI and has supported the development of the indigenous 
SEECP, these initiatives have not had significant practical results. The absence of visible 
results of regional cooperation schemes has been attributed to the lack of clear mechanisms 
of implementation as well as some degree of institutionalisation. In addition, their activities 
have often been duplicated as they were initially badly coordinated and competition often 
emerged between them. Finally, most initiatives do not have independent budgets and 
depend primarily on loans from IFIs.
Moreover, although it was explicitly stated by Brussels that subregionalism and integration 
were not incompatible, some countries in the region did not want to be part of regional 
cooperation schemes for fear that they would become an excuse to delay their European 
membership (Bailes, 1999). Croatia in particular showed scepticism towards joining
As Chapter 3 has shown, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries regional cooperation in the 
Balkans was also obstructed by factors external and internal to the region, namely nationalisms and foreign 
intervention.
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initiatives that linked it to the region and remained an observer to SECI, the MPFSEE and 
the SEECP, while requesting to join the latter only after the EU granted it candidacy in June 
2004. Similarly, in May 2001, Bulgaria threatened to withdraw from the Stability Pact for 
fear that it would become an obstacle to its relations with Brussels (Bechev, 2001:15-16).^"*  ^
External obstacles to regionalism have therefore primarily been caused by the systemic 
pressures on the Balkans by the European integration process.
In addition, by pursuing policies based on bilateral agreements with Balkan countries at the 
same time as promoting regionalism, the EU also created distortions and divisions in the 
region which had a negative impact on the region-building attempt (pull-out effect).^ "^  ^To 
illustrate, whereas Bulgaria and Romania were involved in the enlargement process since 
the mid-1990s through EAs and their participation in the CEFTA, the Western Balkan 
countries were only included in the SAP in 1999 in the aftermath of the bombing campaign 
against the FRY. In addition, whereas Croatia and FYR Macedonia signed SAAs with the 
EU in 2001 and the former was granted candidate status in June 2004, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Serbia-Montenegro have not yet been deemed capable of doing so and Albania has not 
yet completed SAA negotiations. Finally, despite establishing a Customs Union with the EU 
in 1996 and being granted candidate status by the European Council of Helsinki in 
December 1999, Turkey had not been allowed to initiate negotiations for membership until 
2003.
239 According to the European Commission, '’^ Experience has shown that a pre-requisite fo r successful 
regional cooperation is a clear will by participants to support such cooperation politically, 
administratively and where appropriate, financially. The setting o f concrete and realistic objectives with 
a clear added value is another condition’' (European Commission, 1997: 5)
According to Sophia Clement, "the efforts to create subregionalism in Southeast Europe, therefore, create 
a basic paradox: the EU subsystem aims at enhancing subregionalism in its immediate periphery while its very 
existence contributes at the same time to weakening the former^' (Clement, 2000: 89).
Similarly, NATO promoted regional cooperation through the SEEI and the MPFSEE but its contractual 
relations with the region were based on the bilateral PfP agreements.
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Domestic preconditions for successful regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe have 
also been lacking. In the post-Cold War era, all Yugoslav successor states except Slovenia 
faced significant 'stateness' problems regarding the definition of their national identities and 
borders. The retarded state and nation-building process of former Yugoslav states left 
unsettled questions over the status of Kosovo and relations between Serbia and Montenegro 
which represent areas of potential conflict (Janjic, 2003: 115). In addition, regardless of 
whether they were shaped as unitary states (Croatia and FYR Macedonia), federations 
(Serbia-Montenegro) or confederations (Bosnia-Herzegovina), the successor states of 
former Yugoslavia were unfinished entities whose political elites relied on démocratisation 
as the last available resource in the internal power struggles and only under external 
pressure. Consequently, they were unstable entities and faced the same problems with 
ethnicity that drove Yugoslavia to its end (Malesevic, 2000).^ "*^
Finally, the post-Cold War era also witnessed delayed transition to market economies in 
Southeastern European countries, a fact that sapped growth and had an adverse effect on 
regional cooperation. In the early 1990s, all Balkan countries confi*onted serious structural 
problems at the macro and micro-economic levels. Macro-economic imbalances included 
trade, current account and fiscal deficits as well as high unemployment rates (BeCEI, 2003: 
5). Microeconomic problems were related to a process of de-industrialisation, incomplete
^  Reviewing power-sharing arrangements in the cases o f Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY Macedonia and Kosovo, 
Florian Bieber concluded that most institutional systems present a high degree of consociationalism on paper. 
In practice, however, little power-sharing takes place and inclusion has proved easier to achieve than 
cooperation between ethnic communities. Only in FYR Macedonia some aspects o f the Ohrid Agreement have 
moved away from institutionalising ethnicity. Even here, however, the move away is at the symbolic level, such 
as in the preamble of the constitution, while the institutions of state are given strong ethnic qualifiers (Gosselin, 
2002: 14; Bieber, 2003).
6 An expanding literature on the disintegration of Yugoslavia has underlined the crisis o f state and its catalytic 
impact on the country's final disintegration. According to most analysts, Yugoslavia did not collapse because it 
was a multi-ethnic country of mutually antagonistic groups organised in a federal way but because it was an 
undemocratic state where political institutions failed to regulate relations between the different ethnic groups 
(Woodward, 1995; Schopflin, 1998; Malesevic, 2000).
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privatisation and inadequate restructuring. In addition, Western aid directed towards the 
region created a culture of dependency (Kekic, 2001).
Although the late 1990s and early century witnessed a ‘second transition’ and improved 
macroeconomic performance for Bulgaria and Romania which were invited to initiate 
negotiations with the EU in December 1999 and Croatia which was granted EU 
candidateship in June 2004, the rest of the countries in the region still confront significant 
macro-economic and micro-economic imbalances and have been left out of the enlargement 
agenda. High unemployment rates, current account and budget deficits as well as industrial 
and agricultural collapse are problems facing Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. In the post-Cold War era, therefore, the 
majority of the Western Balkans confronted not just transition to market economies but 
development at the same time.
According to Dimitar Bechev, therefore, '"The internal distinctions and the specific role 
played by Brussels certainly put a question mark to the extent that the Southeast European 
region-building project has the potential o f bringing forth deeper integration and proceed 
on a more intensified scale" (Bechev, 2001: 16). They also call into question the ability of 
constructivism to explain the emergence of regional cooperation in the Balkans since many 
Southeastern European states in fact wanted to deconstruct the region and align themselves 
with mainstream Europe, much as Central and East European states had in the 1990s. 
Regional cooperation in the Balkans, therefore, has no chance of being effective unless the 
problem of ‘stateness’ and economic backwardness are addressed and the relationship 
between regionalism and integration is clarified.
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8.2 Policy Implications
Linz and Stepan conclude that simultaneous state-making and démocratisation will be 
compatible if the state is defined in non-nation-state terms. This means that citizenship must 
be inclusive, that there must be a combination of collective and individual rights and that 
certain institutional arrangements, ranging from the right electoral sequencing to 
consociational democracy or federalism, must be applied (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 33-34).^ "^  ^
Consociational democracy requires that all groups be represented in parliament, major 
groups be included in coalition governments and minorities are represented in state 
administration and have the possibility to veto/or autonomy at the local/regional levels 
(Gosselin, 2002: 14).^ '*^  Federalism, on the other hand, is a type of autonomy where all 
regions enjoy equal powers and have an identical relationship to the central govemment.^"^*
In Western Europe, for example, state and nation-building are completed processes and 
where they are challenged political mechanisms have been put into place in order to mitigate 
separatist demands. In Spain, for example, 'regional autonomy/federacy' is granted by the 
constitution to the 'historic communities', such as Catalonia and the Basque region, which
246 goa/ is democratic consolidation, a democratising strategy would require that less majoritarian and 
more consensual policies be crafted in each of the above arenas, namely civil society and mass media, 
citizenship laws, state bureaucracy, legal system and economic society" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 37).
Consociationalism, however, recognises some collective identities to the exclusion o f others and 
institutionally entrenches those cleavages. It carries risks of friezing shifting identities and Augmenting social 
and political life into enclaves. Its success, therefore, depends significantly on elite will. There may, however, 
be no better alternative in deeply divided societies emerging from war, as shown by the examples of Northern 
Ireland or Lebanon (Bose, 2002: 249).
Two distinct types of federalist philosophies exist. A nationalising or mono-national, which aims to make 
the sovereign polity congruent with one culture. The US is a paradigmatic case of this type Wiereas other 
examples include the Netherlands and the German-speaking Swiss lands. The multi-ethnic or multi-national 
model 'seeks to express, institutionalise and protect at least two national or ethnic cultures'. It has infiuenced 
the making of post-colonial federations in Canada, South Afiica, India, Malaysia, the post-communist Russian 
Federation and the FRY. Recent reconstructions o f Spain and Belgium are also influenced by the notion of 
multinational federalism (Bose, 2002: 92).
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have significant powers but play little role in national government and institutions (Ghai, 
2000: Belgium was gradually turned from a unitary state to a highly decentralised
federation or confederation. Competences have been divided between the national 
government, the Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital) and the so-called 
Communities derived from cultural identity (French, Flemish and German) (Lewis, 2001: 
130).^^° In Italy and France, central government authority remains dominant through 
arrangements referred to as regionalism or decentralisation respectively (Ghai, 2000: 9).
The main characteristic of the Yugoslav transition which has seen the creation of smaller 
multi-ethnic countries is the need to create stable states with political institutions able to 
define the terrritorial borders of their polities and the boundaries of their national identities. 
According to Susan Woodward, a precondition for self-sustaining democracies in 
Southeastern Europe is a "domestically grounded sense o f national identity defining 
borders, members, constitutional tradition and citizenship rights, which must in each o f the 
new states be constructed if  a new Balkans is to emerge" (Woodward, 2001:25). Similarly, 
Bugajksi has argued that "the only legitimate and durable form o f Balkan stability and 
reconstruction has to be based on indigenous democratic development, the 
self-determination o f new states and voluntary international integration" (Bugajski, 2000: 
192).
For Kosovo creating a viable state means above all the resolution of the 'status' problem. As 
the status question relates to the broader conflict of interests between Albanians and Serbs
The 'stateness' problem could have disrupted the Spanish transition, but the success o f the leadership in 
handling the transformation of the unitary state into the multi-lingual and multi-national estado de la 
autonomias approved by referendum in 1978 demonstrates that even new democracies can deal with complex 
constitutional change (Linz and Stepan, 1996(b): 140).
The Belgian case has been a relative success due to common history and culture, consensus-building and a 
constitutional compromise, namely the split between the functions of the Regions and those o f the Communities 
(unique feature o f the functional and cultural/linguistic axes) (Lewis, 2001: 133).
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affecting Kosovo, Serbia-Montenegro and the international community, there will not be 
stable peace unless Pristina, Belgrade and the UN Security Council reach a political accord. 
A true peace accord for Kosovo will have to be within the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
and accepted by all the countries of the region as was the case with Dayton (Janjic, 2003: 
114). It could revolve around endorsing 'conditional independence' whereby sovereignty 
would be subject to certain criteria and could be made subject to the exercise of veto rights 
by the international community (IGC, 2003: 3). The prospect of independence would also 
commit local actors into building the rule of law and promoting the development of civilian 
and minority institutions by Serbs and other non-Albanian Kosovars (Triantaphyllou, 2002).
For the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, it is questionable whether the Constitutional 
Charter can offer a clear legal framework or mandate for reform. Consequently, the 
international community has to accept the result of the referendum in Montenegro in 2006. 
Meanwhile, given that Serbia is a weak political entity in search of its constitutional set up, 
the negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro and the process of creating a new Serbian 
constitution should be taking place at the same time. Serbia should be defined 
constitutionally as a democratic, multi-ethnic state that can but does not necessarily have to 
be in union with Montenegro. Some of the priorities involve the removal of the 
presidential system, development of the institutions of parliamentarianism, democratic 
control of the army and the police as well as decentralisation and regionalism with respect to 
Voijvodina and the Sanjak (Janjic, 2003: 289-291).
Given that the Dayton settlement is becoming a permanent framework, the issue for the 
future is how to make Bosnia-Herzegovina a more centralised state with multi-ethnic
The establishment of new relations between Serbia and Montenegro on the basis o f two independent states 
that coordinate fields of joint interest, such as access to university education, could be an interesting model for 
other former Yugoslav countries (Janjic, 2003: 291).
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institutions where its people have a closer relationship to decision-making processes 
(Bugajki, 2000: 190; Dassu and Whyte, 2001: 127). As Chandler has written "as long as 
Bosnian people have little relationship to decision-making processes, it is unlikely that any 
broader sense o f common interest will emerge" (Chandler, 1999: 197). An exit strategy for 
the High Representative and the international organisations should, therefore, be devised 
and the transfer of politics to national politicians be on the agenda (Gligorov, 2002:2). The 
FBiH, however, fears that if the international presence were to be discontinued without 
constitutional change, the RS would secede. Domestic institutional redesign is also needed 
that would make power-sharing arrangements a fijll operational reality (Gosselin, 2002: 
14).^ ^^  Meanwhile, it has been argued that devolution of power to the municipalities is the 
best way of making the nation-building experiment more credible (Triantaphyllou, 2002).
For Croatia, a consociational model could help accommodate the insecurities of the Serbian 
minority many of which are still refugees. Although autonomy for Knin and Glina that will 
allow the further return of Serbs to their original settlements has been initiated and the 
CLNM has been adopted providing guarantees for minorities in national and local-level 
bodies, further constitutional change to allow proportional representation in parliament as 
well as the participation of the minority in coalition governments would greatly enhance 
Serbian feelings of security in the country. Finally, for FYR Macedonia the application of 
key components of the Framework Agreement, such as the further promotion of Albanians 
in public office, is of key importance for resolving its ‘stateness’ problem.
The successor states of Yugoslavia, however, have not been capable of constitutional 
change without considerable use of force (Gligorov, 2001:94). In the absence of indigenous
To date, most of the constitutional debate on reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina concerned the extent to which 
equal treatment throughout the country could be guaranteed by symmetrical mechanisms instituted in each 
entity (Perry, 2002: 3).
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democratic development, it is political conditionality by the European Union that can 
contribute towards creating viable inclusive states. Involving the EU in state and 
nation-building, however, can be more credible if the country is a candidate for membership 
and state-building is made endogenous to integration. In Romania, for example, 
inter-ethnic relations between the Romanian majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority 
were normalised under pressure to abide by the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession 
(Mungiu-Pipidi, 2003:263). A change in strategy in Southeastern Europe, therefore, should 
be '7o support the process o f nation and state-building within the credible, structured and 
enhanced procedure o f accession o f the Western Balkans into the European Union" 
(BeCEI, 2003: 15). As stated by Stefano Bianchini, ""state-building, security and 
inclusion are part o f the same coin"' (Bianchini, 2003:212).
Granting concrete EU accession prospects to the Western Balkans would also contribute to 
tackling the economic underdevelopment of the region. According to Milica Uvalic ""a key 
challenge for all Southeastern Europe is finding ways o f creating sound conditions for  
self sustaining economic growth while trying to avoid or reduce excessive dependence on 
externally provided resources" (Uvalic, 2003: 100). Export led-growth is the key to 
development in the Balkans and it requires industrial restructuring and the spread of 
modem technology as well as supply side increase in p roductiv ityT his can be facilitated
According to Vucadinovic "Unless a high level o f démocratisation and Europeanisation o f the Balkans in 
achieved, territorial and minority issues will continue to present a significant problem in these areas and a 
constant challenge to security” (Vucadinovic, 2002; 140).
Given that military reform and democratic control o f the army are integral parts o f the state-building 
process, NATO’s association to the region is equally important and should be further clarified. But no 
consensus has emerged to date with respect to the larger strategic purpose o f NATO enlargement. 
Meanwhile, “competition between the region’s fragile new democracies fo r  a position in the inside track 
leading towards inclusion has become a constant, with damaging consequences fo r subregional 
association and reconciliation” (Nation, 2003: 40).
In the medium term, however, employment will have to come from SMEs specialising in services also 
with view to increasing the tertiary sector share in GDP so as to deal with demands of integration without 
forming a new European periphery. Financial facilities that would promote these activities, such as forms o f
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through the EU’s cohesion policy and the development of appropriate assistance 
programmes (Noutcheva, 2003: 2). In addition, through the use of its economic 
conditionality, the EU can help Western Balkan countries prepare for assuming the 
competitive pressures of membership.^^^
Regional Policy seeks to improve long-term growth performance of recipient countries by 
targeting assistance to the supply side, with the bulk of interventions focused on 
infrastructure and vocational training. Introduced to address industrial decline and rural 
under-development in countries of the European periphery, the structural funds 
methodology adopted the principle of additionality which ensures that European funds do 
not distort domestic spending patterns. It also requires substantive input from local and 
regional governments in setting development priorities thus contributing to improving the 
effectiveness of public administration as well as to Europeanisation.Ireland’s high 
growth rates in the post-Cold War era, for example, were underpinned by the 17 billion 
pounds received in total EU support, most of which came from the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds (ESI, 2003: 5).^ *^
At the moment, however, the EU is scaling down financial support to the Western Balkans
micro-credit, should be further promoted (Gligorov et al, 1999: 42-43).
Bulgaria and Romania, for example, accelerated their economic reform programmes after being invited 
to start negotiations for membership in 1999.
According to Radaelli "'Europeanisation refers to the processes o f a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) 
institutionalisation o f formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles 'ways o f doing 
things ’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making o f EU public 
policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic o f domestic discourse, identities, political structures 
and public choices” (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 17).
The lesson from the Greek experience is that structural funds had a higher impact on growth in the late 
1990s when they were combined with sound macro-economic policies and a supply-side competitiveness 
strategy (Petrakos and Pitelis, 2001: 311).
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unsure of what sort of a relationship to promote in the region. The SAP, for example, did not 
grant development aid to the region as was the case with the enhanced pre-accession for 
Bulgaria and Romania prepared both by Agenda 2000 in 1997 and the Copenhagen 
European Council in December 2002 (Van Meurs, 2003: 14). In addition, the Thessaloniki 
European Council of June 2003 did not adopt the proposals for additional funding for 
economic and social cohesion made by the ESI.^^  ^In the absence of a concrete enlargement 
prospect for the Western Balkans, introducing forms of pre-accession assistance into the 
SAP would also strengthen reform processes and governance capacity in the region and 
place the EU in a stronger position to request a credible commitment for the other pillars of 
its policy, such as responsible fiscal policies (ESI, 2003: 1
According to the Belgrade Centre for European Integration (BeCEI), the EU can also 
support policy coordination in the Western Balkans via its own monetary instruments, 
namely euroisation (BeCEI, 2003). Calls for euroisation were first made in the aftermath 
of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. According to Daniel Gros, 
for example, euroisation would have a systemic impact in transforming the political 
economy of Balkan countries by providing full access to international capital markets, 
lower interest rates and certainty over future monetary stability. For the more unstable 
countries, it would also improve debt service capacity by lowering the risk premium 
(Gros, 1999: 11).^ ^^  According to an early assessment by Gligorov et al, however, 
currency boards were seen as a better means of macroeconomic monitoring than 
euroisation (Gligorov et al, 1999). The currency board experiment has generally
ESI recommended that the 'pre-accession status without negotiations' granted to Turkey in 1999 should be 
extended to the Western Balkans (ESI, 2003)
^  More effective tax collection and enforcement of laws that widen the tax base and introduce VAT is 
crucial in addressing the fiscal deficits o f Balkan countries (Gligorov et al, 1999: 38).
Risks, however, include overvalued real wage rates that would negatively affect export capacity 
(Emerson, 1999: 7).
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succeeded in the Balkans. To illustrate, in the first of operation in Bulgaria, inflation fell 
to 1% and GDP turned from a negative to a positive trend while foreign exchange reserves 
tripled (Lewis and Sevic, 2000: 300). The advantages of euroisation, therefore, need to be 
carefully weighed for each country separately especially in light of the decreasing rates of 
inflation in the region and should be accompanied by labour market reforms.^^^
Finally, as suggested in section 8.1 and demonstrated by the Croatian example, the 
enlargement door should also be kept open for regional cooperation to be taken seriously by 
Southeastern European countries. The commitment of Balkan countries to the deepening of 
subregional cooperation should not be taken for granted and will depend on whether their 
leadership will perceive such a process as a contributing factor, not a substitute to their 
aspirations of full membership. At present, for example, regional cooperation is explicitly 
built in the SAAs as a condition to be fulfilled both before they are signed and during their 
implementation and is seen as a prerequisite for ‘potential candidacy’. Only when regional 
cooperation becomes a stepping stone to accession, however, will compliance with the SAP 
conditions become likely and regional cooperation be reconciled with integration 
(Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003). In addition, the EU should clarify the Stability Pact’s 
linkage to the broader integration process.^^^
The complexity of the problems facing Southeastern Europe call for the reconsideration of 
some of the available instruments for conflict prevention, reform assistance and regional 
cooperation in the direction of strengthening the European perspective of the Western
Labour market reforms include bringing down barriers to employment, upgrading training and reducing 
unemployment.
According to Sophia Clement, “os shown by the Nordic example, regional cooperation fa r from being 
a natural development can be created as a consequence o f enlargement (Clement, 2000: 90).
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Balkan countries (van Meurs, 2003: When the political and economic preconditions
for EU candidacy, however, are met subregional cooperation in itself may seem 
unnecessary. Balkan regionalism, therefore, is a temporary arrangement and as such the 
level of expectations from the projects should be lowered. As Joseph Nye wrote in 1968 "it 
is important that the analyst preserve an open, yet skeptical attitude toward regionalism 
and that he try to formulate explicit propositions about its role and limits in local 
peacekeeping, economic development and community-building” (Nye, 1968: xvi).
"A longer process of integration, organised along the lines of functionality and conditionality rather than 
on a regional basis might be the golden mean between the abstract vocation fo r EU membership and 
unrealistic breakthrough models, while at the same time constituting an improvement in the management of  
expectations and apprehensions" (Van Meurs, 2000: 7).
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